Non-Ideal Epistemology in a Social World by Saint-Croix, Catharine
Non-Ideal Epistemology in a Social World
by
Catharine Saint-Croix
A dissertation submitted in partial fulllment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Philosophy)
in the University of Michigan
2018
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, University of Helsinki, Co-Chair
Professor Brian Weatherson, Co-Chair
Professor James Joyce
Associate Professor Ezra Keshet
Associate Professor Eric Swanson

Catharine Saint-Croix
csaintx@umich.edu
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-2863-1739
© Catharine Saint-Croix 2018
For my parents, who supported me at every step; and my brothers,
who I still hope to be like when I grow up.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Dissertations have a way of taking over one’s life, I’ve learned. They
are shaped by inuences large and small, expected and unpredictable,
fortunate and unfortunate. I have been unreasonably fortunate, for my
part. For that good fortune, my family is rst and foremost responsible.
There aren’t many parents who, upon hearing that their child plans to
study philosophy, don’t somuch as raise an eyebrow. There aren’tmany
parents who, upon hearing that their child plans to study philosophy in
graduate school, manage to keep that eyebrow rmly in place. Mom and
Dad, I cannot tell you both how much our weekly phone calls mean to
me. I am truly lucky. I love you both. Thank you. Marty and Joey,
there just aren’t better brothers out there. Aunt Mary Alice, I wish that
we’d been able to spend more time together while I was working on
this project. Every time we sat down for lunch or coee I left feeling
refreshed in purpose and clarity. Thank you. Grandpa and Grandma
Tierney, I miss you both and I hope I’ve made you proud.
My committee, of course, deserves a great deal of recognition as well.
Insofar as this project is comprehensible to anyone outside of my own
head, I owe Maria Lasonen-Aarnio a great debt. Maria provided me
with productive, insightful challenges from the very beginning. She also
showed me how to weave a mess of ideas into a clear tapestry, telling a
iii
single story along the way and cutting out what wasn’t helpful. I can’t
recall a single meeting with Brian Weatherson from which I left with-
out a list of books and articles to read (if not a stack). I owe much of
the cohesiveness and clarity of this project to Brian’s ability to provide
context and grounding. I took advantage of Jim Joyce’s open door all
too often. Thank you, Jim, for entertaining every one of my esoteric
questions about probability and Bayesian epistemology. My backlog
of projects stemming from these conversations is staggering (and ex-
citing). Though a late addition to my committee, Eric Swanson was a
crucial resource, providing incisive comments, context, and criticism.
Ezra Keshet taught me just about everything I know about semantics
and, while neither Heim nor Krazter appears in the dissertation, they
do appear in just about every other project I’m working on these days!
There are many others within the Michigan Philosophy community
who deserve recognition, too. Rich Thomason has been an unwavering
source of encouragement, support, and down-to-earth realism. (And
refuge—I’ll clean out my desk soon!) Jamie Tappenden is among the
kindest, most supportive people I know. Thank you for introducing
me to Somerset Maugham, Jamie. Ishani Maitra has been unfailingly
generous with her time and intellect, and my work has beneted im-
mensely from that generosity. Ken, if I can ever get through it, I’ll send
you a recording of my Cacchione—hopefully, without a nail in it. And,
of course, thank you to Jean and Jude, without whom I’d be at sea.
The “grad space” in Michigan’s philosophy department is a terrible
place to work. The open plan oce we share is far from conducive to
uninterrupted reading, writing, or thought. It is, however, conducive to
iv
wonderful (and helpful) conversation. For those conversations, I want to
thank Sara Aronowitz, Kevin Blackwell, Mara Bollard, Annette Bryson,
KimberlyChuang,MercyCorredor, DanielDrucker, BillyDunaway, Anna
Edmonds, Claire Field, Dmitri Gallow, Reza Hadisi, Johann Harimann,
Rebecca Harrison, Jason Konek (you’ll always be a Last Place Champ to
me), Zoë Johnson King, Sydney Keough, Eduardo Martinez, Cameron
McCulloch, FilipaMeloLopes, Sumeet Patwardhan, Caroline Perry, Adam
Rigoni, Steve Schaus, Umer Shaikh, Alex Silk, Rohan Sud, DamianWas-
sel, and Elise Woodard.
Beyond the Philosophy Department, my research was supported by
fellowships from the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies,
the Susan Lipschutz Award, the Institute for Research on Women and
Gender, the Marshall M. Weinberg Summer Fellowship, and the Wirt
and Mary Cornwell Prize. Many others outside of Michigan provided
support, encouragement, and feedback along the way, but I would es-
pecially like to thank Elizabeth Barnes, Roy Cook, and Georgi Gardiner.
On a dierent note. As we know them, there are nineMuses in Greek
mythology. They guide and guard the creation of comedy and tragedy,
dance and song, history and astronomy, and not one, not two, but three
distinct forms of poetry. However, stretching back to the rst century
BCE, there is somedebate about their number. BeforeHesiod andHomer
— poets, conveniently enough—declared a tripling proliferation among
them, I’m told that the Muses numbered only three in some traditions.
But no three entities, be they goddess, nymph, woman, whathaveyou,
are enough to contain the vicissitudes and eccentricities and of cre-
ative work. In their wisdom and, no doubt, torment, these poets un-
v
derstood that each creative form requires of its supplicants particular
attentions anddevotions. Since therewere nodissertations in their time,
no conference papers, and no graduate seminars, I take the absence of
such Muses to be a simple omission. Having had no opportunity to
make their acquaintance, how could Homer have known them, much
less named them? So, I want to acknowledge these under-appreciated
Muses, whose favorite devotions seem to be daily writing sessions, care-
ful planning, and joy taken in the creative success, however large or
small, of one’s friends. Since I cannot know their names, however, I
address my gratitude in this matter to my friends Robin Dembro, Zoë
Johnson King, and Elise Woodard, whose persistent belief in the power
of steady routine over deadline-inspired binge-writing has surely brought
me into the good graces of these unnamedMuses. At the very least, their
examples, encouragement, and kindness have helpedme become a bet-
ter writer, a better philosopher, and a better human.
To my friends Robin, Damian, Kate, and Frank: thank you. You lis-
tened to me rant, rave, exult, and cry. You kept me grounded through
the worst and the weirdest. You brought color to what would have been
all in gray. You answered the phone and I know you always will. Thank
you. To Sydney and Zoë: you two are models of joy. Your positivity and
generosity are unparalleled. Thank you for being constant reminders
that our discipline can be a wonderful place.
Alex, I have much for which to thank you. You traveled across the
frozen tundra with me (virtually and in real life...), you supported me,
and you believed in me well before I did. Thank you.
Jess. I’ve tried to quantify your support for me over this process, but
vi
it’s been dicult. On the assumption that youmade seven cups of coee
for me per week (which seems low) and three cups of tea, that works out
to something like 4,000 uid ounces of support. But, that’s not quite
accurate. For one thing, it doesn’t factor in the times you left the cof-
fee set up for me in the morning after leaving early for work. It also
misses the comforting hot chocolate, the strange and delightful shrub-
based concoctions, and the well-timed whiskey. It’s also insuciently
dierentiated. For example, the support value (S-value) of the coee
with which you’d bribe me out of bed in the morning obviously dwarfs
that of the third coee of the day. And the coee that miraculously ar-
rived just as I was sure I couldn’t possibly read another page clearly has
an S-value that’s o the charts. So does the warm encouragement that
came with it. To make matters worse, the 4,000 uid ounces don’t ac-
count for foodstus at all! While I think I can estimate the number of
meals we made together and the total tonnage of terrible Chinese food
we ordered, I don’t know where to begin with relative S-values for these
things. Even if I could settle on the S-values (and then do the requisite
conversions), none of this even begins to address the hours you spent
planning our time away from work, your reassurance that it really is
okay to do something other than write for a day, or your unquestioning
certainty in the value of my work. I can count up the hours we spent on
road trips, at drag shows, and in aquariums... But I just don’t know how
to convert all of these units into kindness and care and love. So, in lieu
of all that: thank you for love and support beyond measure.
Doubtless, there are contributors to this project I’ve neglected herein.
Please accept my apologies—I owe you a beer.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii
LIST OF FIGURES x
ABSTRACT xi
CHAPTER
I. Introduction 1
II. Privilege and Superiority: Formal Tools for Standpoint
Epistemology 5
2.1 Standpoint Epistemology 8
2.2 Inclusivity as a Normative Goal 14
2.3 The Nature of Privilege 17
2.4 The Model 34
2.5 Occupying a Standpoint 53
2.6 Inclusivity and Deference 66
2.7 The Role of the Political 72
III. Evidence in a Non-Ideal World 76
3.1 Coins, Sharks, and Terrorists 78
3.2 Evidential & Ideological Distortion 86
3.3 Epistemic Consequences 92
3.4 Structural Epistemic Injustice & Responsibility 111
IV. I Know You Are, But What Am I? 117
viii
4.1 Methodology 119
4.2 The Foundation of Social Identity: Social Roles 125
4.3 The Dimensions of Social Identity 132
4.4 Upshots 147
4.5 Alternative Accounts 158
4.6 Conclusion 167
BIBLIOGRAPHY 168
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
2.1 A = {vA}, E(w) = {W} 49
2.2 A = {v1, vA}, E(w) = {{w},W} 49
2.3 A = {v1, v2, vA}, E(w) = {{w}, {u},W} 50
2.4 E(w) = {{w,y}, {y, u},W} 50
2.5 Adding a source v toM 56
2.6 E(w) = {{w,y}, {y, u}, {w,u},W} 60
x
ABSTRACT
Idealization is a necessity. Stripping away levels of complexitymakes
questions tractable, focuses our attention, and lets us develop compre-
hensible, testable models. Applying such models, however, requires
care and attention to how the idealizations incorporated into their de-
velopment aect their predictions. In epistemology, we tend to focus on
idealizations concerning individual agents’ capacities, such as memory,
mathematical ability, and so on, when addressing this concern. By con-
trast, this dissertation focuses on social idealizations, particularly those
pertaining to salient social categories like race, sex, and gender.
In Chapter II, Privilege and Superiority, we begin with standpoint epis-
temology, one of the earliest eorts to grapple with the ways that so-
cial structures aect our epistemic lives. I argue that, if we interpret
standpoint epistemologists’ claims as hypotheses about the ways that
our social positions aect access to evidence, we can fruitfully employ
recent developments in evidence logic to study the consequences. I lay
the groundwork for this project, developing a model based on neigh-
borhood semantics for modal logic. Adapting this framework to stand-
point epistemology helps to clarify themeaning of terms like “epistemic
privilege” and “superior knowledge” and to elucidate the dierences
between various accounts of standpoint epistemology. I also address
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a longstanding criticism of these views: Longino’s (1990) bias paradox,
which suggests that there is no objective position from which to judge
the goodness of a particular standpoint.
Chapter III, Evidence in a Non-Ideal World, turns to the broader so-
cial context, looking at how ideology aects the availability of evidence.
Throughout the chapter, I take the formation, justication, and main-
tenance of racist, sexist, and otherwise oppressive beliefs as a central
case. I argue that these beliefs are, at least sometimes, formed as a result
of evidential distortion, a structural feature of our epistemic contexts
that skews readily available evidence in favor of dominant ideologies.
Because they are formed this way, such beliefs will appear justied on
prominent accounts of justication, both internalist and externalist. As
a result, epistemic norms that fail to account for such non-ideal con-
ditions will deliver verdicts that are not only counter-intuitive, but also
morally unpalatable. This, I argue, reveals a kind of structural epistemic
injustice, especially where oppressive ideology is involved and suggests
the need for epistemic norms that are sensitive to agents’ social contexts.
Much of the discussion in Chapters II and III depends on social cate-
gories like race and gender, arguing that they have a distinctive inuence
on our epistemic lives. In Chapter IV, I KnowYou Are, ButWhat Am I?, my
co-author and I focus on social categories themselves, distinguishing be-
tween self-identity, social identity, and social role.1 We self-identify as gay
or straight, men or women, couch-potatoes or gym rats. Sometimes,
these identities aect our social roles — the way we are perceived and
treated by others — and sometimes they do not. This relationship be-
1Co-authored with Dr. Robin Dembro.
xii
tween our internal identities and our preferred public perceptions begs
for explanation. On our account, this relationship is captured by what
we refer to as ‘social identity’ — roughly, internal identities made avail-
able to others. We argue that this account of social identity plays an illu-
minating role in structural explanation of discrimination and individual
behavior, dissolves puzzles surrounding the phenomenon of ‘passing’,
and explains certain moral and political obligations toward individuals.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Idealization is a necessity. Stripping away levels of complexitymakes
questions tractable, focuses our attention, and lets us develop compre-
hensible, testable models. Applying such models, however, requires
care and attention to how the idealizations incorporated into their de-
velopment aect their predictions. In epistemology, we tend to focus
on idealizations concerning individual agents’ capacities, such as mem-
ory, mathematical ability, and so on, when addressing this concern. By
contrast, this dissertation focuses on the eect of social idealizations,
particularly those pertaining to salient social categories like race, sex,
and gender.
Chapter II. Privilege and Superiority We begin with standpoint epis-
temology, one of the earliest eorts to grapple with the ways that social
structures aect our epistemic lives. Standpoint epistemology is a cor-
nerstone of feminist philosophy. Proponents of this view argue that (1)
inhabiting a social position provides onewith a distinct epistemic stand-
point, (2) in virtue of occupying that standpoint, an individual has epis-
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temic privilege with respect to certain relevant propositions (eg: only
women can know what it’s like to be a woman), and (3) because of that
epistemic privilege, individuals occupying those standpoints are likely
to have superior knowledge about topics relevant to their standpoint (eg:
individuals occupying oppressed or marginalized standpoints have su-
perior knowledge about oppression and how it works in society). These
ideas are an essential starting point for both epistemic and moral de-
fenses of inclusivity, explanations of testimonial injustice, and so on.
Surprisingly, however, relatively little work has been done on the logic
of standpoint epistemology. In part, this is because defenses of stand-
point epistemology have often been so deeply entrenched in their polit-
ical aims that conventional epistemology has struggled to see what else
standpoint theorists’ observations can oer.
Chapter II argues that, if we interpret standpoint epistemologists’
claims as hypotheses about the ways that our social positions aect our
access to evidence, we can fruitfully employ recent developments in
evidence logic to study the consequences. I then lay the groundwork
for this project, developing a model based on neighborhood semantics
for modal logic. Recently, van Benthem and Pacuit (2011b) have demon-
strated that neighborhood semantics provides a way to capture the rich-
ness of individual agents’ evidence, especiallywhere that evidence arises
from dierent sources and, as a result, supports dierent conclusions.
Adapting this framework to standpoint epistemologyhelps to demon-
strate the broader signicance of the view, clarify the meaning of terms
like “epistemic privilege” and “superior knowledge” and to elucidate the
dierences between various accounts of standpoint epistemology, in
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particular those oered by Collins (2002) and Hartsock (1983b). I also
address a longstanding criticism of these views: Longino’s (1990) bias
paradox, which suggests that there is no objective epistemic position
from which to judge the quality of privilege or superiority of a particu-
lar standpoint.
Chapter III. Evidence in aNon-IdealWorld Where Chapter II focuses
on the view from the margins, Chapter III turns to the broader social
context, looking at how ideology aects the availability of evidence. I
take the formation, justication, and maintenance of racist, sexist, and
otherwise oppressive beliefs as a central case throughout the chapter.
I argue that these beliefs are, at least sometimes, formed as a result
of evidential distortion, a structural feature of our epistemic contexts
that skews readily available evidence in favor of dominant ideologies.
Because they are formed this way, such beliefs will appear justied on
prominent accounts of justication, both internalist and externalist. As
a result, epistemic norms that fail to account for such non-ideal con-
ditions will deliver verdicts that are not only counter-intuitive, but also
morally unpalatable. This, I argue, reveals a kind of structural epistemic
injustice, especially where oppressive ideology is involved and suggests
the need for epistemic norms that are sensitive to agents’ social contexts.
Chapter IV. I Know You Are, But What Am I?1 Much of the discus-
sion in Chapters II and III depends on social categories like race and
gender, arguing that they have a distinctive inuence on our epistemic
1Co-authored with Dr. Robin Dembro.
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lives. In Chapter IV,my co-author and I focus on social categories them-
selves, distinguishing between self-identity, social identity, and social role.
We self-identify as gay or straight, men or women, couch-potatoes or
gym rats. Sometimes, these identities aect our social roles — the way
we are perceived and treated by others — and sometimes they fail to do
so. This relationship between our internal identities and our preferred
public perceptions begs for explanation. On our account, this relation-
ship is captured by what we refer to as ‘social identity’ — roughly, in-
ternal identities made available to others. We argue that this account
of social identity plays an illuminating role in structural explanation of
discrimination and individual behavior, dissolves puzzles surrounding
the phenomenon of ‘passing’, and explains certain moral and political
obligations toward individuals.
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CHAPTER II
Privilege and Superiority: Formal Tools for
Standpoint Epistemology
How does being a woman aect one’s epistemic life? What about be-
ing black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social posi-
tions can give rise to a form of epistemic privilege. Through that privi-
lege, thosewhooccupy standpoints gain access to evidence, group knowl-
edge, sui generis ways of knowing, or some other distinctive epistemic
good. Whatever form this privilege takes, the resulting epistemic supe-
riority has far-reaching implications for our epistemic communities, es-
pecially where their inquiries concern the social groups associated with
standpoints. In particular, standpoint theorists argue, we have an obliga-
tion— epistemic, moral, or both— to include occupants of these stand-
points in such inquiries.
“Privilege” and “superiority” aremurky concepts, however. Critics of
standpoint theory argue that they are oered without a clear explana-
tion of how standpoints confer their benets, what those benets are, or
why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. The view, ar-
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gue Longino (1993) and Hekman (1997), risks conating justice with truth
or indulging in relativism. Others worry that the view is trivial, merely
overstating the observation that what we know is shaped by the lives we
live. Either way, these concepts are left in need of clarication. Absent
such clarication, the central questions of standpoint epistemology are
dicult to formulate precisely, much less answer. As a result, standpoint
theory has had little uptake in conventional epistemology.
But this need not be so. This goal of this paper is to articulate and de-
fend a version of standpoint epistemology that avoids these criticisms,
coheres with conventional epistemology, and supports the normative
goals of its feminist forerunners. In the rst part of the paper, I draw on
the work of Collins (2002) and Harding (1992), arguing that we ought to
characterize the privilege gained by occupying a standpoint in terms of
expert evidential support relations rather than knowledge. As I’ll show,
we can account for the force of standpoint theorists’ normative conclu-
sions in purely epistemic terms on this view, thereby evading conven-
tional epistemology’s discomfort with assigning normative signicance
to political, moral, and other non-epistemic forms of value.1 More-
over, this shift in focus to expert evidential support relations opens the
door tomodeling techniques that track the inuence of standpoints (and
standpoint-based testimony) on an agent’s beliefs. The second half of
this paper develops such a model and demonstrates how it can be used
1 This is not to suggest that such political and moral justications are any less com-
pelling. Rather, the goal is to provide an adequate, purely epistemic basis for the nor-
mative force of standpoint epistemology’s central normative observations and render
important aspects of the notion of a standpoint tractable within a conventional frame-
work. Happily, this is a case in which our epistemic, moral, and political obligations
go hand-in-hand.
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to precisify and begin exploring someof standpoint epistemology’s core
questions: What does occupying a standpoint involve? How does it af-
fect an agent’s other doxastic states? How should non-occupants interact
with standpoints?
We’ll proceed as follows. §2.1 takes a closer look at standpoint episte-
mology and its critics. Standpoint epistemology has a rich history full of
many dierent approaches, so the goal of this section is to narrow our
sights, clarifying the assumptions we’ll adopt and focusing our atten-
tion on a particular subset of standpoint epistemologies. §2.2 explains
the goal of inclusivity and introduces a worry about whether standpoint
epistemology can support a convincingly feminist version of that goal.
As we’ll see, this seems to depend, at least in part, on the kind of priv-
ilege with which standpoints supply their occupants. We turn to the
task of characterizing that privilege in §2.3, where I argue that expert
evidential support relations are a natural, plausible candidate. Building
on this account, §2.4 develops our model, drawing on van Benthem and
Pacuit’s (2011b) dynamic logic for evidence-based belief. §2.5 and §2.6
focus agents’ interactions with standpoints, demonstrating how we can
apply thismodel to the questions of what itmeans to occupy a standpoint
and hownon-occupants ought to interact with occupants’ testimony, re-
spectively. Finally, §2.7 returns to the political and empirical claims that
ground standpoint theory in actual social hierarchies, illustrating their
circumstantial role in deriving the content of the epistemic norms this
account delivers.
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2.1 Standpoint Epistemology
Standpoint epistemology begins from the observation that our social
situations shape our interactions with evidence, belief, and knowledge.
To an extent, this idea is uncontroversial. An auto mechanic, for exam-
ple, may take the evidence gained from listening to an engine to sup-
port very dierent conclusions from those at which someone without
the same training and experience would arrive. An oncologist will take
their observation of a CAT scan to support dierent conclusions than
you or I might gather from the same observation. And, given that their
training and experiencemake both expertsmore likely to be right, these
facts have clear normative implications: if youwant to knowmore about
that lump or that strange rattling, you should talk to a professional. Or,
more generally, good epistemic agents should defer to experts.2
It is not only auto mechanics, oncologists, and other obvious experts
to whom we owe epistemic deference, however. Standpoint theorists
argue that occupants of social positions like gender, race, and other so-
cially salient categories can—under certain circumstances— demand a
similar kind of recognition. We owe deference to those who occupy the
standpoint of women on matters with for which occupying that stand-
point makes themmore likely to be right, such as how sexismmanifests
in the workplace and whether certain behaviors are threatening or of-
fensive to women.
Being an expert and occupying a standpoint are also similar in that
inhabiting the social position associated with them — being employed
2cf. Lewis (1981); Pettigrew and Titelbaum (2014)
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as an oncologist, being a woman — is not a sucient condition for ei-
ther status. The former requires education and training, while the latter,
standpoint theorists argue, requires attending to the prevailing, hierar-
chical social conditions. While some early variants of standpoint epis-
temology, such as Rose (1983), appear to advocate automatic privilege in
virtue of social location, we will adopt the more robust, more common
approach taken by Collins (2002), Harding (1992), Smith (1997) and oth-
ers, which requires that standpoints be achieved rather than given.3 A
key advantage of this kind of view is that it suggests a distinctive kind
of content for the epistemic privilege conferred by occupying a stand-
point and, in doing so, grounds our analogywith expertise. According to
Wylie (2013), achieved standpoints “put the critically conscious knower
in a position to grasp the eects of power relations on their own under-
standing and that of others,” (p. 5). As we’ll see, this kind of restriction
is essential to the goal of providing epistemically-motivated inclusivity
norms. Without it, the vast variation among those within particular so-
cial groups — think Janet Mock and Ann Coulter — makes it dicult
to see what kind of unied epistemic incentive could possibly justify
group-specic inclusivity norms.
For this reason, it will be useful to make explicit the distinction be-
tween inhabiting a social position (or location, role, group, etc.) and occupying
the standpoint associated with such a position. The former merely de-
scribes the social situation of the agent, whereas the latter involves (at
3 Wylie (2013) points out that both Harding (1992) and Smith (1997) explicitly reject
characterizations of their early work on which standpoints are reduced to social loca-
tion.
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least) a claim about her attitudes toward that social situation.4
This notion — that social categories can generate standpoints that
provide their occupants with legitimate, distinctive epistemic goods —
is one of three key claims to which standpoint theorists generally ad-
here. The second is that the social hierarchies in which these categories
are embedded incentivize dominant groups to devalue or ignore tes-
timony arising from subordinate standpoints.5 Whether through out-
right prejudice, motivated reasoning, or some other epistemic short-
coming, dominant social positions (and the standpoints associated with
them) come with negative evaluations of the epistemic products of sub-
ordinate standpoints, unduly discounting the unfamiliar epistemic prac-
tices of those groups. Together, the rst two commitments provide con-
text for the last: obligations of inclusion and deference. Standpoint the-
orists argue that epistemic (and moral) normativity requires inquirers
to include occupants of relevant standpoints in their epistemic com-
munities and treat their contributions with deference. Excluding them,
they argue, ensures a less objective, less successful inquiry. As to why,
however, views diverge.
For early standpoint theorists, this claim was based on the idea that
the standpoints of the oppressed reect reality, whereas ideology clouds
the epistemic practice of those in dominant social positions. At rst
glance, this may seem like a natural extension of the previous point,
with the thought being something like this: in virtue of experiencing
4 There’s a question in the background here about whether those in relatively dom-
inant social positions can occupy a standpoint in the relevant sense. I will not take a
stance one way or another. For reasons that will become clear below, both views are
compatible with the relatively minimal account described herein.
5 See, for example,Mills (2005).
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oppression through the lens of an understanding of oppressive social
relations, one comes to an otherwise dicult to obtain understanding
of how that position shapes one’s experiences and outcomes. We will
take up a view along these lines below, but the early standpoint theo-
rists, such as (Hartsock, 1983a), paint a rather dierent picture. On this
view, certain social locations themselves foster more accurate beliefs, not
only concerning one’s own social position, but also the social and nat-
ural world more broadly. Against a Marxist background, for example,
Hartsock (1983a) argues that,
. . . there are some perspectives on society from which, how-
ever well-intentioned one may be, the real relations of hu-
mans with each other and with the natural world are not visi-
ble. (p. 285)
On Hartsock’s view, the standpoint of women is a product of sexual di-
vision of labor, by which she means both the institutionalized expecta-
tions about women’s work and the fact that (currently) only those who
are assigned female at birth are capable of child-bearing. These factors
generate epistemic privilege because they focus women’s attention on
. . . a world in which the emphasis is on change rather than
stasis, a world characterized by interaction with natural sub-
stances rather than separation from nature, a world in which
quality is more important than quantity, a world in which the
unication of mind and body is inherent in the activities per-
formed. (p. 290)
These features form an epistemic practice that allows women to cut
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through the ideological fog, leading them to better overall beliefs. So,
the way women’s lives are lived is responsible for the very broad form
of epistemic privilege Hartsock’s account suggests. The reason that in-
quiries lacking women inquirers are less successful, therefore, is simply
that they are composed entirely of sub-par inquirers.
There is a fundamental tension in this version of the project, how-
ever. As Longino (1993, p. 106-7) points out, if the claim is that epis-
temic success in general depends on the correctness of the standpoint
from which one engages with the world, then this must be true of our
judgments about standpoints, too. On this view, however, such judg-
ments are the product of a particular social theory. Since knowledge of
such theories also requires that one approach the question froma correct
standpoint, we need a way to identify that correct standpoint, which will
also need to be identied by a correct social theory, and so on. So, the
prospects for nding a neutral position fromwhich to judge the relative
truth-aptness of one standpoint against another seem grim. Moreover,
if we assume that the justifying theory is the same one that justied our
initial judgment, we’re in a worryingly circular situation. One couldwell
imagine that the very dierent standpoints (such as socially dominant
ones) would provide similarly circular structures, leaving no way to dis-
criminate between the two. Even if there is a unique correct standpoint
(or collection thereof), a convincing means of identication is elusive.
For Longino, this suggest the stronger claim that standpoint theorists
cannot be committed to the existence of objectively privileged stand-
points. Those who occupy standpoints may indeed gain knowledge,
she argues, but this does not imply that their standpoint is better than
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any other. Without intrinsic superiority, however, a dilemma emerges.
Since standpoints generate conicting doxastic commitments, we must
either adopt a kind of relativism, so that the beliefs and knowledge aris-
ing from a particular standpoint are judged according to the standards
thereof, or we need a way of integrating them (ibid.).
Relativism is dicult to squarewith the epistemic andpolitical projects
at hand, however. If knowledge is relative, then those occupying domi-
nant standpoints are simply correct— the fact that someone has knowl-
edge to the contrary becomes irrelevant. On this horn of the dilemma,
there is no clear route to an epistemic incentive for inclusivity. So, this
paper will set relativist approaches aside. There may be other reasons
to adopt such approaches, but it is neither essential to standpoint epis-
temology nor conducive to our goals.
For Longino, the fact that both horns of this dilemma require “the
abandonment or the supplementation of standpoint as an epistemic
criterion” is a signicant problem for standpoint epistemology (ibid.).
However, as we pursue the second option — nding a way to integrate
the conicting epistemic products of dierent standpoints — we’ll see
that supplementation is a feature, not a bug. We’ll take an approach
closer to those of Harding (1992) and Collins (2002), both of which pro-
vide amoremodest rendering of standpoints’ epistemic privilege. These
accounts suggest that privilege is product of a particular way of under-
standing experiences that are unavailable to those who do not inhabit
the relevant social location. So, standpoints are not a universal epis-
temic criterion with the power to determine the nature of ideal epis-
temic agents on this kind of view. The role of a social theory changes
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here, too. Instead of explaining which standpoint is the most correct,
the main role of social theory (as we’ll see) is to explain why the epis-
temic resources that certain standpoints can oer their epistemic com-
munities are so easily ignored. As a result, Longino’s original worry
about the well-foundedness of standpoint epistemology doesn’t get o
the ground. Nevertheless, because this picture abandons the idea that
standpoints are a universal epistemic criterion, it implies that there is
no unique “correct” standpoint. So, we remain saddled with the task
required by the second horn: integration.
Returning to the question with which we began this digression, views
along these lines also provide a clear, if very dierent, explanation of
when and how the concept of superiority relates to the privilege stand-
points provide. On these less universalist views, an inquiry excluding
standpoint occupantswill be less objective and less successfulwhen those
individuals have access to relevant, otherwise unavailable epistemic goods.
We return to questions of what those epistemic goods look like and how
they support inclusivity in §2.3. For now, we turn to inclusivity itself.
2.2 Inclusivity as a Normative Goal
The goal of standpoint epistemology is to provide an argument for
the claim that inquiry in the social sciences, if not beyond, must pro-
ceed from and include the perspectives of women, racial minorities,
and other subjects of research whose voices are likely to be marginal-
ized as a result of their social location (Harding, 1992, Ch. 2). Articu-
lating this goal involves setting out two kinds of norms: individual-level
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norms concerning deference to standpoint occupants’ testimony, which
we’ll return to in §2.6, and our present concern, community-level norms
about inclusivity. These are norms governing how our epistemic com-
munities ought to be organized. After all, norms about how to interact
with standpoint occupants are somewhat inconsequential if our epis-
temic communities systematically exclude such individuals. So, what
does it mean to include someone in an epistemic community?
Generally, including someone in an epistemic community means
that they are able to contribute to knowledge production — that their
testimony is received by that community and inuences its course.6
While anything tting this description is better than outright exclusion,
it allows for what I’ll call the harvest response to standpoint theory, a wor-
ryingly weak way of fullling the goal of inclusivity:
Even if standpoint epistemologists are right about privilege
and superiority, communities of inquiry can discharge their
epistemic obligations by simply harvesting the knowledge of
the relevant communities. All this requires that a community
recognize that they require the testimony of standpoint occu-
pants, gather that testimony, and incorporate it into their ev-
idence, then return to its work. Continually involving stand-
point occupants is unnecessary.
Should the harvesters realize that standpoint-privileged testimony is
once again necessary, they can simply return to the orchard. Anemic as
itmay be, harvesting testimony like this does allow standpoint occupants
6While the nature of epistemic inclusivity appears to be somewhat under-theorized
in general, notable references includeDotson (2014), Langton (2009), and Fricker (2007).
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to contribute to knowledge formation — harvesting, then, is a form of
inclusivity. Let’s call it opportunistic:
Opportunistic Inclusivity. Include occupants of a particular
standpoint only when you believe (a) that their testimony is
likely to be relevant, and (b) that its content is otherwise inac-
cessible.
While this consultation-like approach may be appropriate to certain
tasks, it is nevertheless inadequate to feminists’ aims.7 For the target
cases — stable epistemic communities in the social sciences — rectify-
ing the problem requires a more substantive endpoint. Those who are
excluded ought to be brought in, be considered part of the inquiry, and
be given the opportunity to play an ongoing role:
Stable Inclusivity. Include occupants of relevant standpoints
throughout the inquiry, regardless of whether (a) or (b) holds.
The relevant form of inclusivity is not achieved by merely taking epis-
temic goods from those who continue to be excluded.8 For this rea-
son, the obligation to “study up” from marginalized lives, as Harding
(2009) puts it, seems under-specied, involving no standing obligation
to maintain that standpoint as an ongoing inuence. In order to merit
7 For example, depending on how one understands the purpose and responsibili-
ties of political representation (cf. Pitkin (1967)), it may be the case that a good elected
representative ought to consult with their constituencywhen the conditions ofOppor-
tunistic Inclusivity aremet and otherwise leave them be, even where that constituency
is marginalized.
8 Additionally, Opportunistic Inclusivity presents a signicant risk for the kind of
testimonial injustice Miranda Fricker explores in Epistemic Injustice. Continuing to ex-
clude marginalized individuals from the epistemic community leaves their status as
knowers dubious and, as a result, provides an obviousmeans bywhich prejudicemight
infect the community’s response to their testimony.
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the name, then, an account of feminist standpoint epistemology ought
to support Stable, not merely Opportunistic, Inclusivity.
If the epistemic benet of a standpoint is encapsulated entirely by
the knowledge produced in virtue of occupying it, however, it seems as
if those benets are available to anyone willing to harvest them. As a re-
sult, such accounts may be unable to justify the stronger norm, thereby
falling short of feminists’ moral and political aims. So, our question is
two-fold: what kind of epistemic privileges do standpoints create and
does an epistemically appropriate response to such privileges involve
Stable Inclusivity?
2.3 The Nature of Privilege
Epistemic privilege is at the heart of standpoint theorists’ arguments
for inclusivity and deference. Exactly what it means to say that stand-
points confer privilege is often unclear, however. In the less universalist
accounts we’re targeting, what kind of privilege do standpoints provide?
How do they provide it? What is its scope?
At the very least, standpoints provide access to a certain kind of evi-
dence— the experience of what it’s like to occupy the social location as-
sociated with that standpoint (henceforth,WIL-evidence). For example,
onlywomen can experience being awoman and, therefore, onlywomen
have access to that kind of phenomenal evidence. This is the same kind
of privilege bats have with respect to phenomenal evidence concerning
what it’s like to be a bat (Nagel, 1974). In this form, the privilege thesis is
relatively uncontroversial for conventional epistemologists. Moreover,
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access to evidence is widely regarded as a fundamental part of privilege
among standpoint theorists. But it can’t be the full story.
Our discussion so far has laid out several desiderata for an adequate
(and adequately feminist) account of the standpoint-privilege thesis: (1)
provide a plausible story about what privileges standpoints confer and
how they do so, (2) distinguish inhabiting a social position from occu-
pying a standpoint, (3) explain how privilege provides epistemically-
grounded support for Stable Inclusivity, and (4) support exploration of
standpoint epistemology’s central questions from theperspective of con-
ventional epistemology, in particular questions concerning the nature
of occupancy and the content of deference norms. To meet these goals,
I’ll argue, it will be helpful to characterize the privilege derived from
standpoints in terms of otherwise unavailable (or unlikely) expert evi-
dential support relations. By this, I mean to pick out relationships be-
tween the evidence one acquires and the propositions they take that ev-
idence to support. For example, someone occupying the standpoint of
U.S. Muslim womenmight learn that that look indicates a certain kind of
subtle prejudice. This is not to suggest that evidential support relations
encapsulate every aspect of what it means to occupy a standpoint, how-
ever. Rather, the goal of this section is to locate a plausible, relatively
minimal characterization of occupying a standpoint that meets the cri-
teria above and falls within the scope of conventional epistemology.9
Of course, the weaker accounts of privilege we’ll look at — such as the
qualia-like account above — will be both plausible and minimal. Being
9 While I’ll argue that expert evidential support relations t the bill, it is, of course,
possible that nothing does. In that case, the appropriate response would be to revise
the desiderata, accept a partial solution, or abandon the project.
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unable to meet these desiderata, however, they are inapt candidates for
a form of privilege relevant to standpoint theorists’ goals.
Given the prominent role of knowledge in the literature on stand-
point theory, the absence of knowledge as an explicit element of the
target characterization requires some explanation. So, let’s begin with
knowledge-based accounts.
2.3.1 Privilege as Knowledge
Standpoint theorists often discuss privilege in terms of group knowl-
edge shared among those who occupy a standpoint.10 At the outset,
this seems to cohere nicely with the goal of developing a formal model
for standpoint epistemology — there are plenty of well-known, well-
behaved logics for knowledge, which bodes well for our fourth desider-
atum. As we’ll see, however, knowledge-based accounts of privilege that
support Stable Inclusivity not only bear a striking resemblance to ac-
counts that locate privilege in evidential support relations but also bring
troubles of their own.
PhenomenalKnowledge. As a rst pass, a very conservative account of
privilegemight simply build on the access to evidence thesis, limiting its
scope to knowledge directly resulting from that evidence. So, the priv-
ilege associated with the standpoint of women would consist of access
toWIL-evidence about being a woman and, as a result, WIL-knowledge
of the same.11
10 cf. Collins (1998),Rose (1983), Hartsock (1983a), etc.
11 Note that this does not need to be identiable to the agent under the guise of
knowledge of what it’s like to be a woman.
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This account has twomajor advantages: it provides a fairly clear, un-
controversial account of the content of privilege (though the question
of what the experience of women might be complicates this) and the
privilege involved is a consequence of widely accepted ideas about the
conditions under which one can acquire WIL-knowledge. In particu-
lar, the idea that one cannot gain this kind of WIL-knowledge without
having the relevant experience.12 In sum, it’s an inoensive view.
Unfortunately, it’s also inadequate. The same featuresmake this highly
circumscribed account of privilege anodyne undermine its ability to
support community-level inclusivity norms. If the only way to gain the
privileged knowledge to which standpoints provide access is to occupy
the standpoint, then testimony cannot be used to share that knowledge.13
In other words, everything that privilege supplies is conned to occu-
pants of the same standpoint, meaning that desideratum (3) is not met.
So, while important and relatively uncontroversial, this kind of rst-
personal WIL-knowledge isn’t enough.
Phenomenal Knowledge + Closure. There is an obvious extension of
this conservative account, however: closure. On this view, privilege
consists not only in the knowledge derived from otherwise unavailable
WIL-evidence, but also in access to the consequences of adding that
knowledge to what’s otherwise knowable. While it might be impos-
12 This is one of the common conclusions drawn from Jackson’s (1982) discussion of
whatMary learns when she has the experience of seeing red for the rst time. Knowing
all of the physical facts about vision, light, and so forth does not provide this kind of
knowledge.
13See Cath (2018) for extended discussion of the relationship between testimony and
WIL-knowledge.
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sible to convey exact phenomenal knowledge directly (as the previous
account would require), we can analogize that experience and convey
important elements of it.
Muchof our knowledge aboutwhat various experiences are likeworks
this way. For example, one way to gain this kind of knowledge concern-
ing what it’s like to eat a ghost pepper is to eat one and, after recovering,
develop accurate beliefs about your phenomenal experience by relating
it to other experiences you’ve had— eating a ghost pepper ismore like eating
a jabañero than eating a cucumber, eating a ghost pepper is a catastrophically
painful experience. Another way to gain this kind of one-step-removed
WIL-knowledge is to accept someone else’s testimony.14 The dierence
between ghost peppers and standpoints, of course, is that the experience
of eating a ghost pepper is available to anyone foolhardy enough to try
it. This is also the kind of testimonial exchange at the heart of powerful
works like Coates’s (2015) Between the World and Me and Serano’s (2016)
Whipping Girl. Neither author can directly convey their experience, but
the authors’ ability to relate their experience makes these important re-
sources for readers outside the authors’ social locations.15
While this clearly goes a long way toward doing the work standpoints
are meant to do, it remains inadequate. As we saw in §2.1, awareness of
the role of social location in shaping the lives and experiences of the
oppressed is an essential aspect of standpoint theory. Without reason to
14 Granted, the quality of the knowledge gained this way may depend on how relat-
able the hearer’s experience is. Without some catastrophically painful experience to
relate to, the hearer’s understanding of the speaker’s testimonymay not be particularly
vivid.
15 Of course, there are many other reasons such works are important to individuals
who share the authors’ social locations.
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think that such an understandingmust permeate all of this type ofWIL-
knowledge, this account allows one to occupy a standpoint in virtue
of having other WIL-knowledge concerning that social location. Since
(nearly) anyone who inhabits a social location is thereby in a position to
gain such knowledge, this account eectively collapse standpoints into
social locations. So, desideratum (2) cannot be met.16
One might think there’s a way out here, however. Perhaps there’s a
worthwhile distinction to be made between piecemeal knowledge con-
cerning what it’s like to be a woman, which might be any bit of knowl-
edge tting the prole described in this section, and knowledge of what
it’s like to be a woman simpliciter, which is a more holistic enterprise. It
is this latter, holistic WIL-knowledge that should be our focus.
While I agree that there is such a distinction, I don’t think it’s one
that standpoint epistemologists ought to hang their hats on. First, this
genuine, holistic knowledge of womanhood is exceedingly dicult to
acquire, if not entirely non-existent. Setting aside the concern that this
presumes there to be such a privileged, univocal body of knowledge
constituting knowledge of womanhood, this suggestion requires that
knowledge of womanhood necessarily involves an understanding of so-
cial hierarchies and the like. This implies that such knowledge is only
available to those who have the privilege of an education (formal or oth-
erwise) that would provide them with such concepts. This may or may
not be appropriate to the notion of occupying a standpoint, but it is
certainly inappropriate to the concept of knowing what it’s like to be
a woman. The same goes for Blackness, or disability, or any other so-
16 This worry applies to the previous account as well.
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cial group. Second, and relatedly, this seems like an uncharitable way
to discount the experiences and testimony of women whose circum-
stances or political views prevent them from incorporating these con-
cepts into their knowledge of their social position. Even in the case of
Phyllis Schlay, a famously anti-feminist political activist, it seems quite
implausible to deny that she had genuine WIL-knowledge concerning
womanhood in virtue of having had the experience of living as a woman
— and she could share that knowledge, right alongside her misguided
beliefs about what’s best for women and why society treats them way it
does. Similarly, to claim that someone in the clutches of ex-gay con-
version therapy doesn’t know what it’s like to be gay seems straight-
forwardly incorrect. The fact that one’s knowledge is partial or cast in
less-than-maximally-illuminating terms does not prevent it from be-
ing knowledge. Most importantly, this very particular notion of what
constitutes WIL-knowledge of a social location goes well beyond the
specication of phenomenal knowledge + closure without giving much of
a story about how and why a successful agent’s knowledge of woman-
hood ends up lookingmore likeOprahWinfrey’s than Phyllis Schlay’s.
So, this move puts our rst desideratum in jeopardy as well. We’ll look
at a contentful supplementation of phenomenal knowledge that avoids
these issues in the next section, but this isn’t a promising way to save the
current account.
Another reason standpoint theorists ought to avoid the phenomenal
knowledge + closure account of the standpoint-privilege thesis is that it
permits Opportunistic Inclusivity. On this view, knowledge of how the
standpoint’s phenomenal knowledge relates to other propositions is not
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privileged. That knowledge is available to non-occupants — standpoint
occupants just ll in the gaps, so to speak. So, at least in principle, non-
occupants can know exactly when the testimony of standpoint occu-
pantswill be necessary. They can gather the relevant testimony as needed
and return to their inquiry, excluding the standpoint occupant. Because
of this, this account of privilege does not provide strong support for Sta-
ble Inclusivity, thus coming up short with respect to desideratum (3).
There’s clearly something amiss about this last argument, however.
For the cases we’re interested in, non-occupants don’t tend to know how
standpoint occupants will respond to new evidence. There are two note-
worthy features of this observation. First, realizing that oneneeds knowl-
edge that a particular standpoint would be able to provide is itself some-
thing that might require occupying that standpoint.17 Consider, for ex-
ample, taking your car to the mechanic. Sometimes, it’s clear that the
car needs to be xed — the Check Engine light goes on, there’s a ter-
rible squealing coming from the serpentine belt, etc. This isn’t always
the case, however. What seems like no problem at all to you — your
tire tread looks a bit worn, your brakes are kind of squishy, the sound
from the engine changed a little — might be exactly the kind of thing a
mechanic would worry about based on their experience and expertise.
But, since that evidence doesn’t indicate the need to go to your expert
from your perspective, you don’t. (This, of course, is part of why regu-
17 There is a distinct worry nearby: non-occupants are also liable to disregard the
knowledge of occupants. See §2.6 and §2.7 for discussion of this point. Our purpose
in this section is to identify the epistemic value brought about by Stable Inclusivity.
Theworry about social hierarchies aecting how (andwhether) non-occupants take up
their testimony is real, but it is relevant to explaining the need for politically-inected
epistemic norms, which is yet to come.
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lar tune-ups exist.) A crucial part of the mechanic’s epistemic value to
you is the fact that their experience and expertise give them access to
these evidential relationships. Those relationships are part of the epis-
temic privilege that comes with being amechanic. The same, onemight
think, goes for occupying a standpoint. Second, even if non-occupants
can come to understand how occupants outside of their epistemic com-
munity will respond to their evidence, they are likely to be less ecient
at doing so because they lack the kind of day-to-day experience that
provides occupants with opportunities to learn. In other words, non-
occupants come up short because they lack expertise.
Phenomenal Knowledge + Expertise. On this view, the privilege con-
ferred by standpoints includes the expertise gained from inhabiting one’s
social location while possessing a certain understanding of that location.
Just as the car mechanic’s experience and expertise teach him that that
noise indicates that your serpentine belt needs to be replaced, someone
occupying the standpoint of U.S. Muslim women might learn that that
look indicates a certain kind of subtle prejudice. Without the combi-
nations of experience and expertise each possesses, they might never
come to understand that these relationships exist.18 In other words,
when combined with the experience of living with them, phenomenal
knowledge and expertise generate new understandings of the relation-
ships between evidence and theworld that are unavailable without them
(or, at least, dicult to acquire). In keeping with the idea that the epis-
18 Independently, Luntley (2009) oers an account of the nature of expertise that
leans heavily on this kind of fruitfulness as a distinguishing feature.
25
temic goods privilege provides should be understood as knowledge, we
can capture such relationships as a form of knowledge. So, what the
Muslim woman gains as a result of occupying her standpoint is knowl-
edge that that look indicates prejudice.
This account does well with respect to the desiderata missed by the
previous accounts. Since developing the expertise in question requires
an understanding of social locations and how they can aect one’s ex-
perience, occupying a standpoint is not an automatic consequence of
inhabiting a social location. So, desideratum (2) is met.
The accountmeets our third desideratum—providing epistemically-
grounded support for Stable Inclusivity— aswell, though the routemay
be less obvious. While the role of social expertise in generating privi-
lege is plausible, one might worry that this account, like the last one,
only supports Opportunistic Inclusivity because that privileged knowl-
edge, once acquired by standpoint occupants, can be harvested. Your
mechanic can tell you to listen for that sound and explain what it means;
your friend can point out that look and tell you what’s going on. This
doesn’t necessarily undermine the value of Stable Inclusivity, however.
On this view, standpoints allow their occupants to discover new rela-
tionships between their evidence and the world continually— the locus
of their privilege is not that they already know all of these relationships,
but rather that they are in a better position to learn them than those who
do not occupy their standpoint. So, including occupants in inquiries
concerning their expertise allows them to discover new, relevant evi-
dential relationships. And, this isn’t so strange. That very inquiry might
include social scientists for the same reason — someone with expertise
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and experience in the area is apt to see new relationships that wouldn’t
be obvious to someone without the same epistemic advantages. The
only dierence is one we’ve seen before: while most anyone can, with
time and training, gain expertise and experience with social science, the
same cannot be said for occupying a standpoint. This, then, provides a
basis for the target community organization norm: Stable Inclusivity.19
So, (3) is met.
Even so, a knowledge-based account may be less than ideal. The fo-
cal point for this account, expertise, need not be cached out in terms
of knowledge. We might characterize expertise as a kind of compe-
tence, for example, or a disposition to form a certain kind of belief in
response to one’s evidence. Since this account pins privilege to expertise
as knowledge, however, one of two things must be the case: either the
alternative characterizations fall short and expertise is simply equiva-
lent to this kind of knowledge or other forms of expertise are somehow
insucient grounds for privilege. The latter is especially pressing for
this account, since analyses of knowledge often involve conditions such
as sensitivity, safety, relevant alternatives, etc. that seem unnecessarily
strong for answering the question of whether someone is an expert.20
Relatedly, the characterization in terms of knowledge may ask more
than is plausible as the consequences of the kind of experience this ac-
count picks out. Wemight expect an agent who occupies a standpoint to
have better responses to relevant evidence thannon-occupants as a result
19 While this form of inclusivity will not ensure the aective results one might hope
for from inclusivity — a felt sense of inclusion, a sense of being welcome — it never-
theless meets the epistemic goal set out in §2.2.
20 cf. Nozick (1981), Sosa (1999), Dretske (1981), respectively, for these conditions on
knowledge.
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of the process described above, but a guarantee that this improvement
rises to the level of knowledge implies a much more robust connection
between this process and its epistemic consequences. So, even though
the analogy with experts provides a plausible story about the kind of
privilege standpoints confer, this knowledge-based version of the ac-
count is missing a story about how standpoint occupants acquire that
privilege. For these reasons, I take it that a less weighty account of ex-
pertise is preferable.
Moreover, much of this is more naturally described directly in terms
of evidential support relations rather than knowledge thereof. Shifting
our attention to evidential support relations will also make way for de-
veloping a formal model that not only better captures standpoint theo-
rists’ discussions of privilege, but also provides the structure necessary
for examining the question of how agents ought to interact with stand-
points, thereby allowing us to meet condition (4).
2.3.2 Privilege as Expert Evidential Support Relations
Much like the last, this account of privilege rests on the expertise that
agents inhabiting particular social locations develop as a result of in-
terpreting their experience through an understanding of the social hi-
erarchy in which they are embedded. We’ll shift focus away from the
knowledge that process may produce, however, instead taking the lo-
cus of privilege to be the package of evidential support relations such
expertise provides.
The phrase evidential support relations (ESRs) refers to the relation-
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ship between a piece of evidence — some testimony, an observation,
an experience21 — and the hypotheses it supports. This is sometimes
meant in an objective sense, referring to the hypotheses that the evi-
dence really doesmake more likely. For our purposes, it will also be use-
ful to talk about subjective evidential support relations, which are the
relationships agents themselves accept. If Flatley the Flat Earther takes
the fact that the bottoms of clouds appear at to support the hypothesis the
Earth is at, this is among the ESRs he accepts, regardless of the fact that
this evidence does not actually support the hypothesis that the earth is
at. At a minimum, an agent’s ESRs shape how they will respond to new
evidence: upon learning that the bottoms of clouds appear at (or, already
knowing this, upon accepting ESRs relating it to the Earth is at), Flatley
will become more condent in the Earth is at. His condence in other
propositions will likely change as well. He might reduce his condence
in the hypothesis that the Earth is round, while raising his condence in
related propositions such as the Earth is nearly, but not quite, at or the
Earth is a cube.
These subjective evidential support relations clearly bear on the ques-
tion of expertise. For example, it seems to follow from the fact that Flat-
ley’s ESRs do not resemble the objective ESRs concerning geology that
he is not an expert on the subject.22 Intuitively, the same goes for some-
one likeRonda, forwhom the bottoms of clouds appear atdoes not support
21 For our purposes, we can be fairly agnostic about the nature of evidence. However,
see Kelly (2016) for discussion.
22 Two caveats. First, this assumes not just that we take Flatley’s ESRs to be o the
mark, but that they in fact are o the mark. Second, were Flatley’s geological ESRs
otherwise impeccable and comprehensive, amore nuanced evaluation of his expertise
might be called for.
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the Earth is at butwhohas relatively little else in theway of ESRs, knowl-
edge, or any other epistemic attitude concerning geology. While a full
account of expertise is beyond the scope of this paper, I take the point
these examples are meant to draw out to be relatively uncontroversial:
relative to a particular epistemic community, being an expert about a
topic involves having subjective evidential support relations concern-
ing the topic that are both more comprehensive and closer to the ob-
jective evidential support relations than those broadly held within that
community.23 Unlike knowledge-based expertise, this more forgiving
account oers a plausible, reliable outcome of the situations in which
standpoint occupants nd themselves.24 As such, this account does a
better job of meeting desideratum (1).
It is alsoworth noting that this looser picture of expertise still grounds
inclusivity. At the very least, experts so described are epistemically valu-
able in the same way that a thermometer or other measuring device
would be. In the absence of a better way of learning the temperature,
one should use and rely upon a thermometer for the simple reason that
you’re likely to do better if you do. In the case of theMuslimwoman, the
norms we are developing apply because she really is more likely to be
right about how to interpret that look than you are. Moreover, the feature
of expertise that justies Stable Inclusivity — the greater likelihood of
23 I do not mean to suggest that this is the extent of expertise or that there is no
general, context-independent concept of expertise. See Luntley (2009) for a general
discussion of the nature of expertise.
24 Expertise may involve not only a better understanding of which evidence sup-
ports which propositions, but also a better way of interpreting incoming perceptual
information. Though I will not focus on this aspect of expertise, the implementation
of evidential support relations provided below can accommodate both. See footnote
35.
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generating new, more accurate evidential connections as a result of be-
ing part of the inquiry— does not depend on expertise being construed
as knowledge. So, we retain the ability to meet the third desideratum.
Focusing on evidential support relations also coheres well with the
projectsmany standpoint theorists describe. For example,Collins’s (2002)
central example in “Black Feminist Epistemology” concerns the gulf be-
tween the interpretations of single motherhood in the Black commu-
nity that are oered by conventional social science, on one hand, and
those oered by Black women themselves, on the other. Black women,
she notes, focus on the social conditions encumbering single mothers,
while conventional social science focuses on “welfare queens” and char-
acter defects (Collins, 2002, p. 273). This, combined with the dominant
role of the white male standpoint in the academy, undermines Black
women’s participation in and contribution to social research (along with
the breadth and accuracy of conventional research):
Black women scholars may know that something is true — at
least, by standards widely accepted among African-American
women— but be unwilling or unable to legitimate our claims
using prevailing scholarly norms. [...] The methods used to
validate knowledge claimsmust also be acceptable to the group
controlling the knowledge validation process. [...] Thus, one
important issue facing Black women intellectuals is the ques-
tion ofwhat constitutes adequate justication that a given knowl-
edge claim, such as a theory or fact, is true. (p. 273)
That is, in virtue of sharing the standpoint associated with Black sin-
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gle mothers, Black women scholars relate dierently to evidence about
rates of social assistance, outcomes for their children, and so forth. From
their standpoint, this evidence supports hypotheses concerning the dam-
aging consequences of racism, inadequate social support systems, and
under-valued labor. Crucially, this relationship between evidence and
the world is not shared by dominant standpoints — it does not t with
conventional social science’s view of Black women.25
It must be noted that, because this is a general view of the privilege
that standpoints provide, the ideas presented here are not meant as a
thorough characterization of Collins’ project, which concerns not only
standpoint epistemology, but also centering and exploring the epistemic
practices of Black women.26 Nevertheless, evidential support relations
capture crucial elements of the privilegesCollins identies, such as knowl-
edge validation processes, worldviews, and ways of knowing, and do so in a
way that provides an epistemic incentive for inclusivity. As we saw in
the passage quoted above, knowledge validation processes are a mat-
ter of what kind evidence can support a proposition. Evidential sup-
port relations contribute to determining which inquiries agents pursue
and how they respond to new evidence, both of which are crucial as-
25 And, since that white male standpoint does not share the kinds of experiences
that generate these support relations, it never will. We’ll return to the socio-epistemic
impact of these asymmetries in §2.7.
26 Out of respect for Collins’ work, this point merits further emphasis. While Collins
is engaged in standpoint epistemology, her aims are very dierent from those of this
paper. The project we’re engaged in involves nding an abstraction amenable to the
peculiarities of dierent standpoints and tractable within conventional epistemology.
Neither is a concern for Collins. Where the present project involves a broad, minimal
account, Collins’ work captures the rich, distinctive epistemic practices of the group
she focuses on, Black women. Just as a general account of what it is to be a painting
will not do much to illuminate Guernica, this paper should not be understood as an
eort to capture Collins’ account of Black feminist epistemology. For this, please see
Collins (2002).
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pects of Collins’ use of worldviews. They also encapsulate the kind of
evidence an agent will take to be relevant to a question, meaning that
they provide a structure within which to represent the idea of distinc-
tive ways of knowing. For example, Collins points to the role of emo-
tion as demarcating a distinctive way of knowing, writing that, “con-
nected knowers see personality as adding to an individual’s ideas,” (ibid.,
p. 283). This kind of eect inuence might be represented as the dier-
ence between evidential support relations that interpret testimony uni-
vocally and ones that change depending on the agent’s evidence about
the speaker’s personality. This kind of structural view will not supply
content — that being the job of more specic accounts like Collins’ —
but it does demonstrate the applicability and exibility of evidential
support relations.27
In Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?, Sandra Harding surveys many
other ways feminist standpoint theorists explain the idea that stand-
points grant their occupants’ epistemic privilege. She includes not only
Collins, but alsoHartsock’s (1983a) focus on the consequences of gender-
segregated labor practices, Aptheker’s (1989) concern for the ways sub-
ordination shapes the meaning and signicance women assign to their
work, and many others (p. 121-132). Common to all of these, she argues,
is the idea that the subordinated experience of women grounds their
privilege and “makes strange what had appeared familiar” (p. 150). Be-
liefs that seem incontrovertibly supported by the evidence according to
a dominant standpoint may lose their apparent inevitability when ex-
27 None of the foregoing should suggest that evidential support relations can provide
a complete account of what it means to occupy a standpoint. Rather, they provide a way
to characterizemany of the important epistemic practices associatedwith standpoints.
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amined from the perspective of a subordinate standpoint. When cou-
pled with the experience, justicatory practices, and worldviews that
come with occupying such a standpoint, the same evidence may seem
to support very dierent hypotheses. The standpoint theorist’s claim is
that, where that dierence is the result of occupying a standpoint, the
occupant’s expertise makes her response more likely to resemble the
objective evidential support relations. Dierent (and better) knowledge
may be the result of including standpoints, but the reason for this is the
distinctive evidential support relations brought about by the factors that
create standpoints. So, in formalizing the dynamics of inquiry, it is ac-
cess to these expert evidential support relations that should be the focus
of our model.
2.4 TheModel
In developing a model capturing the idea that access to expert ev-
idential support relations is a key epistemic privilege associated with
standpoint occupancy, our goal will be to provide enough structure to
explore two questions:
• What does it mean for an agent to occupy a standpoint? How does
occupying a standpoint interact with existing doxastic states?
• How should the privilege of standpoints impact agents who don’t
occupy them? How should such agents respond to standpoint-based
testimony?
The rst is important because it does not follow from the fact that oc-
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cupying a standpoint ensures expertise that anyone responsive to those
expert evidential support relations thereby occupies the standpoint. This
further claim — that occupying a standpoint is equivalent to being re-
sponsive to the relevant evidential support relations— is one that stand-
point theorists reject. We’ll return to the question of what else occupy-
ing a standpoint involve be (and how much a model like this one can
capture) in §2.5. As we’ll see in §2.6, answering the second question will,
to some extent, depend on how we answer the rst.28
For both of these tasks, we’ll be interested in how the evidential sup-
port relations provided by a standpoint interact with other evidential
support relations. To represent this, ourmodel will build in two idiosyn-
cratic features. First, the ability to identify dierent viewpoints, be they
standpoints, religious faiths, trusted friends, or any other distinct source
of evidence interpretation. Second, we’ll build in epistemic operators—
belief and having support—that directly (and distinctively) depend on the
interactions between the evidential support relations provided by these
viewpoints. In §2.5, we’ll see how these features can be used to illus-
trate the eects of coming to occupy a standpoint and coming to trust a
standpoint occupant.
In this section, we’ll focus on the model itself, building on the work
of van Benthem and Pacuit (2011b). Like many epistemic logics, van Ben-
them and Pacuit’s is modal a framework. The semantics for belief and
28 Questions concerning intersectional standpoints —What does it mean to occupy
multiple standpoints? What is the dierence, if any, between occupying multiple
standpoints and occupying an intersectional standpoint? — are unfortunately beyond
the scope of this paper. These are important and dicult questions. While I think
the model described below has interesting, distinctive things to say about them, they
deserve a focused treatment.
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evidential support are handled in terms of possible worlds and the truth
values of propositions at those worlds. The main dierence will be the
use of neighborhoods to track our agent’s epistemic state, rather than bi-
nary accessibility relations between worlds.
2.4.1 An Informal Introduction to Neighborhood-Based Models for
Modal Logic (and Slugs)
Before diving into neighborhood models, a review of more famil-
iar epistemic logics is in order. In standard modal logics for belief and
knowledge, our location in the space of possible worlds is of paramount
importance. In such models, the accessibility relation tells us which
worlds are indistinguishable from one another, given the evidence we
have. To say that w is accessible from v is to say that, for all an agent at
v knows (or believes, depending on our idiom), she could be at either
one. For example, take the proposition slugs have four noses. Let’s call it
Slugs. Since you probably don’t know whether Slugs is true, the worlds
you consider possible will include some Slugs worlds and some ¬Slugs
world. For each such world, standard epistemic logics will say there is
an accessibility relation between the world you occupy, which we’ll call
w, and those possibilities. Suppose s, a Slugsworld, and s’, a ¬Slugsworld,
are among them. Now, we can say that the pairs 〈w, s〉 and 〈w, s ′〉 are in-
cluded in your accessibility relation.
As it turns out, w is a Slugs world! Slugs do, in fact, have four noses.29
Having learned this, you can now distinguish between w and s ′ because,
29More accurately, slugs have four olfactory organs, which are closer to tentacles than
noses (Chase, 2001, p. 180).
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as you now know, s ′ is not the real world. That’s represented in the
model by removing the pair 〈w, s ′〉 (along with any other that linked w
to a ¬Slugsworld) from you accessibility relation. But, your accessibility
relation will keep the other pair we looked at, 〈w, s〉. For all you know,
you could be in either w or s. More importantly, all of the worlds you
think might be the actual world are Slugs worlds now. So, on such mod-
els, we can say that you believe (or know) Slugs.
Much of this interpretation will change as we develop the neighbor-
hood model. Both in terms of formal constraints and epistemic inter-
pretation, the accessibility relations we’ve been focusing on are the locus
of these changes. Formally speaking, accessibility relations will be sets
of pairs such as 〈w, JSlugsK〉, where JSlugsK picks out another set of worlds
— the set of worlds at which Slugs is true, such as w and s. Rather than
marking the indistinguishability of two worlds as they do in standard
models, accessibility relations in our neighborhood model will mean
that an agent at w has some evidence that supports Slugs (along with any
other propositions that are true in all of the Slugs worlds). For this rea-
son, we’ll call them evidence relations in our neighborhood model.
After learning Slugs in the previous paragraph, you updated your evi-
dence relation to include 〈w, JSlugsK〉 (unless you don’t trustmy gastropo-
logical testimony). On our neighborhood model, however, this update
isn’t enough to determine whether you believe Slugs. Accepting an in-
terpretation of your evidence (my testimony about slugs) on which it
supports Slugs (you trust me as a source of slug-related information and
you don’t think I was speaking in code, trying to deceive you, or what-
not) is not the same as learning that Slugs is true. Instead, we’ll need to
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see how that interpretationmeshes with the rest of your evidence. If it’s
consistent with the rest of your evidence, then we’ll be able to say that
you believe Slugs. But what if it’s not? What if there’s a clash?
Four paragraphs back, you probably had no views whatsoever about
Slugs. Suppose you had. Suppose, for example, that you remember
reading aNationalGeographic article several years ago, according towhich
slugs have six noses. Then, when I suggested Slugs, you had a conict: by
your lights, you had support for the old proposition, let’s call it Slugs6,
and support for Slugs. But, there are no worlds that are part of both
propositions. Supposing that all of your other views about the world
are consistent and independent of olfactory facts about slugs, you now
have two dierent “theories”, so to speak, about the world: a Slugs theory
and a Slugs6 theory. In our neighborhoodmodel, what you believe is de-
termined by what’s true across all such internally consistent theories.30
This suggests a fairly strong notion of belief: you don’t need to think
that every possible world is a φ-world in order to believe φ, but you do
need to think that every consistent theory your evidence supports re-
quires that φ.31 If you decide that you no longer trust your memory
of the article (or me), the pair 〈w, JSlugs6K〉 (or 〈w, JSlugsK〉) will drop out
of your evidence relation and you’ll once again have a belief about the
exact number of noses that slugs possess.
The logic we’ll develop for viewpoint models will also contain lan-
30 These will also be maximally complete, meaning that they use as much of your
evidence as possible. We’ll come back to this point below.
31Note, however, that the strength of this belief operator depends somewhat onwhat
it means to trust or accept an interpretation of your evidence. I’ve left this quasi-
technical term loose intentionally. Additionally, while we won’t delve into conditional
belief here, it is straightforward to dene a notion of conditional belief on this model
and, in doing so, get at weaker conceptions of belief.
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guage for talking about having direct support for a proposition. In stan-
dard epistemic logics, we have a possibility operator (there’s some acces-
sible world, some candidate for the actual world, in which Slugs is true)
butwedon’tmake anydistinction betweenhaving direct-but-inconclusive
evidence for Slugs and just regarding Slugs as a possibility. Here, we will.
In the scenario above, for example, we’ll be able to say (1) that you have
support for Slugs and Slugs6, (2) that you don’t have support for other
slug-related hypotheses, say Slugs3 or Slugs5, even if you regard them
as possible, and (3) that even though you don’t have direct support for
the claim that slugs have between four and six noses (Slugs4−6), you be-
lieve it because Slugs4−6 is true on every consistent theory you can put
together.32
Finally, as has been suggested throughout this section, the viewpoints
that agents trust— friends, religious andpolitical aliations, standpoints,
their own intuitions, and so on—will play an explicit role in ourmodel.
Those viewpoints’ interpretations of the agent’s evidence (that is, the
evidential support relations they provide) are the basic building blocks
of her evidence relation. In the scenario above, you trust both me and
National Geographicwhen it comes to slugs. In the parlance we’ll develop
below, this means that you take my viewpoint to include Slugs and Na-
tional Geographic’s to include Slugs6. Even though you’re wrong about
what National Geographic would have to say about slugs in this instance
— in actuality, there’s no old issue stating that slugs have six noses —
32 In their closely related framework, van Benthem and Pacuit (2011b) dene opera-
tions of evidence re-organization on which the reective agent can observe facts like
this about her evidence and, from them, gain direct support for a proposition like
Slugs4−6. We won’t review these operations here, but they can be straightforwardly
translated into the framework developed below.
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we’ll nevertheless say that you trust National Geographic. Cases like this,
in which agents trust a viewpoint but misunderstand what it supports,
will be important to our discussion of deference in §2.6. Additionally,
the ability to identify collections of evidential support relations by the
viewpoint that supplies them will allow us to articulate several distinc-
tive, robust conceptions of what it means to occupy a standpoint. It’s
also worth pointing out that, while this was a case in which you had two
distinct pieces of evidence (my testimony and your memory) that led
you to your understanding of the viewpoints in question and what they
claim, viewpoints can oer dierent interpretations of the same piece
of evidence. You, your dad, and your uncle might have very dierent
views about how to interpret the evidence your uncle provided when
telling the tale of how he caught a 900-pound marlin last summer.
With this background in place, we can set marlins and slugs aside
for a moment and turn to the formal details. In §2.4.2, we’ll look at the
model itself. §2.4.3 adds a language we’ll use to interpret that model and
§2.4.4 concerns how we can represent standpoints in this framework.
2.4.2 Viewpoint Models
For the sake of simplicity, we’ll stick to nite models.33 With the no-
table exception of evidence itself, each of the pieces discussed in the last
section shows up in the denition of our model:34
33 While much of what’s said here extends straightforwardly to innite models, de-
tails of the logic dened below, such as maximal consistent theories, will need more
careful attention.
34The viewpoint model presented in this section builds on van Benthem and Pacuit’s
(2011b) model for evidence-based belief. See also Pacuit (2017) for a general introduc-
tion to neighborhood models.
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Viewpoint Model. Given a set of atomic propositions P, a
viewpoint model consists of a tupleM = 〈W,V, A,E,I〉 with a
non-empty set of worldsW, a family V of sets, each consisting
of ordered pairs 〈w,φ〉, which map worlds to formulas in L0,
an evidence relation E = {〈w, JφKM〉 | 〈w,φ〉 ∈ V for some V ∈ A
and JφKM 6= ∅}, and an interpretation function I : P → ℘(W).
Several features of this model, in particularW, P, and I, play essentially
the same role here as they do in more familiar modal frameworks. W is
just the set of worlds in our model, where each possible world is a way
the world could be, as far as our agent is concerned. P is just the set of
atomic sentences in the model, from which the logical expressions we’ll
evaluate will be built (along with the logical operators we’ll dene in
the next section). I is an interpretation function mapping each atomic
sentence in our language to the set of worlds at which it is true.
On to the peculiarities. Suppressing direct representation of the agent’s
evidence is largely amatter of convenience. Since the changes we’ll look
at in §2.5 concern changes to the sources an agent trusts rather than to
her evidence, directly representing the evidence is unnecessary — this
version does the same work as a model directly representing evidence,
but in a simpler fashion.
Instead, we have the evidence relation. As we saw above, the evidence
relation is similar to the accessibility relation found in standard modal
logics, though it will play a very dierent semantic role. Instead ofmap-
ping worlds to worlds, E maps worlds to sets of worlds, which are the
propositions supported by the agent’s evidence. Those mappings are
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drawn from the viewpoints in A, the set of viewpoints the agent trusts.
A is a subset of V, the set of all viewpoints represented in the model.
Each element of V represents a particular viewpoint — a standpoint, po-
litical aliation, or whatnot — to which an agent might be responsive.
For the sake of simplicity, this model assumes that the support view-
points provide is binary rather than degreed. So, a viewpoint either
supports a proposition or it does not. Given this assumption, we repre-
sent each proposition a viewpoint supports at a particular world as a pair
〈w,φ〉.35 We’ll make use of this broad set of viewpoints in §2.5, where we
will look at changes in which viewpoints an agent trusts. In constructing
the evidence relation, however, we’ll focus on the viewpoints the agent
already trusts.
The viewpoint model constructs E by amalgamating the viewpoints
in A. To do this, we take each pair in each viewpoint in A and add the
associated interpreted pair to E, provided that the interpreted pair’s ex-
tension is non-empty.36 The interpreted pair is just the pair that links w
to the set of possible worlds at which the sentence is true rather than the
sentence itself. To return to our slugs, if 〈w,Slugs6〉 is a pair coming from
the viewpoint associated with National Geographic, its interpreted pair is
〈w, JSlugs6K〉. So, if the viewpoint associated withNational Geographic is in
A, we’ll add 〈w, JSlugs6K〉, to E (as long as JSlugs6K isn’t empty). In order to
determine which worlds go into JSlugs6K we’ll need a semantics, which
we’ll look at in the next section.
35 To accommodate the broader notion of expertisementioned in footnote 24, view-
points can be taken to act on perceptual information rather than bodies of evidence.
36 By way of explanation, an empty extension doesn’t provide positive support for
any possible world, so plays no role in helping the agent gure out which world might
be the actual world.
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For convenience, we’ll dene two more pieces of notation: vi(w) and
E(w). Let vi(w) pick out the formulas associated with w according to vi,
so that vi(w) = {φ |〈w,φ〉 ∈ vi}. Similarly, let E(w) pick out the set of all sets
of worlds associated with w according to E, so that E(w) = {X |〈w,X〉 ∈ E}.
We’ll also impose some constraints on viewpoints and the evidence
relation. First, the agents’ own viewpoint, vA, must be included in A.
Second, agents know the space of possible worlds. Since viewpoints
map worlds to formulas rather than sets of worlds, we use a trivially
true proposition, p∨ ¬p, to model this constraint:37
Triviality. For eachw ∈W, there is some p ∈ P such that p∨¬p ∈
vA(w).
It follows from the rst and second constraints that W ∈ E(w) for all
w ∈W in any viewpoint model.
Third, individual viewpoints are consistent. So, the intersection of
all sets of worlds supported by a particular viewpoint at a worldmust be
non-empty:
Consistency. For each vi ∈ V and each w ∈ W,
⋂
{JφK | φ ∈
vi(w)} 6= ∅.
This is not to suggest that agents can’t think that there are inconsistent
ways of seeing the world in a broader sense of the term ‘viewpoint’. In
order for her to trust it, however, a viewpoint must be consistent. So,
our model restricts attention to these plausible viewpoints.38
37 It’s worth noting that this constraint also implies that this framework does not
avoid the problem of logical omniscience.
38 Note that this does not require viewpoints to be consistent across worlds. What a
viewpoint supports at wmight be inconsistent with what it supports at w ′. Since we’ll
restrict our attention to uniform models, however, these situations will not arise.
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In addition, we’ll restrict our attention to uniformmodels:
Uniformity. For all w,w ′ ∈W, E(w) = E(w ′).
Less formally, uniformmodels are those in which each viewpoint eval-
uates the agent’s evidence (which, recall, we are holding xed) the same
way across all possible worlds. So, what our agent ought to believe ac-
cording to viewpoint v will be the same no matter which world she in-
habits. The changes we’ll be interested in are those arising from changes
to the viewpoints our agent trusts. As with the choice to avoid directly
representing evidence, it is possible to set this constraint aside, but adopt-
ing it greatly simplies our discussion.
Finally, it is worth highlighting the absence of a common constraint:
veracity. Veracity fails because, while viewpoints must be internally
consistent, they need not be reliable. So, the actual world may not be
among the worlds picked out by a particular viewpoint. Moreover, since
consistencydoes not extend to other viewpoints, an agent can trust view-
points that conict with one another, as was the the case in the olfactory
dispute discussed above. This will be critical to the semantics for view-
point models, to which we now turn.
2.4.3 A Basic, Static Logic
Our language, drawn from vanBenthemandPacuit (2011b), will remain
relatively close to the standard operators for doxastic logic:
Evidence andBeliefLanguage. Let P be a set of atomic propo-
sitions. Where p ∈ P, L is the smallest set of formulas generated
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by the grammar
p | ¬φ | φ∧ψ | Bφ | φ | Lφ
Additional propositional connectives (∨,→,↔) are dened as
usual and the existential modalityMφ is dened as ¬L¬φ.
So, if we have p and q as atomic propositions, L includes ¬p, ¬p ∧ q,
B(¬p ∧ q), ¬B(¬p ∧ q), and so forth. This set of formulas, L, is the set of
sentences our logic will be able to interpret.
While the propositional connectives are no doubt familiar, themodal
operators B, , and L require some explanation. Their intended inter-
pretations are as follows. For any proposition φ,
• Bφmeans “the agent believes φ”,
• φmeans “the agent has evidence that directly supports φ”, and
• Lφmeans “the agent knows that φ”.39
With the language dened, we can now give a semantics that will tie it
into the viewpoint models described above.
The denition that follows describes what needs to be true about a
model in order for a formula in this language to be true at a particular
world in that model.
Truth. LetM = 〈W,V, A,E,I〉 be a viewpoint model. Truth of
a formula φ ∈ L is dened inductively as follows:
39While knows is a natural interpretation for L, this operator can also be interpreted
in alethic terms as necessity (and its counterpartM as possibility). These operators are
provided mostly as a convenience; our focus will be on B and .
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M, w |= p i w ∈ I(p) (for all p ∈ P)
M, w |= ¬φ i M, w 6|= φ
M, w |= φ∧ψ i M, w |= φ andM, w |= ψ
M, w |= φ i there exists an X ∈ E(w) such that for all
u ∈ X, M, u |= φ
M, w |= Bφ i for all maximal consistent theories40
X ⊆ E(w) and all u ∈ ⋂X , M, u |= φ
M, w |= Lφ i u |= φ for all u ∈W
The truth set of φ is the set of worlds JφKM = {w |M, w |= φ}.
Standard logical notions of satisability and validity are de-
ned as usual.
This deserves a bit of explanation. Let’s begin by taking a familiar ex-
ample, ¬q, as a warm-up. To determine whether ¬q is true at a world u,
the condition for negation states that we need to determine whether the
negated formula is true at the world in question. Since this is just q, an
atomic proposition, we look to the condition for atomic propositions.
There, we nd that any atomic formula p is true at some world w just in
case w is in the interpretation of p, I(p). So, if u ∈ I(q), thenM, u |= q
and, therefore, q is true at u. Given this, it can’t be the case thatM, u 6|= q.
So, we can conclude that ¬q is false at u. (If u is not in I(q), on the other
hand, then the same process tells us that ¬q is true at u.)
Now let’s look at . Recall that φ is meant to be true just in case
40Dened below.
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the agent has evidence that directly supports φ. The truth condition for
support states that φ is true at a world just in case there is some set in
E(w) such that all of the worlds in that set are φ worlds. Since viewpoint
models dene the value of E(w) as the set of propositions supported atw
by at least one viewpoints the agent trusts, this means φ will be true at
wwhenever the truth set for some proposition supported atw by a view-
point the agent trusts entails φ. So, if you trust National Geographic and,
therefore, add 〈w, JSlugs6K〉 to E, then (Slugs6) will be true at w becauseJSlugs6Kwill be in E(w) and Slugs6 will, of course, be true at every world inJSlugs6K. You’ll have direct support formany other propositions, too. For
example, since every world in JSlugs6K is a world at which Slugs6 ∨ Slugs5
is true, (Slugs6 ∨ Slugs5) will be true at w as well.
The condition for B is less straightforward. The truth condition for
belief requires that a propositions is true across all of the dierent max-
imal consistent theories an agent can piece together according to the
viewpoints she trusts. Suppose, for example, that we have an agent who
isn’t sure about whether the atheists or the Catholics are right about
the existence of God. Even so, both viewpoints support evolution. So,
despite the fact that she can’t put all of her evidence together consis-
tently (there’s no world in which God both exists and doesn’t exist), all of
the ways she can put her evidence together consistently are theories on
which evolution is true. Absent any trusted anti-evolution viewpoints,
then, she’ll believe that evolution is true. With that in mind, here’s the
formal denition for maximal consistent theories:
(Relative)MaximalConsistentTheory. Given a viewpointmodel
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M = 〈W,V, A,E,I〉 and a world w ∈ W, a family of sets X is a
maximal consistent theory relative to w just in case
1. (Relative) X is a nite subset of E(w),
2. (Consistent) The members of X have a non-empty inter-
section, and
3. (Maximal) For any x ∈ E(w) such that x 6∈ X, {x} ∪ X violates
(2).
So, if E(w) = {X1, X2, X3} and X1∩X2 6= ∅, then {X1, X2} satises (2)— there is at
least one world that both X1 and X2 regard as possible. If the intersection
of X3 with X1∩X2 is empty, then {X1, X2} satises (3) relative to E(w)— it’s a
maximal consistent theory relative to E(w). (For all we’ve said, however,
one of {X3, X2} or {X1, X3}might also be a maximal consistent theory!)
A few more examples will help to clarify how B and  work. Let
M = 〈W,V, A,E,I〉 be a viewpointmodel, letW = {w,u}, and letI(φ) = {w}
so that φ is true only at w. Our viewpoints will be V = {v1, v2, vA}. Since
we’re working with uniform models, I’ll describe V and E only in terms
of the formulas and sets of worlds supported rather than in terms of the
pairs linking worlds to those elements, as doing so simplies the presen-
tation. Let v1(w) = {φ}, and v2(w) = {¬φ}. In keeping with the Triviality
constraint, the agent’s viewpoint, vA, contains a pair 〈w,φ∨¬φ〉 for each
w ∈W, ensuring that each evidence relation contains the set of all worlds
in our model. The rest of the elements of E will be constructed from A,
per the viewpoint model denition above. Here are a few situations that
might obtain.
The agent in Figure 2.1 lacks direct support for φ because the only
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w u
Figure 2.1: A = {vA}, E(w) = {W}
This is the naive agent. She neither has evidence for φ nor
believes it and the same goes for ¬φ.
viewpoint she trusts, {w,u}, includes u and M, u 6|= φ. So, M, u 6|= φ.
The same goes for ¬φ, mutatis mutandis. So,M 6|= ¬φ. In addition, she
believes neither φ or ¬φ because her only maximal consistent theory is
{w,u} and it don’t settle whether φ is true.
w u
Figure 2.2: A = {v1, vA}, E(w) = {{w},W}
Adding v1, our agent now has evidence for φ and believes
φ.
The agent depicted in Figure 2.2, on the other hand, does have sup-
port forφ. In trusting v1, she adds JφK, the set of worlds in whichφ is true,
to her evidence relation. Additionally, she believes φ. She still has ex-
actly onemaximal consistent theory, but this time there’s just one world
in the intersection of the support relations in that theory: w. Since φ is
true at w, this meansM, w |= Bφ.
The case forM |= φ in Figure 2.3 is the same as it is for Figure 2.2.
This time, however, she has a second maximal consistent theory – the
one consisting of {u} and W. So, what goes for φ goes for ¬φ, mutatis
mutandis. Looking at the relationships between her evidence, it’s clear
why our agent doesn’t believe either proposition. She trusts two distinct
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w u
Figure 2.3: A = {v1, v2, vA}, E(w) = {{w}, {u},W}
Since v1 and v2 disagree about whether the evidence sup-
ports φ, the evidence relation depicted here contains con-
icting support relations. So, the agent has evidence for φ
and ¬φ, but believes neither.
theories about the way the would could be, {{w}, {w,u}} and {{u}, {w,u}},
and they disagree about φ. So,M 6|= Bφ. This demonstrates the fact that
having evidence for φ does not imply believing φ on viewpoint models.
Belief also doesn’t require that an agent have evidence for φ in the
sense dened here. Consider a model on whichW = {w,y, u}, I(φ) = {y},
and E(w) = {{w,y}, {y, u}, {w,y, u}}, such as Figure 2.4. Since none of these
w y u
Figure 2.4: E(w) = {{w,y}, {y, u},W}
A case in which an agent believes φ but has no direct sup-
port for φ.
sets is one on which φ is true at each world,M 6|= ¬φ. However, since
there is just one maximal consistent theory, {{w,u}, {w,y}, {w,u, y}}, and φ
is true at the one world in the intersection of those sets, M |= Bφ. So,
even though no individual piece of evidence supports φ directly, taken
together, her evidence gives her reason to believeφ.41 Tomake thismore
41For an axiomatization, completeness results, and other logical details, see van Ben-
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concrete, suppose you’re trying to decide whether to start reading The
Hobbit, 1984, or Jurassic Park. You have two friends who’ve read all three,
both of whom you trust to know your tastes. However, when you ask
which of the three novels you’ll like best, your friends give you dierent
answers: Damian tells you it’ll be eitherTheHobbit or 1984 andBoris tells
you it’ll be 1984 or Jurassic Park. According to ourmodel, you should be-
lieve you’ll like 1984 best, given this state of aairs, even though neither
friend gave you direct support for this.
2.4.4 Viewponts & Standpoints
So far, viewpoints haven’t played a direct role in the logic we’ve de-
veloped. This will change as we turn to the dynamics of standpoints —
coming to occupy a standpoint and interacting with occupants — in the
next section. These dynamics depend on identifying standpoints with
particular viewpoints in V. The Latina standpoint, for example, might
be a particular L ∈ V. Occupying the Latina standpoint, then, will be a
matter of bearing a particular relationship to L. Before looking at that
relationship, however, a few points about this are worth noting.
First, a bit more about what standpoints look like from the perspec-
tive of themodel. I’ll make no eort to dictate the content of the propo-
sitions standpoints support. The goal here ismerely to capture the struc-
ture of standpoints in a way that makes them tractable from the per-
spective of conventional epistemology. In addition, while standpoints
will support particular propositions on this model, this does not imply
that agents who trust standpoints will necessarily believe those proposi-
them and Pacuit (2011b).
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tions. Someone who trusts a standpoint may be in the kind of situation
depicted in Figure 2.3, in which they are best described as trusting two
viewpoints that contradict one another regarding the propositions the
standpoint supports. This possibility will be critical to our discussion of
what it means to occupy a standpoint.
Second, as we’ve seen before the notion of the standpoint of a par-
ticular group is misleading. So, it will be more accurate to characterize
the Latina standpoint as a set L of closely related viewpoints. Occupying
this standpoint, then, will be bearing the relevant relationship to some
L ∈ L. For the most part, this is a technical detail for our purposes, but
it’s worth bearing in mind.
Finally, agents may not be able to assess whether they occupy a given
standpoint accurately. That is, an agent may be mistaken about what a
particular standpoint says about her evidence. The same goes for any
other source that has agent-independent standards for evidential sup-
port relations. Someone who takes the Catholic faith to provide sup-
port for the proposition Jesus never rose from the dead is simply mistaken
about the tenets of the Catholic faith. This distinction between eviden-
tial support relations from an agent’s perspective and from an agent-
independent perspective will be important to keep in mind as we look
at agents’ interactions with standpoints in the next sections.
With our model in place, we can now turn to the core questions:
What does it mean to occupy a standpoint? How should agents inter-
act with standpoints? Along the way, we’ll need to add some dynamic
operators to our model. As we’ll see, there are many ways to character-
ize these changes, oftenmarking points of contentionwithin standpoint
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theory. So, deciding between them will mean settling on a particular
kind of standpoint theory. Some of these decisions will turn out to be
irreducibly political, rather than epistemic, as they ought to be for this
hybrid theory. By looking at candidate characterizations of these dy-
namics in logical terms, however, we’ll get a clearer sense of their nor-
mative consequences and the nature of the political commitments nec-
essary to support them.
2.5 Occupying a Standpoint
What does it mean for an agent to occupy a standpoint? How does
coming to occupy a standpoint aect one’s other doxastic states? At rst
blush, it might seem as if there’s a simple answer here. Why not treat
coming to occupy a standpoint in the same way that one would treat
coming to trust any other viewpoint?
AdoptiveOccupancy. Occupying a standpointmeans trusting
a viewpoint associated with that standpoint. In terms of our
model, an agent occupies a standpoint L just in case there is
some L ∈ L such that L ∈ A.
If that’s right, coming to occupy a standpoint would involve a straight-
forward change: upon adding a viewpoint associated with a standpoint
to the set of viewpoints she trusts, an agent could be said to occupy a
standpoint. We can model this change as an instance of a more general
update.42
42Viewpoint Addition and [+v]φ closely resemble vanBenthem and Pacuit’s (2011b, p. 9)
Evidence Addition and [+φ]ψ, which dene a similar process for a single proposition.
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Viewpoint Addition. LetM = 〈W,V, A,E,I〉 be a sourced evi-
dencemodel and v a viewpoint inV. ThemodelM+v = 〈W+v,V+v, A+v,E+v,I+v〉
hasW+v=W, V+v= V, I+v= I,
A+v= A ∪ {v}, and
E+v(w) = E(w) ∪ JφKM for all w ∈ W and all φ s.t. 〈w,φ〉 ∈ v
and JφKM 6= ∅
Here, the only changes fromM toM+v, the updatedmodel, are to the list
of viewpoints the agent trusts, A, and, correspondingly, to the evidence
relation, E. We can then dene the modality [+v]ψ, meaning “ψ is true
after the agent comes to trust viewpoint v” to describe this change:
(VA) M, w |= [+v]ψ i for each φ ∈ v,M, w |= φ implies M+v, w |=
ψ
The condition on VA — for each φ ∈ V, M, w |= φ— requires that each
proposition be true at some world in the model, meaning that an agent
must take the propositions a viewpoint supports to be at least possible if
she’s going to add it to the viewpoints she trusts.43
On this proposal, a college freshman who starts to take the feminist
analysis she’s learned seriously — trusting the viewpoint and adding it
to A— counts as occupying a feminist standpoint. As a result of this up-
date to her evidence relation, everything she believes will be consistent
with the propositions supported by that viewpoint. This is because the
belief operator requires anything she believes to be true on every max-
imal consistent theory. Once she’s added the feminist standpoint to the
43 Recursion axioms for [+v]ψ and the other operators discussed in this section to be
included in an appendix.
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viewpoints she trusts, any proposition that cannot be true according to
that standpoint can no longer be true on every maximal consistent the-
ory of hers (even if its true on many of them). This is a positive feature
of the proposal. Nevertheless, it is too weak to serve as amodel of stand-
point occupancy for at least two reasons.
First, it leaves propositions inconsistent with the standpoint exactly
as well-supported as they were before she came to occupy the stand-
point. To see this, recall our denition for the support operator:
M, w |= φ i there is some X ∈ E(w) such that for all u ∈
X, M, u |= φ
If a standpoint supports φ = sexism aects women’s employment prospects
in the United States at every world, the agent who believes ¬φ to begin
with will not adopt the belief φ as a result of trusting the standpoint.
As described, she’ll lose the belief ¬φ, but she won’t come to believe
the opposite. And, since support only requires that there be some set of
worlds in the agent’s evidence relation that are all ¬φ-worlds, she’ll still
have support for ¬φ. Figure 2.5 depicts this kind of situation. While this
is appropriate for coming to trust a viewpoint in general, the notion of
occupying a standpoint seems to require a more robust response.
Second, this result also implies that the proposal would allow agents
who come to occupy a standpoint to hold none of the beliefs central to
it. Given the claim that the privilege associated with occupying a stand-
point involves developing genuine expertise with respect to the eects
of social hierarchy on one’s lived experience, this seems like the wrong
result. In §2.3, I argued that that expertise should be understood in
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w y u
Figure 2.5: Adding a source v toM.
Suppose φ is true only at world u and that the viewpoint
being added, v, contains support for φ. In this case, the be-
lief ¬φ is lost atM+v, but the agent does not believe φ be-
cause there are two maximal consistent theories and they
disagree about φ.
terms of evidential support relations — as a way of responding to ev-
idence. The model we constructed in §2.4 construes those ESRs as one
amongmany viewpoints to which an agent might be responsive. As this
kind of example illustrates, however, having expert ESRs among those
with which you form your beliefs may not be enough to count as an
expert (even setting aside other issues, such as the kind of access you
have to those ESRs). For example, under Adoptive Occupancy, our col-
lege freshman might still trust her conservative upbringing, according
to which housekeeping is a woman’s most important duty. So, when
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asked about this, she would respond with the uncertainty betting hav-
ing contradictory ESRs on the matter. Despite knowing how the femi-
nist standpoint would interpret her evidence, her inability to distinguish
between a good interpretation and a bad one suggests that she is not, in
fact, an expert with respect to understanding how social structures aect
her life as a woman. Being an expert requires knowing what to discard
as well as what to keep.
Nevertheless, this is an important epistemic state. We often consider
only those who occupy standpoints and those who do not. But, this kind
of relationship with a standpoint — mere understanding, perhaps —
marks an important distinction between ways not to occupy a stand-
point. This agent is quite dierent from the anti-feminist, for example.
While shemight still be “on the fence”, she is taking the views she would
have were she to occupy the standpoint seriously. In virtue of including
it among the viewpoints she trusts, she is neither against it nor is she
unaware or ignorant of it. This kind of case will play an important role
when we turn to non-occupants’ interaction with occupants’ testimony
in the next section.
Since merely being responsive to the concerns of a group or under-
standing how they are likely to respond to a situation is not sucient
for occupying that group’s standpoint, we’ll need a stronger alterna-
tive. Since contradictory viewpoints were a problem for Adoptive Oc-
cupancy, we might try to avoid the problem by requiring standpoint
occupants to eliminate such viewpoints:
Consistent Viewpoint Occupancy. Occupying a standpoint
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means not only trusting a viewpoint associatedwith that stand-
point, but also ceasing to trust viewpoints inconsistent with
the standpoint. In terms of our model, this requires adopt-
ing some L ∈ L for a standpoint L and removing viewpoints
inconsistent with L.
The idea here is that occupying a standpoint requires taking a position
against contradictory viewpoints. To be more specic, we’ll say that two
viewpoints are contradictory when there is no maximal consistent the-
ory to be built from both (that is, when there is no possible world that’s
true across all of the propositions each viewpoint supports). To model
this, we’ll need another dynamic operation. This time, our focus will
be eliminating the evidential support relations arising from viewpoints
inconsistent with the standpoint.
ViewpointHomogenization. LetM = 〈W,V, A,E,I〉 be a view-
point model and v a viewpoint in V. The model
M◦v = 〈W◦v, V◦v, A◦v, E◦v, I◦v〉 hasW◦v =W, V◦v = V, I◦v = I,
A◦v = {v} ∪ {vi | vi ∈ A and
⋂
〈w,φ〉∈ vi or v JφKM 6= ∅}
E◦v = {〈w, JφKM〉 | 〈w,φ〉 ∈ vi for some vi ∈ A◦v}
The major changes to this model involve an update to the agent deni-
tion A, which we then use to reconstruct E, the evidence relation. The
agent adds the target viewpoint— the standpoint— and eliminates all of
the viewpoints that have no overlap with the standpoint. After this kind
of update, then, the agent will no longer accept such sources’ interpre-
tations of her evidence. On this model of occupancy, our college fresh-
man not only comes to trust the feminist analysis she’s learned, but also
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rejects viewpoints that are inconsistent with it, such as, say, the conser-
vative worldview she learned at home. Coming to occupy a standpoint
means coming to distrust viewpoints that contradict it.
This characterization resolves the rstworry forAdoptiveOccupancy:
because any viewpoint that would have added support for such a propo-
sition has been eliminated from the collection of viewpoints she trusts,
she no longer has support for those propositions.
Removing all of the viewpoints that contradict the standpoint is quite
drastic, however. This requires agents who adopt standpoints to disavow
all of their contradicting viewpoints completely, regardless of whatever
else they might support. To take up Collins’ central example again, the
fact that conventional social science supports a worldview on which it
is the character aws of black women, rather than systemic racism, that
is to blame for their circumstances suggests that this version of occu-
pancy will require an agent to remove conventional social science as a
lens through which to interpret her evidence.44 This, one might think,
overstates the epistemic commitments that go along with occupying a
standpoint.45
Additionally, a weaker version of our second worry for Adoptive Oc-
cupancy persists. Removing inconsistent viewpoints does not imply
44 In a case like this, it may not even be possible to simply drop something like the
viewpoint of conventional social science.
45 A more nuanced model might manage this worry by changing the way our agent
specication works, substituting the set of viewpoints the agent accepts for a priority
relation among viewpoints. This would allow us to construct E by adopting what’s sup-
ported by higher priority viewpoints and adding in just what’s consistent with the al-
ready adopted viewpoints for each lower-priority viewpoint. Occupying a standpoint,
then, would involve giving it high priority. For the sake of brevity, I won’t elaborate
on this iteration of our model here — the point is that this particular worry is better
understood as an artifact of simplicity. cf. (van Benthem and Pacuit, 2011a, §4), which
elaborates on how neighborhood semantics can be used in plausibility models.
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that our agent comes to believe the propositions the standpoint sup-
ports. This is because of the gap between support for a proposition and
belief in our model. To be eliminated by this operation, a viewpoint
must support, say, ¬φwhere the standpoint in question supports φ. But,
a viewpoint that passes this testmay still support propositions consistent
with ¬φ, so that ¬φ worlds are included in its evidence sets. For exam-
ple, if two viewpoints each including the same ¬φ world but dierent φ
worlds, ¬φ will be true on the maximal consistent theory consisting of
those two viewpoints, as in Figure 2.6.
w
y
u
Figure 2.6: E(w) = {{w,y}, {y, u}, {w,u},W}
Suppose φ is true only at w and u. The viewpoints provid-
ing {w,y} and {y, u} could survive viewpoint homogeniza-
tion with a viewpoint supporting φ (in red here), allowing
the agent to end up in a state like this one, in which she
has a maximal consistent theory between {w,y} and {y, u}
on which ¬φ is true.
As a result, it won’t be the case that φ is true on all maximal consis-
tent theories. Since Bφ depends on having only φ worlds in all of the
maximal consistent theories the agent can put together, this means that
we can’t guarantee that the agent will believe φ.
This raises an important question: just how much of what a stand-
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point supports must an occupant believe? Should standpoint occupants
believe everything supported by those standpoints? If so, we’ll need a
dierent kind of condition altogether.
Strict Occupancy. Occupying a standpoint requires rejecting
possibilities inconsistent with that standpoint.
We can model this with the following update:46
Viewpoint Scrubbing. LetM = 〈W,V, A,E,I〉 be a viewpoint
model and v a viewpoint inV. ThemodelM!v = 〈W!v,V!v, A!v,E!v,I!v〉
has V!v = V,
W!v =
⋂
〈w,φ〉∈vJφKM
A!v = {v} ∪A,
E!v(w) = {X | ∅ 6= X = JφKM ∩W!v for all φ s.t. 〈x,φ〉 ∈ vi for
some vi ∈ A!v}, and
I!v = V(p) ∩W!v
The change to W reduces the set of possible worlds to those within the
intersection of the propositions supported by the standpoint, while the
updates to E and I render the model consistent with that change. On
this characterization, occupying a standpoint means taking it as a kind
of fundamental worldview that denes the boundaries of any other epis-
temic endeavor. Rather than removing inconsistent viewpoints entirely,
this operation just scrubs away the possibilities that allow those view-
points to be inconsistent with the standpoint in the rst place. This
46 M!v is closely modeled on van Benthem and Pacuit’s (2011a)’s M!φ for public an-
nouncement in evidence models.
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solves both of the potential problems for Adoptive Occupancy: agents
who occupy a standpoint accept no evidence directly supporting propo-
sitions that contradict the standpoint and they believe all of the propo-
sitions it supports. So, our college freshman can keep her conservative
viewpoint around. The only dierence is that many of the propositions
it supports will have an empty truth set because there’s just no way for
them to turn out to be true by her lights. As a result, those propositions
won’tmake it into her evidence relation. Looking back at Figure 2.6, this
situation cannot arise because y, the ¬φ world that caused the problem,
will be removed by scrubbing for the standpoint that provides {w,u}.
Thismay seem too strong, however, because StrictOccupancy comes
at the cost of preventing agents from so much as entertaining the pos-
sibility that a proposition supported by the standpoint is false. Stand-
points are infallible on this view. On the knowledge-based conceptions
of standpoint privilege discussed in §2.3, thismay be appropriate. Given
the worries with which we ended that discussion, this may seem like an
unwelcome outcome.
There is a great deal of space between the Strict and Consistent View-
point versions of occupancy, however. We might, for example, take a
more targeted approach on which occupants view their standpoint as
fundamental, but do not foreclose other possibilities:
Promoted Occupancy. Occupying a standpoint requires re-
jecting direct, but not indirect, support for propositions in-
consistent with that standpoint.
To model this, we’ll dene an operation that removes direct support
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for propositions inconsistent with those supported by the standpoint,
leaving everything else intact:
Viewpoint Promotion. LetM = 〈W,V, A,E,I〉 be a viewpoint
model and v a viewpoint inV. ThemodelM∗v = 〈W∗v,V∗v, A∗v,E∗v,I∗v〉
has V∗v = V, W∗v =W, I∗v = V ,
A∗v = {v} ∪A, and
E∗v(w) = {JφKM∗v | 〈w,φ〉 ∈ vi for some vi ∈ A∗v and JφKM ∩⋂
〈w,ψ〉∈vJψKM 6= ∅}
The condition on E removes the individual evidential support relations
inconsistent with the standpoint.47 That is, rather than removing in-
consistent viewpoints entirely, this operation promotes the possibilities
supported by the standpoint by removing direct support for proposi-
tions inconsistent with them. In doing so, it leaves in place support for
propositions that are neutral with respect to her standpoint, in the sense
that they can be true regardless of whether everything the standpoint
supports is true. So, this is another case in which our college freshman
neednot entirely foregoher conservative upbringing, instead just ignor-
ing the parts that support propositions like women ought to raise families
rather than joining the workforce. The dierence between this and Strict
Occupancy is that she can still consider the possibilities outside of the
standpoint. As a result, the situation illustrated in Figure 2.6 can arise
here as well. When one of her maximal consistent theories converges
on possibilities outside those delineated by her standpoint, our agent
47This amounts to a one-step version of the prioritization discussed in footnote 45.
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may no longer believe all of the propositions supported by the stand-
point. So, this option answers our earlier question — must standpoint
occupants believe everything the standpoint supports? — in the nega-
tive. This may be warranted, however. The agent in this situation has
support for mutually incompatible propositions, all of which are com-
patible with the standpoint she occupies. Upon realizing that she has in-
compatible maximal consistent theories, questioning the troublesome
proposition supported by that standpoint (φ in Figure 2.6) seems only
reasonable. Whether this realization calls formodifying her views about
the standpoint, investigating the viewpoints providing support for the
now-uncertain propositions, or simply being content with that uncer-
tainty, merely acknowledging that her evidence lacks a clear, univocal
interpretation on the viewpoints she trusts neednot constitute a betrayal
of her standpoint.
Between Strict Occupancy and Promotion, I take the latter to be the
more plausible characterization of how occupying a standpoint aects
an agent’s epistemic state, at least for the kind of standpoint epistemol-
ogy I’ve argued for in this paper. While both involve elevating an expert
viewpoint, Strict Occupancy appears to be a form of dogmatism. This
goes beyondwhat’s necessary of an expert— an expert need not be inca-
pable of considering the possibility that her views are false. In fact, one
might worry that such dogmatism renders the agent less of an expert
than a counterpart who hasn’t scrubbed the incompatible possibilities.
The dogmatic agent cannot meaningfully abandon, let alone question,
her standpoint because scrubbing the incompatible possibilities means
that she’ll continue to believe those propositions even if she eliminates
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all direct support for them. This hardly seems to support the kind of
deliberate adjudication an expert should be able to engage in.
By contrast, the Promoter’s choice to bring the standpoint’s eviden-
tial support relations to the fore can be reversed. She does prioritize the
standpoint’s verdict about her evidence, but nevertheless remains en-
gaged with the possibility that some of the propositions the standpoint
supports may be false. Moreover, Promotion is far more responsive to
the possibility of changing one’s views. As we’ve seen, there are many
distinct sets of evidential support relations that “count” as part of any
standpoint. Plausibly, an agent who occupies a standpoint can (and will)
shift among these as she gains experience. Promotion just requiresmak-
ing the same change, this time with the new version of the standpoint.
Under Strict Occupancy, however, any proposition that contradicts a
proposition supported by the initial standpoint will have an empty truth
set, regardless of its being supported by a dierent instantiation of that
same standpoint. So, support such propositions cannot make it into her
revised evidence relation. This, too, is a reason to worry about whether
Strict Occupancy can reasonably be said to let the privilege of being a
standpoint occupant — access to these expert evidential support rela-
tions — support treating the occupant herself as an expert.48
Nevertheless, Strict Occupancy does leave room for a stridently po-
litical understanding of what it means to occupy a standpoint. The ver-
sion of occupancy I’ve argued for is largely a matter of employing the
expertise developed as a result of being in a position to occupy a stand-
48Themore detailed approach to prioritization discussed in footnote 45may provide
an even better account of how expertise works in a framework like this one.
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point. To motivate a more politically charged conception, however,
consider a case in which most of the viewpoints an agent might trust
undermine belief in her own capacity to participate in that epistemic
community. Here, StrictOccupancymight be necessary—being uncer-
tain of whether you are t to participate can be silencing even when you
are invited to do so.49 So motivated, concerns about Strict Occupancy
being dogmatic or otherwise epistemically suspect may seem less im-
mediately pressing. Even if occupancy is purely a matter of politically-
motivated adherence to these ESRs, however, the resulting norms must
still pass epistemic muster. In terms of both organizational and indi-
vidual norms, the fact that Strict Occupancy makes individuals poorer
candidates for expertise is worrisome. With this in mind, we turn to the
normative implications of occupancy.
2.6 Inclusivity and Deference
Standpoint epistemology’s norms must operate at two levels: the or-
ganizational norms governing communities of inquiry and the defer-
ence norms governing individuals’ interactionwith occupants’ testimony.
Without the former there may be no occupant testimony on which the
latter can act and, without the latter, the eects of the former may be
fruitless. This section aims to ground these norms and address two con-
cerns about putting them into practice.
In §2.2, I argued that Stable Inclusivity is the appropriate target for
49 This is particularly common in the history of racialized belief about intellectual
capacity. SeeMills (2007).
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these organizing norms. §2.3 argued that standpoint theorists ought to
focus on occupants’ expertise, in terms of how they respond to their ev-
idence, in order to explain what epistemic advantage provides grounds
for them. If we take Promotion to be the appropriate account of stand-
point occupancy, then the initial explanation of why an epistemic com-
munity ought to include occupants stands — with respect to inquiries
that concern their standpoints, occupants are more likely to get it right
than non-occupants. So, Stable Inclusivity is grounded in the value of
including experts. But, if Strict Occupancy is the appropriate account,
the argument for Stable Inclusivity is somewhat less obvious. As we saw,
Strict Occupancy is suciently rigid to draw into question the extent to
which standpoint occupants ought to be treated as experts as an inquiry
progresses. Even if strict occupants are not experts, however, they nev-
ertheless provide relevant and otherwise unavailable evidence. More-
over, insofar as the central problem with treating Strict occupants as
experts has to do with their being, in a sense, unresponsive to much of
the other evidence they trust, this is not necessarily a reason to disre-
gard the expert value of their testimony. Had such agents not acquired
the evidence they are ignoring, Scrubbing for the standpoint would not
present this particular problem for their claim to expertise. That is, it is
possible for similar agents to have the same attitudes and same claim to
expertise (via their standpoint) without this undermining concern. This
suggests that the inadequacy of their response is importantly contin-
gent. Whether this is enough to justify treating their testimony as ex-
pert remains opaque, but there is at least room for further defense of
Stable Inclusivity under Strict Occupancy.
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This leaves us with deference, the individual-level counterpart to in-
clusivity. Because the epistemic good we’ve identied as common to
standpoint occupants is a form of expertise, we’ll take more general
norms governing deference to experts as a starting point. In the case of
objective chances, those norms look something like Lewis’s (1981) Prin-
cipal Principle, which, roughly speaking, states that you should set your
degree of belief in a proposition to your expectation of the objective
chance that it is true, given your evidence.50 Similar principles apply to
your future credences, other rational agents, and so on. In general, these
principles state that, conditional upon your expert having a certain at-
titude once they’ve been brought up to speed with what you know that
they don’t, you should have that attitude as well. So, if you take Judge
Judy to be an expert on domestic disputes and you learn that she be-
lieves that Jenna is guilty, you should also believe that Jenna is guilty.51
Similarly, standpoint deference principles will require interlocutors
to adopt occupants’ attitudes where those attitudes concern occupants’
expertise. What might such an update look like on the kind of frame-
work developed here? To sketch this process, we’ll begin with testimony.
Testimony, in general, serves to inform the hearer about what propo-
sitions particualr viewpoints support on this framework. Where that
testimony concerns a standpoint occupied by the speaker, it is relevant
not only to the speaker’s viewpoint, but also their standpoint.52 With
50There are numerous issues with Lewis’ formulation, but this simple version will
suce for present purposes.
51 This assumes that you don’t have any additional relevant information and that
there’s no other expert you defer to who disagrees with Judge Judy.
52 Though I will not delve into this question at present, this does assume that hears
can identify testimony that counts as coming from a speaker’s standpoint. This kind of
“marked testimony”, I take it, plays a signicant role inmany discussions of testimonial
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the relevant viewpoints updated appropriately,53 the question becomes
how the hearer ought to relate the standpoint to the rest of those she
trusts. Given the role of Promotion in allowing the standpoint occu-
pant to act as an expert using the viewpoint associated with her stand-
point, we might take Promotion to be the appropriate response here as
well. While Promotion does leave room for using the agent’s current
evidence, it falls short of the general principles dened above because
it allows for only one candidate expert. To remedy this, we might gen-
eralize Promotion by allowing a set of promoted viewpoints:
Multi-ViewpointPromotion. LetM = 〈W,V, A,E,I〉be a view-
point model and let V be a subset of V. The model
M∗V = 〈W∗V ,V∗V , A∗V ,E∗V ,I∗V〉 has V∗V = V, W∗V =W, I∗V = I,
A∗V = V ∪A, and
E∗V(w) = {JφKM∗V | 〈w,φ〉 ∈ vi for some vi ∈ A∗V and,
for some v ∈ V , JφKM ∩⋂〈w,ψ〉∈vJψKM 6= ∅}
This behaves exactly as the earlier version of Promotion, with the ex-
ception that a proposition will make it into the agent’s evidence relation
in virtue of being consistent with any of the promoted experts. Even so,
Multi-Viewpoint Promotion leaves much to be desired. For example, it
requries that all experts are treated identically, which captures relatively
few cases. I leave it to future work to determine how best to design ex-
pert principles for viewpoint models (and neighborhood semantics for
injustice and gaslighting (cf. Fricker (2007), McKinnon (2017)). With these examples in
mind, I will assume that hearers can distinguish the relevant testimony suciently well
for present purposes, though this does bear further discussion.
53 This can be handled either as direct changes to elements of V or as the agent re-
placing elements of A that represented the viewpoints before receiving new testimony
with elements of V that match their new understanding of the viewpoints.
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evidence logic in general).54 Whatever form such principles take, stand-
point occupants’ testimony ought to be treated as expert testimony.
Again, however, this story is less convincing under Strict Occupancy.
If the justication for taking on occupants’ testimony has more to do
with the fact that they provide an otherwise unavailable interpretation
of your evidence than it does with their being experts, an update like
this one seems far too strong. A weaker response, such as Viewpoint
Addition, may still be warranted, however. Even if they do not provide
expertise, standpoint occupants still provide a well-grounded interpre-
tation of the evidence, which an interlocutor would be unwise to ignore.
As we saw in §2.5, coming to trust a viewpoint this way still has the ef-
fect of undermining beliefs that contradict it, but it lacks the inquiry-
dening force of the alternatives. This suggests that there is a trade-o
to be had between the strength of our notion of occupancy, on one hand,
and the strength of the epistemically grounded norms it can support on
the other. At both the individual and organizational levels, an account
of occupancy that preserves the parallel with expertise, such as Promo-
tional Occupancy, provides a clearer route to epistemically-justiable
norms. Either way, however, implementing these norms presents a sig-
nicant challenge.
For both Strict and Promotional Occupancy, the norms just sketched
focus on standpoint occupants. Understood as “third-party” devices ex-
plaining howwe, as theorists, ought tomeasure howwell non-occupants
are doing, this isn’t too worrisome. Employing them requires that we
54 Again, I suspect that a more nuancedmodel, such as the one suggested in footnote
45, would provide resources for a more viable account of deference.
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have a way of identifying standpoint occupants and their viewpoints,
but this, too, is within the scope of our theoretical position. Standpoint
theorists have broader aims than this, however. Insofar as the goal is to
actually improve research communities, norms with some capacity to
guide those communities are far more valuable than norms that merely
characterize their shortcomings. For an agent to respond to norms like
these, however, she must be able to correctly identify standpoint occu-
pants. Without this ability, her shortcomings will remain opaque to her.
There is a similar worry, of course, for the more general counterpart of
these norms: it doesn’t help to tell someone to defer to experts if they
can’t tell who the experts are.55 A particularly common response to this
issue is to track how accurate purported experts are over time. Even if
you can’t understand how they got their answers, you can determine
whether they answered correctly and, using that information, update
your views about their expertise.56 One might worry that this solution
is particularly ill-suited to the case of standpoint occupants, however. If
the evidence towhich occupants are responding is privileged, and there-
fore inaccessible to non-occupants, how can a non-occupant verify that
those who appear to be standpoint occupants are, in fact, occupants?
The situation here is not so grim, however. Part of the point of stand-
point epistemology is to highlight a systemic problem that inhibits the
quality and accuracy of research programs, especially in the social sci-
ences. If that is, indeed, a consequence of the exclusion standpoint epis-
temologists’ norms are meant to address, then following these norms
55 See Goldman (2001) for further discussion of this problem.
56 The accuracy measures used in Bayesian epistemology do exactly this.
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will impact the course of the research in question. Such impacts thereby
provide testable predictions that provide non-occupants with evidence
concerning the expertise of the supposed occupants to whom they de-
fer. Such consequences may not be as clear or direct as, say, predictions
of tomorrow’s weather, but they provide relevant data nonetheless.
2.7 The Role of the Political
So far, we have an account on which the privilege standpoints pro-
vide is closely tied the notion of expertise, characterized in terms of
evidential support relations, and a model that lets us use this account to
explore variations of the theory, all of which are intended to be tractable
from the perspective of concentional epitsemology. Lest this be under-
stood as an attempt to “trim o [standpoint epistemology’s] unwieldy
or discomting elements so as to incorporate it into more conserva-
tive philosophies or methodologies,” (Harding, 2009, p. 194), it is worth
taking care to emphasize that this is only part of the story. Standpoint
epistemology is incomplete without the political moorings that situate
these structures in the real world. These political commitments play
at least three particularly important roles in the version of standpoint
epistemology developed here.
An Argument for Occupancy. In §2.5, we looked at ways to character-
ize what it ismeans to occupy a standpoint. The repercussions of choos-
ing between these characterizations go well beyond determining who
occupies a standpoint and who does not. One of the clearest benets of
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the account developed here is that it situates standpoints within conven-
tional epistemology, treating those who occupy standpoints as experts
within a particular domain. So, whatever epistemic norms apply to ex-
pert testimony apply to standpoint occupant testimony. If, however,
we choose a characterization of what it means to occupy a standpoint
that picks out a narrower group than the relevant experts, we strain that
continuity. And, as we saw, there are some considerations in favor of re-
quiring signicantly more of standpoint occupants than just expertise
and experience. So, whether occupying a standpoint looks like acting
as an expert (at least enough so that the model can treat them the same
way) remains an open question that cannot be resolved on the epistemic
side alone.
Demonstrating the Generative Capacity of Expertise + Social Loca-
tion. In §2.3, I argued that the we can explain the privilege associated
with occupying a standpoint in terms of the combination of one’s lived
experience and a kind of expertise concerning the social location pro-
viding that experience. While we can make space for this in the model,
however, it is not something that can be accounted for in purely epis-
temic terms. Themodel developed here ismerely a framework—lling
out the details of how particular standpoints provide these evidential
support relations and what they look like is the work of political and
social philosophy. With this piece in place, our general epistemic obli-
gation to defer to experts applies to the case of standpoint occupants.
This does not yet explain the politically salient specicity of stand-
point theorists’ epistemic norms, however.
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Incentive and Ignorance. The specicity of these norms arises from
the demonstration that social hierarchies incentivize those who occupy
dominant locations to ignore or discount testimony ‘marked’ as the prod-
uct of a standpoint. Here, again, the epistemic and political go hand-in-
hand. Demonstrating that social location creates such incentives is ex-
actly the kind of work done byMills’s (2007) “White Ignorance”, among
many others. If that’s right, then politically neutral epistemic norms
— deference to experts, for example — will not suce. At the very
least, it suggests the need for explicitly social norms in the organization
and governance of epistemic communities concerned with standpoint-
relevant research. Since the expertise of those occupying subordinated
standpoints is obfuscated for agents in dominant social positions, it also
suggests that it may be epistemically valuable to have socially-inected
internalist epistemic norms.
At the outset, I suggested that our epistemic and moral obligations
bolster one another. Each of the roles we’ve considered here is a case in
point — the political works in concert with the epistemic, allowing us to
recover standpoint theory’s politically-infused epistemic norms.
Conclusions
We began with the goal of nding an account of standpoint episte-
mology that could not only avoid common pitfalls and support su-
ciently robust normative conclusions, but also provide enough struc-
ture to explore clear, precise theses about how agents ought to interact
with standpoints. The account we’ve developed, on which agents’ dis-
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tinctive ways of relating to their evidence constitute the epistemic priv-
ilege that standpoints provide, meets these criteria. Moreover, we can
arrive at this kind of view without arguing that oppression or social lo-
cation automatically endows anyone with epistemic superiority. While
this account (and the formal model associated with it) leaves out many
important aspects of what it is to occupy a standpoint — aect, prac-
tical consequences, etc. — it captures much of the central epistemic
phenomenon, doing so in a way that preserves individuals’ distinctive
experiences. In providing an account of the theory’s epistemic back-
bone that is largely continuous with conventional epistemology, it al-
lows us to apply familiar formal modeling techniques and understand
how we can integrate standpoints into such systems. This continuity
allows us to employ conventional epistemic norms — regarding defer-
ence to experts, in particular — alongside largely independent political
observations to recover standpoint theorists’ hybrid normative commit-
ments. Standpoint epistemology’s politically-laden normative commit-
ments do not conict with conventional epistemology. Rather, they are
a consequence of taking seriously the social contexts in which we carry
out our epistemic lives.
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CHAPTER III
Evidence in a Non-Ideal World
More often than we’d like, we encounter people who hold oppressive
beliefs — beliefs that lead them to misrepresent and, as a result, mis-
treat others on the basis of their social groups. Whether such beliefs are
racist, sexist, or otherwise morally repugnant, it’s tempting to dismiss
those who hold them as malicious or irrational, if not both. And many
have.1 Often, these arguments proceed by identifying some respect in
which the agent’s response to her evidence is decient. She responded
irrationally to her evidence, gathered it poorly, or ran afoul some other
aspect of the relationship between evidence and justication. If that’s
right, we can dismiss these beliefs as unjustied. Where malice moti-
vates such beliefs, we can do the same.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that we can explain away
the apparent justication of every oppressive belief by appealing tomal-
ice ormishap and call the case closed. First, it is at least possible for one’s
body of evidence to support such beliefs. Even agents whose evidence-
gathering practices are suciently varied and careful can be unlucky.
1 Cf. Bolinger (2018), Basu (forthcoming), Shelby (2014), Geuss (1981), and Haslanger
(2012b).
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On standard accounts, beliefs formed on such a basis can meet the re-
quirements of justied belief. Second, even if those explanations do
cover every actual case, there is practical value to knowing what it might
look like to be in epistemic contexts that would produce confounding
cases. Wheremost responses to the “rational racist” and “justied sexist”
point to shortcomings they may be blind to, being able to identify the
dierences between our actual epistemic contexts and ones that would
produce bodies of evidence capable of justifying such beliefs provides
a distinct, contrastive response.
There’s more than this practical upshot to be had, however. In this
paper, I’ll argue that it is not only possible, but in fact quite common
for individual agents in oppressive social contexts to accrue bodies of
evidence that support oppressive beliefs. Under such conditions, gain-
ing misleading evidence isn’t merely a matter of bad luck. It is the pre-
dictable result of a phenomenon I’ll call evidential distortion, a structural
feature of our epistemic contexts that skews readily available evidence.
More specically, our focus will be cases in which ideology is to blame
for that distortion. As we’ll see, the very common functionalist concep-
tion of ideology, under which perpetuating and reinforcing unjust so-
cial conditions is a dening feature, implies that this kind of ostensibly
justifying evidential distortion will occur. This suggests the need for
an account of justication that is responsive to agents’ non-ideal epis-
temic and social conditions. While I will focus on what I take to be the
most important cases — the formation of ostensibly justied oppres-
sive beliefs — this phenomenon extends to any case in which this kind
of predictable, systemic evidential distortion occurs.
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I aim to establish two central claims. First, that beliefs formed as a re-
sult of evidential distortion will appear justied on prominent accounts
of justication, both internalist and externalist.2 Second, that these cases
reveal a kind of structural epistemic injustice, especially where oppres-
sive ideology is involved. §3.1 explains the notions of evidential and
ideological distortion. In §3.2, I draw a line from the background fea-
tures that give rise to such distortion to its eects on agents’ epistemic
contexts. We’ll focus on the epistemic consequences of evidential dis-
tortion in §3.3 and establish the rst claim. Finally, in §3.4, we will see
how these distortions can bring about a structural form of epistemic in-
justice, establishing the second claim. I’ll also argue that this kind of
injustice creates a broad-based ameliorative responsibility toward our
epistemic contexts.
3.1 Coins, Sharks, and Terrorists
Our epistemic success depends on our evidence. This is because ra-
tional agents are bound to respond to the evidence they obtain, regard-
less of whether doing so constitutes an epistemic improvement. As a
result, rational agents are sometimes led astray, ending up with false be-
liefs or inaccurate credences that are nonetheless justied. Often, this is
merely amatter of bad luck. In the caseswe’ll focus on, however, the role
2 For the sake of clarity, I take justied doxastic attitudes to be the result of cred-
itworthy inquiry. While the notion of creditworthy inquiry leaves space for both in-
ternalist and externalist views, it rules out factive interpretations of justication, such
as Littlejohn’s (2012). I set accounts like this aside because I am primarily interested
the eects of ideology and other distorting inuences on creditworthy inquiry. How-
ever, I am not wedded to the term ‘justication’. The reader may substitute whatever
content-neutral term she pleases for doxastic states formed in a creditworthymanner.
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of luck is overshadowed by other, less impartial aspects of our epistemic
environments.
Let’s begin with a neutral example. In the opening scene of Rosen-
crantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, Rosencrantz catches the glint of a coin
in the dirt and stops his horse to pick it up. He tosses the coin and an-
nounces “Heads.” Tossing it again, he gets the same result. A third toss,
"Heads." And a fourth. This continues for another fteen tosses before
Guildenstern catches the coin mid-toss, snatching it away from Rosen-
crantz, to examine whether it actually has a tails side. Finding that it
does, he tosses it back to his companionwith a look of suspicion. Rosen-
crantz catches it on the back of his hand and declares, “Heads.”3
Supposing that the coin is fair, the pair is having remarkably bad
epistemic luck when it comes to learning the coin’s bias. Were the coin
severely biased towardheads, by about .9659, the 20-ip sequencewould
be as likely as not, but it’s vanishingly unlikely with a .5 bias. Absent
nigh-unshakable certainty that the coin is fair or dubiously counter-
inductive priors,4 this unfortunate string of evidencewill likely lead them
away from the truth, lowering their condence in the actual bias of the
coin. Nevertheless, their terrible epistemic luck has nobearing onwhether
their responses are rational. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, however,
are in a truly bizarre situation.
Not all instances of potentially misleading evidence are so extraor-
dinary. On July 30th, 2001, Time Magazine ran a terrifying cover story:
“The Summer of the Shark”. The story describes several fatal shark at-
3See Stoppard (1994).
4For the bulk of what follows, I won’t presume that rational constraints on credences
rule out such priors.
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tacks from that summer in horric detail, while companion articles ad-
vise swimmers on how to avoid attacks, recount the heroic rescue of an
eight-year-old boy from a bull shark, and explain the science behind
the hunting tactics of one of the planet’s oldest, most ecient predators
(Time Magazine, 2017). The Time issue came on the heels of dozens of
television news broadcasts and print exposés. By the end of the sum-
mer, shark attacks were the fourth most discussed item on television
news (Eisman, 2003, p. 55).
As one might expect, this surge in coverage led many to infer that
shark attacks were on the rise, that they posed a signicant, immanent
threat to swimmers, and so on. This eect was so pervasive, in fact, that
legislation aimed at curtailing the scourge of attacks was not only pro-
posed, but passed into law (Sunstein, 2002, p. 20). The new law banned
shark-feeding excursions in Florida waters, even though the link be-
tween these excursions and the attacks was tenuous at best.5 More im-
portantly, the problem it was meant to address — the increasing danger
of shark attacks — turned out to be a ction. In the summer of 2001,
shark attacks actually decreased signicantly compared with the previ-
ous year (Keen, 2002). In the years since, the Summer of the Shark has
become a symbol of irresponsible news coverage and a go-to example
of the “if it bleeds, it leads” trope.6
What’s important about this example, for our purposes, is that the
5 It’s worth noting that ocials at the time stated that the ban was unrelated to the
high-prole attacks and resulting public panic, though there was widespread skepti-
cism about this Hatcher (2001). Moreover, public calls for the ban did cite feeding
expeditions as a contributory cause.
6 See, in particular, The Daily Show, “I Know What You Did Last Summer of the
Shark”, July 15, 2002.
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relevant inferences — from an increase in coverage over previous years
to the belief shark attacks are a signicant danger or to decreased con-
dence in swimming is safe— seem perfectly rational. While there might
be better explanations available, such as a slow summer in the news-
room, there’s nothing obviously irrational about the less cynical infer-
ences. Moreover, just as it seems reasonable to become increasingly
condent that trac is not only bad, but extremely bad with succes-
sive complaints from friends, becoming more condent in shark attacks
are a signicant danger with each new report seems far from irrational.7
While this case diers from Rosencratnz and Guildenstern’s coin ip-
ping in that the ‘right’ inferential structure is far less obvious and the
data is far more removed from the propositions in question, a common
thread connects them: bad epistemic luck. Given their doxastic states at
the time, the evidence they collected led them away from the truth.
That summer ended with another drastic changed in media cover-
age. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, news media
were understandably inundated with coverage of the event. Even after
the initial turmoil died down, however, coverage of terrorism remained
dramatically elevated in comparison with the decade preceding the at-
tack (Pew Research Center, 2006). As with the Summer of the Shark, the
coverage of terrorism dwarfs the risk. While Americans aremore likely
to be killed in a terrorist attack than a shark attack, both are far less likely
than death by bathtub, toaster, or texting (Nye, 2016). On a broader scale,
7 Notice that this need not rely on the so-called Illusory Truth Eect, which results
from being exposed to mere repetition of a proposition (Hasher et al., 1977; Unkelbach
and Rom, 2017). Here, agents may be relying on assumptions about proportionality
with respect to signicance and frequency of coverage. We’ll take a closer look at how
to characterize these inferences below, in §3.3.4.
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the threat of terrorism in Western countries has dropped signicantly
since the end of the 20th century, when terrorist organizations like the
ETA, a Basque separatist organization, and the IRA, the Irish Republican
Army, were active (DataGraver, 2016). In contrast with the short-lived
Summer of the Shark, however, the distortion in coverage that grew out
of September 11th persists, as do its epistemic repercussions. According
to a Gallup poll conducted in 2015, 16% of Americans still believed that
terrorism was themost important issue facing the United States (Rikin,
2015). Similarly, a recent survey by the Pew Research Center found that
70% of Americans are ‘very concerned’ or ‘somewhat concerned’ about
Islamic extremism in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2017, §5).
There are many reasons for the dierence between these cases in
terms of longevity and impact. Most saliently, they dier dramatically
in scale and motive. For our purposes, however, the most important
dierence between these cases is the role of ideology. September 11th
brought about a dramatic shift in Americans’ relationship with terror-
ism. What was once a distant or isolated problem became an existential
threat tied to an unfamiliar religion. In the United States, Islam went
from being regarded as a minority faith closely related to the other
Abrahamic religions to being feared as a hotbed of fanaticism. The so-
called War on Terror, which focused almost exclusively on Islamic ter-
rorism, became a beacon of patriotism (Eisman, 2003). These associa-
tions have become a background feature of modern American culture
— they are part of our ideology.
As a result, the phrase “Islamic terrorism” is virtually redundant to-
day. This ismisleading, however. Take, for example, the following claim:
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Quarter: Islamic terrorism accounts for about a quarter of ter-
rorist incidents in the United States.
Not only is Quarter false, it also dramatically overstates the case. Ac-
cording to a study by The Washington Post, terrorist attacks carried out
by Muslim perpetrators between 2011 and 2015 account for only 12.4%
of the total number of attacks in the United States despite constituting
44% of printmedia’s coverage of terrorism (Kearns et al., 2017). In light of
this, it is unsurprising that Muslims are regarded with undue suspicion
and fear even sixteen years after the events of September 11th. More to
the point, given an epistemic context in which the evidence an agent is
likely to obtain is so dramatically skewed relative to the facts, a belief like
Quartermight well be justied with neither malice nor mishap marring
the inference.
This kind of biased coverage is a source of evidential distortion.
Evidential Distortion. For any proposition p, p is subject to
evidential distortion in an epistemic context just in case that
context skews the readily available evidence so as to increase
the likelihood that agents in that context encounter evidence
supporting a particular doxastic state with respect to p.
On this denition, evidential distortion is exceedingly common.8 We’ll
take a closer look at the several aspects of this denition below,9 but the
8While most of the cases we’ll focus on concern distortions that support oppressive
beliefs, it is worth noting that this denition includes propositions like the earth is about
5000 years old as well. In a Creationist epistemic context, for example, the available
evidence will be skewed toward supporting belief in this proposition.
9 See §3.2.1 for the notion of an epistemic context and §3.3.3 for a discussion of what
it means for evidence to be skewed in this way.
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Summer of the Shark provides an intuitive example. American news
media and the epistemic contexts associated with it were causally re-
sponsible for the evidential distortion that led to the ensuing panic.
In this sense, the epistemic victims of the Summer of the Shark suf-
fered a very dierent kindof bad luck thandidRosencrantz andGuilden-
stern. Where their misfortune is, as Guildenstern at one point hypothe-
sizes, nothingmore than “a spectacular vindication of the principle that
each individual coin spun individually is as likely to come down heads
as tails”, the media-consuming public had no such probabilistic prin-
ciple to rely upon that summer (Stoppard, 1994). Their misfortune was
rationally maintaining their trust media outlets that, because of an un-
usually dull summer, had toomuch time to ll, toomany pages to print,
and too little content.10 What themedia xated on andwhen they did so
were matters of luck. Not so with respect to Muslims in the years after
September 11th. Here, ideology plays a critical role:
Ideological (Evidential) Distortion. Ideological distortion oc-
curs when a dominant ideology
1. Is the primary cause of evidential distortion, and
2. The distortion brought about supports doxastic states re-
inforcing that ideology.
In the years after September 11th, Muslims were subject to evidential
distortion as a result of the ideological shift that took place in the im-
10 Without a reason to decrease one’s trust in a particular source of testimonial ev-
idence, I assume that it is rational to maintain the one’s trust, even if the testimony
seems somewhat implausible.
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mediate aftermath of the event.11 It is not a matter of luck that agents
whose epistemic contexts are formed in large part by modern Amer-
ican media are disproportionately likely to accrue bodies of evidence
that, for them, will support negative beliefs (or high condence in such
propositions) about Muslims.12 Rather, given the pervasiveness of anti-
Muslim ideology, this is a predictable outcome — so it goes under the
inuence of ideology.
In the remainder of the paper, I’ll substantiate this claim and trace
its consequences. Focusing on the belief-forming mechanisms behind
the cases discussed in this section, updating on testimonial evidence and
generic acquisition, we’ll see that such mechanisms are not only com-
mon, but generally reliable and, perhaps, unavoidable. Most impor-
tantly, relative to content-neutral, asocial epistemic norms governing
justication, the use of thesemechanisms in epistemic contexts aected
by evidential distortion is indistinguishable from their use in unaected
contexts. As a result, such accounts imply that these beliefs may be jus-
tied. For those who take ideology to exert signicant inuence on our
social contexts, this is an unwelcome result. But, as I’ll argue in §3.3.3,
this follows from functionalism about ideology— a very common com-
11 I do not intend to give an account of how that ideological shift came about. This
is, no doubt, a complex story well beyond the scope of the present discussion. Plau-
sibly, however, the initial coverage itself played a signicant role in that shift. Since I
have dened ideological distortion as the eect of an existing ideology, media cover-
age during the weeks and months immediately following may not have contributed
to an instance of ideological distortion, strictly speaking. For this reason, I restrict my
attention to the most recent decade.
12 This is not to say there’s no luck involved in their encountering this evidence —
one might still think it’s a matter of luck that they were born in the relevant time
frame, speak a relevant language, have sucient cognitive capacities to be aected in
this way, and so forth. What’s important for our purposes is the comparison between
counterparts in similar conditions but for the role of ideology.
85
mitment. Where these ideologically-driven evidential distortions target
oppressed social groups, they can bring about structural epistemic in-
justice where they However, the structural nature of this injustice raises
substantive questions about the nature of epistemic blame and respon-
sibility in these cases, which I address in §3.4. For now, we turn to evi-
dential and ideological distortion themselves.
3.2 Evidential & Ideological Distortion
Discussions of oppressive beliefs often focus on the cognitive pro-
cesses of individual agents.13 Evidential distortion, by contrast, concerns
the epistemic contexts in which those agents form their beliefs. Agents’
responses to their evidence will, of course, be critical to the impact of
evidential distortion, but the phenomenon itself concerns the availabil-
ity of evidence in an epistemic context. Throughout this section, it is
important to keep in mind that the picture presented here is merely
descriptive. I discuss the normative upshots of evidential distortion in
§3.3. As we’ll see, it seems as though standard accounts of epistemic jus-
tication are in need of revision if they are to avoid certifying beliefs
formed on the basis of these distortions.
3.2.1 Distortions in Context
Evidential distortion is a structural feature of our epistemic contexts
that arises when the context skews the readily available evidence so as to
13 See, in particular, Shelby (2003, 2014) andMills (2007).
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support a particular doxastic state. To understand this idea, we’ll begin
by taking a look at the notion of an epistemic context.14
As epistemic agents, wemust engage in evidence-gathering practices.
While the particularities of these practices are idiosyncratic — I read
The Wall Street Journal, you read The New York Times; I use a generic US
version of Google News, you use a personalized version of it — they are
governed, in large part, by our epistemic contexts. These epistemic
contexts inuence topics about which are likely to seek evidence, the
sources we are likely to employ, the methods of dissemination we trust,
the degree of trustworthiness we assign to the evidence obtained, the
frequency with which we seek it out, and so on. We learn these things
from those around us and, while the practices we end up with are by
no means monolithic, they are nevertheless heavily inuenced by our
social contexts’ prevailing epistemic practices.
An epistemic context can be understood as consisting of the epis-
temic practices, habits, and expectations we gather from our social con-
texts. As social contexts shift, so too do their associated epistemic con-
texts. Over the last several decades, for example, our increasing reliance
on the internet has increased the frequency with which we seek evi-
dence, the availability of evidence concerning topics removed from our
everyday lives, and the variety of sources we seek out — not just the
nightly news and the daily paper, but also The Hungton Post, Facebook,
Wikipedia, Snopes, and so forth.
14For the sake of clarity, it’s worth noting that the term “epistemic context” is not
intended to conjure the view known as epistemic contextualism, according to which
knowledge attributions depend on features of the attributor’s context. See Rysiew
(2016).
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Social contexts and their epistemic ramications can be understood
at varying levels of specicity. In the examples above, the Summer of
the Shark and the aftermath of September 11th, the relevant social con-
textwas centered aroundmodernAmerican culture. This is a very broad
level of analysis, however. Many aspects of our narrower social contexts
can result in dierences in our epistemic contexts as well. In particular,
our social roles, political and religious aliations, geographic location,
and age (as well as the intersections of these things) play a signicant role
in shaping our epistemic contexts.15 The dierences in preferred news
sources amongdierent political alignments provide a particularly clear
example of this (Mitchell et al., 2014). Similarly, religious background of-
ten plays a signicant role in determining one’s epistemic context, par-
ticularly with regard to the role of religious testimony and the viability
of faith as an epistemic attitude.
For our purposes, the important feature of epistemic contexts is that,
while they vary along many dimensions, they are nonetheless predic-
tive of individual agents’ epistemic habits, practices, and expectations
at a general level. US citizens, for example, are highly likely to engage
with newsmedia at both the local and national level. Moreover, they are
likely to trust those sources signicantly more than they do friends and
family (Bialik and Eva Matsa, 2017). By structuring our epistemic con-
texts in this way, our social contexts inuence not only how we gather
evidence, but also what evidence we gather. Recall the denition presented
earlier:
15 This idea is closely tied to feminist standpoint theory. See Anderson (2015, §1-2)
for further discussion.
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Evidential Distortion. For any proposition p, p is subject to
evidential distortion in an epistemic context just in case that
context skews the readily available evidence so as to increase
the likelihood that agents in that context encounter evidence
supporting a particular doxastic state with respect to p.
Again, political aliations provide a clear example of this. According to
the PewResearchCenter, 47% of American conservatives favor FoxNews
as their main source of news regarding politics and distrust themajority
of alternative news outlets.16 So, for American conservatives, any topic
for which Fox News presents skewed evidence that, in virtue of being
skewed in that way, more readily supports a particular doxastic state, is
a topic subject to evidential distortion. We’ll examine what it takes for
the readily available evidence to be skewed in §3.3.3.
For the moment, we focus on the question of whether such evidential
distortion constitutes ideological distortion. For this to be the case, recall
that (a) and (b) must apply:
Ideological (Evidential) Distortion. Ideological distortion oc-
curs when a dominant ideology
(a) Is the primary cause of evidential distortion, and
(b) The distortion brought about supports doxastic states re-
inforcing that ideology.
While the ideology of American political conservatism is clearly associ-
ated with a particular epistemic context given the data cited above, the
16 See (Mitchell et al., 2014). According to the same data, American liberals are far less
unied in their preferences and far more trusting of dierent outlets. For the sake of
simplicity, I focus on the conservative case.
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question of whether that association gives rise to ideological distortion
is not only a matter of whether that association causes evidential distor-
tion but also, and more importantly, whether that distortion supports
the ideology generating it. In other words, we’ll need to show that there
is some topic with respect to which Fox News presents evidence skewed
so as to support American conservative political ideology.
To see what that might look like, we turn to the campaign season
leading up to the 2008 presidential election. During that period, 46%
of Fox News’ coverage of the liberal candidate, President Obama, was
negative in tone, compared with 12% of its coverage of the conservative
candidate, Governor Romney. By contrast, only 6% of its coverage was
positive for the liberal candidate, while 28% was positive for the conser-
vative candidate.17 Given that these numbers dier dramatically from
those of other news outlets over the same period and that the viewership
groupings fall along ideological lines identical to the skewing, this sug-
gests that the body of evidence that likely to be gathered by American
conservatives concerning the presidential candidates during this period
was, indeed, aected by ideological, not just evidential, distortion.18
3.2.2 An Objection: Irresponsible Evidence-Gathering
At this point, one might be inclined to object along the following
lines: The problem with the conservative viewer isn’t that she’s being
misled, it’s that she’s doing a poor job of gathering evidence. By re-
17 The remaining stories weremixed in tone for both. See Pew Research Center (2012).
18 While this much does not rule out the alternative explanation that it was the other
news outlets, skewed in the opposite direction, that contributed to ideological distor-
tion rather than FoxNews, a closer look at the data suggests this explanation is unlikely.
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stricting her attention to Fox News, she’s being epistemically irrespon-
sible and, as a result, her beliefs are unjustied. No further investigation
necessary.
While epistemic irresponsibility may well undermine justication,
the relevance of this objection to the case at hand depends on the ex-
planation for the agent’s self-imposed restriction to Fox News. There
are three salient possibilities:
(1) She is being (or has been) epistemically lazy,19
(2) She does not want evidence that will contradict her beliefs,20 or
(3) She is choosing her sources based on the degree to which she trusts
them as reliable sources.
Of these, (1) and (2) are clearly vicious. At the very least, they are epis-
temically vicious— inmany of the cases we’ve looked at, these explana-
tions seemmorally vicious as well.21 So, this objection goes through for
agents whose evidence-gathering practices can be explained by (1) or (2)
— one cannot form justied beliefs on the basis of such irresponsibly
gathered evidence.
Where (3) is the better explanation, however, this objection is less
convincing. In fact, it’s quite the opposite: gathering evidence in accord
with your justied attitudes toward various sources seems to be respon-
sible, epistemically speaking, if not required. While an agent’s favored
sources might be poor in an objective sense, the question at hand is how
19 See Baher (2011) and Cloos (2015) for extended discussion of this case in relation to
evidentialism about justication.
20SeeMills (2007).
21 Since our focus is epistemic justication, however, I will set aside the latter worry
for the moment. See Smith (2011) for discussion.
91
those sources appear to the agent. In the case of our conservative con-
sumer, her justied epistemic attitudes with respect to news sources tell
her that FoxNews is a reliable source of testimonial evidencewhile other
news networks are not.22 For such an agent, the other networks are no
more reliable than her daily horoscope. As far as she’s concerned, avoid-
ing those sources is perfectly rational. In order to carry out their epis-
temic practices, rational agentsmust be able to trust their own epistemic
states and, in doing so, use them to guide their inquiry.23 She may well
be wrong about the quality of her sources, but this alone is not enough
to render her doxastic states unjustied.
We turn now to the eects of this distortion on agents’ epistemic
states and the central normative question: Can beliefs formed on the
basis of this kind of distortion be justied on standard views?24
3.3 Epistemic Consequences
The denition of ideological distortion states that such distortions
skew the evidence readily available in an epistemic context so as tomore
readily support epistemic attitudes that reinforce the distorting ideology.
In this section, I aim to substantiate that claim and argue that common
accounts of justication lack any means by which to distinguish beliefs
22 Smith (1983) explains a number of epistemic missteps that might culpably lead an
agent to such a state. I take it to be at least possible for an agent to nd herself in this
state without tripping over any of these stones.
23 This line of argument is closely related to Lewis’s (1971) defense of “immodest”
inductive methods.
24For the sake of space, I omit discussion of important comparisons between eviden-
tial distortion and other topics in social epistemology. In particular, motivated reason-
ing. See (Mills, 2007) and (McLaughlin, 1988). Cf also (Medina, 2012),(Dotson, 2014), and
(Fricker, 2007).
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formed on the basis of distorted evidence from those formed without
distortion. We begin with evidence.
3.3.1 Bodies of Evidence & Evidential Support
For present purposes, ‘evidence’ is meant in a fairly intuitive sense:
having suciently strong evidence for pmakes it reasonable to believe
p and gaining evidence for pmakes it reasonable to raise one’s credence
in p.25 This still leaves us with the question of what it means to say that
some evidence supports a particular proposition p. There are two rele-
vant senses of evidential support: incremental and total. Incremental
support pertains to the eect that gaining a particular piece of evidence
has on the probability of p. More precisely,
Incremental Evidential Support. Under a probability func-
tion P, some evidence e supports a proposition p just in case
P(p|e) > P(p).
Where e raises the probability of p, e incrementally supports p. In our
discussion of the Summer of the Shark, agents who responded to the
evidence they gained,
(attack) Tonight’s evening news covered shark attacks.
by increasing their condence in the proposition
25 Two points of order. First, for the sake of simplicity, I’ll assume that the relevant
kinds of evidence can be represented propositionally. Second, I won’tmake any claims
with respect to E = K—the problem Imean to illustrate is independent of whether one
takes evidence to be restricted to the propositions one knows. For further discussion
of evidence in general, see (Kelly, 2016, 2008). For discussion of the E = K and the
relationship between evidence and knowledge more generally, see (Williamson, 2002).
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(danger) Shark attacks are a signicant danger.
took attack to provide incremental support for danger. By itself, how-
ever, this is not enough to see the eects of evidential distortion with
respect to danger. For that, we’ll need the second sense of evidential
support: total evidence. Rather than focusing on the eect of a particu-
lar piece of evidence, this notion of support concerns which epistemic
attitudes are supported by one’s total body of evidence.
TotalEvidential Support. Under a probability function P, some
body of evidence E supports a proposition p just in case p is
more likely than ¬p given E.26
Continuingwith shark attacks, then, an agent who takes attack to provide
incremental support for danger might nevertheless have a total body
of evidence that does not support danger. As argued above, however,
the Summer of the Shark is an instance of evidential (though not ideo-
logical) distortion. As a result of continually collecting evidence in this
distorted context, the aected agent is more likely to gather a body of
evidence that supports danger, regardless of whether danger is true.27
This eect on her total evidence brings about two distinct problems
for the aected agent. First, she may be overcondent, having unduly
high credence in danger. Where this eect is severe enough that the
26A more ne-grained notion of total evidential support would dene support in
terms of degrees. For example, so that a body of evidence supports p degree x just in
case P(p) = x. For present purposes, the coarse-grained denition above will suce.
27 Whether that eect will be strong enough to alter whether her total evidence sup-
ports danger will be a matter of the degree of evidential distortion, and how much of
that evidence she in fact encounters. So, there remains an element of luck in the ex-
tent to which the agent is aected by the evidential distortion in her epistemic context.
Nevertheless, she is likely to be more condent in danger than she would be without
that distortion.
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agent takes herself to know danger, she may then regard evidence as
misleading and, as a result, dismiss that evidence.28 The second prob-
lem is rigidity. Here, the question isn’t what particular degree of con-
dence the agent places in the aected proposition, but how entrenched
it is.29 An agent like the Fox Viewer discussed abovemight, for example,
have a middling credence, say .38, in the proposition President Obama
was born in Kenya but be extremely condent that this is the right cre-
dence to have. In this case, it will be dicult to change that credence
signicantly, even if she encounters new evidence that incrementally
supports the negation of that proposition. After updating on that ev-
idence, her credences will barely register the change and her beliefs
won’t budge. These eects make evidential distortion a serious prob-
lem, even for agents whose epistemic contexts eventually lose this char-
acter — the aected propositions have a kind of epistemic inertia that is
dicult to overcome.30 None of this directly speaks to the question of
whether these beliefs are justied, however.
28 This is instance of Kripke’s paradox of dogmatism (Sorensen, 2017). Whether dis-
missing one’s evidence this way is rational is a separate, contentious issue. See Lasonen-
Aarnio (2013) for a discussion suggesting that it may be.
29While theremay be some kinds of evidence that would radically change the agent’s
credences in these cases, the worry is that the vast majority of what she is likely to
encounter will not. See Joyce (2005) for a discussion of these cases.
30 Here, I have inmind agents whose social conditions change in such a way that they
come to learn dierent, perhaps less distorting epistemic practices. These eects may
persist, even through such changes.
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3.3.2 Justication
Views of justication are often divided into two useful, if somewhat
fraught, categories: internalism and externalism.31 For many internal-
ists, in particular evidentialists and subjective Bayesians, justication is
largely a matter of how an agent’s doxastic states relate her evidence.32
For example, evidentialists argue for this account of justication:
Evidentialism. Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is
epistemically justied for S at t if and only if having D toward
p ts the evidence S has at t. (Conee and Feldman, 2004, p.310)
Connecting to the probabilistic notions of evidential support discussed
in the previous section, ‘t’ can be understood as follows:
Under a probability function P, S is justied in believing p to
degree x just in case P(p) = x.
On this kind of view, the fact that one’s evidential support relations
are radically mistaken does not aect whether they can support justi-
ed belief formation. So long as they are properly related to the agent’s
evidence, doxastic attitudes formed under conditions of evidential dis-
tortion will be justied regardless of their content.
However, one might worry that this is far too subjective of an un-
derstanding of evidential support. On this kind of approach, the only
31 For the sake of space, I limit the discussion that follows to what I take to be the
most prominent, representative examples of each category. See Pappas (2017) andKelly
(2016) for more thorough discussions.
32Both of these are so-called ‘mentalist’ internalisms, on which justication is a mat-
ter of having the right kind of mental state, regardless of whether the agent is aware of
that state. Access internalists require, in addition, that an agent be able to point to that
justifying mental state. See (Steup, 2017, §2.3) for further discussion of this distinction.
For present purposes, I continue with a mentalist approach.
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constraints on evidential support relations are the formal features that
dene probability functions. As a result, even extremely racist, sexist,
or otherwise oppressive priors could support justied beliefs. Some-
one who takes anything said by a woman to increase his condence that
women are hysterical, for example, would be justied in those beliefs
so long as his priors are probabilistic. These are trivial cases in which
subjective Bayesians, Evidentialists, and the like have to bite the bullet
with respect to justication. But, they’re not our focus. Rather, the cases
at issue are ones in which the agent’s coming to believe some oppres-
sive proposition is the result of evidential distortion. Without the rele-
vant social factors having played a role in distorting the agent’s evidence,
she would not have come to form the belief. Cases like this can occur
even undermore constrained understandings of evidential support. So,
while I’ll continue to use the subjective account suggested above, the
arguments that follow are meant to apply to more constrained under-
standings of evidential support as well. As long as those constraints do
not make it nigh-impossible for rational agents to encounter evidence
supporting oppressive beliefs, the central cases remain viable.33
But, this leaves open a critical question with respect to ideological
distortion:Why think that agents will be particularly likely to take the evidence
they encounter as a result of ideological distortion to support propositions that
33 To propose constraints that do rule these out seems to be legislating a matter of
moral goodness rather than epistemic goodness. Even if one takes extremely prejudi-
cial priors to be irrational, it seems implausible to restrict rational priors so far as to
rule out the possibility of evidence rationally supporting oppressive beliefs — to do so
would require all rational agents to regard these propositions as nearly impossible, re-
gardless of their experience. Moreover, which propositions turn out to be oppressive
is a contingent matter that depends on one’s social context, which makes ruling them
our a priori implausible.
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cohere with that ideology? We’ll focus on this question in the next section.
Even with that answer in hand, however, one might avoid the odious
conclusion that these beliefs are justied by adopting an externalist ap-
proach. For externalists, justication is sensitive to features beyond the
agent herself. Reliabilists such asGoldman (1979), for example, argue that
the question of whether a doxastic attitude is justied turns on whether
the mechanism by which that attitude was formed is a reliable one.34
On an account like this, one might hope to identify a general feature of
inquiry under evidential distortion that falls short of this condition. We
turn to this approach in §3.3.4.
I think “rational racists” and their ilk are unjustied. Epistemic prac-
tices that are not responsive to the possibility of misleading ideological
distortion are decient tools for forming justied beliefs in epistemic
contexts like our own. As we’ll see in the next two sections, however,
both the externalist and the internalist (at least in the forms discussed
above) get this wrong. We begin with the internalist’s question.
3.3.3 The Role of Ideology
So far, I have been relying on an intuitive understanding of ideology.
However, in order to answer the internalist’s question — why think that
ideology distorts epistemic contexts so as to more readily support be-
liefs coherent with that ideology — we’ll need a more denite notion. In
brief, I’ll take an ideology to be a mutually supporting, self-sustaining
network of beliefs, attitudes, values, social meanings, scripts, and so
34See Goldman and Beddor (2016) for discussion of this condition.
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forth that serves to stabilize certain social practices, institutions, or rela-
tions.35 I do not mean to suggest that this is the only way to understand
the notion of ideology, nor even that it is the only one compatible with
the present project. Rather, Imean to outline a notion of ideology that is
reasonably clear, suciently robust for the task at hand, and compatible
with both political and apolitical understandings of the concept. This
account of ideology is non-cognitivist, non-pejorative, and functionalist.36
Cognitivist views of ideology, such as Shelby’s (2003, 2014), limit their
scope to widely held beliefs, patterns of reasoning, and the like.37 Non-
cognitivist views are more expansive. In addition to the cognitive ele-
ments, they include many aspects of the social context in which those
beliefs are held, such as attitudes, values, social meanings, and so forth.
Next, I’ll use ‘ideology’ in a non-pejorative, sense.38 I want to leave open
the possibility that some ideologies are neither epistemically normorally
problematic.39
Finally, functionalist approaches to ideology require them to play a
particular kind of role in their social contexts. Most often, that role
35 This is similar to the descriptive notion of ideology oered in Geuss (1981).
36 I borrow this set of distinctions from Haslanger (2017), who uses them in relating
her view to Shelby’s (2014).
37 On this kind of view, the epistemic shortcomings of an ideology— not only false-
hood, but also “inconsistency, oversimplication, exaggeration, half-truth, equivoca-
tion, circularity, neglect of pertinent facts, false dichotomy, obfuscation, misuse of
‘authoritative’ sources, hasty generalization, and so forth” (Shelby, 2003, p. 166) — are
the primary target of criticism.
38 This is Geuss’s (1981, Ch. 1, §1) ‘descriptive’ sense of ideology.
39 Certain religious and political ideologies, for example, might be socially benecial,
while scientic ideologiesmight be epistemically benecial. If one is ardently inclined
to keep the name ‘ideology’ for pejorative uses, I am content to give up the term and
target functionalist ‘schmideologies’ instead. If one is then inclined to object that the
only networks of belief and so forth that can be functionalist fall under the scope of
the pejorative use of ‘ideology’, so that ‘schmideology’ is necessarily without instantia-
tion, while still maintaining that ideology is a useful type with actual tokens, I take the
burden of proof to lie with them. I am unaware of any argument to this eect.
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is perpetuating, justifying, or stabilizing the ideology itself, along with
the social structures with which it coheres. Such approaches are quite
common— this self-perpetuating aspect often serves as the feature that
makes ideology a phenomenon deserving of devoted attention.40 This
project is directed at these self-perpetuating accounts of ideology.
Supposing that functionalism is a characteristic of ideology and sup-
posing that racism, sexism, and other oppressions are supported by such
ideologies, we can now answer the internalist’s question. Recall the def-
inition of ideological distortion:
Ideological (Evidential) Distortion. Ideological distortion oc-
curs when a dominant ideology
(a) Is the primary cause of some evidential distortion, and
(b) The distortion brought about supports doxastic states re-
inforcing that ideology.
Let’s begin with (b). Suppose we are in an epistemic context aected
by evidential distortion, so that there is some proposition p such that
the context makes it more likely that the evidence we gather will, in
total, support a particular doxastic state with respect to p. For the sake
of deniteness, let’s suppose that state is believing p. Further, suppose
that this distortion is caused by some dominant ideology, i.41 There are
three relationships thatmight obtain between p and i: (1) p undermines i,
(2) p is neutral with respect to i, or (3) p supports i. Since we’ve assumed
40See (Geuss, 1981, p. 15-19) for a general discussion. Haslanger (2017, 2012b) and Shelby
(2003, 2014), for example, are functionalist views.
41 Recall that a dominant ideology is one that is actively aecting the social context in
a way that coheres with that ideology and is (or is becoming) reected in the structure
of that social context.
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that i is dominant, we can also assume that its overall eects will not
be self-undermining.42 This includes its eects on epistemic contexts.
Moreover, since i is functionalist, we can assume that its overall eects
will be positively self-preserving.
At rst glance, this might seem to allow us to rule out instances of
(1) and (2), but this is too quick. Even if the overall eect of an ideol-
ogy is self-perpetuating, individual elements of that eect might work
against it or be irrelevant to it. A homophobic ideology might, for ex-
ample, make evidence supporting the proposition that gay men are un-
controllably promiscuous pedophiles readily available but also, in the
doing so make evidence supporting ideologically neutral propositions
more salient. Using evidence about the dangers of HIV/AIDS to support
that stereotype, for example, would alsomake evidence supporting ide-
ologically neutral doxastic states concerning HIV/AIDS — such as true
beliefs about the nature of the virus and the auto-immune syndrome
— readily available. This would constitute evidential distortion, but not
ideological distortion. So, while the it is not the case that the inuence
of an ideology supports only reinforcing epistemic attitudes, it will sup-
port enough reinforcing epistemic attitudes to fulll (or contribute to)
the functionalist role.
What about condition (a)? Since both the cognitivist andnon-cognitivist
views of ideology take beliefs to be a critical component of an ideology,
it is dicult to see how a dominant ideology could be dominant without
the functionalist role supporting the formation of those beliefs. Since
42 A discredited or waning ideology, on the other hand might well turn out to be
self-undermining.
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the most direct way to support belief formation is providing evidence,
this suggests that condition (a) will bemet. So, where there is a dominant
(functionalist) ideology, ideological distortion will occur.
Still, a worry lingers. People take the evidence they obtain to sup-
port very dierent propositions. Why think that there’s enough homogene-
ity among dierent agents’ evidential support relations to make this possible?
As a rst pass, it’s worth noting that ideological distortion does not re-
quire a great deal of homogeneity. All that’s required is that the evidence
agents encounter in that context is likely to support a particular doxas-
tic state. Where there are many dierent evidential support relations
among the agents, the distortion brought about will be correspondingly
varied. This raises a new worry, however. What guarantees that this
variation in evidence will not be self-defeating? That is, what prevents
the evidence agent A takes to be in support of p from undermining p for
agent B?
To answer this, recall the discussion of epistemic contexts in §3.2.1.
There, we saw that the social contexts our social contexts exercise sig-
nicant inuence on our epistemic habits, practices, and expectations.
With respect to this worry, what’s important about this is that this pro-
cess serves to render those evidential support relations somewhat more
consistent than theywould be across dierent epistemic contexts. What-
ever the common evidential support relations might be, a functionalist
account of ideology implies that ideological distortion harnesses them
in order to support propositions that cohere with that ideology.43 This
43 On non-cognitivist accounts like the one sketched here, the ideology itself plays
a signicant role in shaping those inferential patterns — this happens through the so-
cial scripts, symbolic meanings, and so forth associated with it (Haslanger, 2017). For
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does not, however, guarantee that every agent in that context will take
the evidence they encounter as a result of ideological distortion to sup-
port the relevant doxastic states. Rather, the claim is that, since the gen-
eral eect of a functionalist ideology is self-preservation and undermin-
ing the ideologywould run contrary to that eect, the inferential pattern
(or combination of patterns) exploited in this way must be suciently
widespread to inculcate epistemic attitudes that serve this function.44
This, then, is the answer to the internalists’s question: it is the func-
tionalist aspect of ideology, operating through its eects on agents epis-
temic contexts and the evidence the obtain therein, that explains how
ideological distortion can occur. If one accepts the claim that ideologies
are functionalist, ideological distortion follows — ideological distortion
is simply the epistemic aspect of functionalism. Moreover, on the in-
ternalist account of justication discussed above, beliefs formed within
and because of such contexts will nevertheless be justied.
3.3.4 The Externalist’s Question
Externalists may still avoid such outcomes. For reliabilist externalists
like those mentioned above, the question is whether they are the prod-
uct of reliable belief-forming mechanisms. If we can demonstrate that
the belief-forming mechanisms involved in these cases at least tend to
be unreliable, there’s hope for an externalist solution. To ascertain how
cognitivist accounts, this route is much less clear. Nevertheless, as a consequence of
being functionalist, this remains the case.
44 Where agents’ evidential support relations with respect to the ideology in question
are suciently diverse, ideological distortion will not occur. In such cases, however, it
is unclear whether that ideology is a dominant one.
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successful this approach might be, we’ll look at two paradigmatic cases:
testimonial inference and generic acquisition.
Testimony. The cases we’ve focused on so far revolve around evidence
drawn from either news broadcasts or print media. Given this, testimo-
nial inference is an obvious way to characterize the belief-formingmech-
anism involved — after watching the news report on a recent shark at-
tack, the viewer updates her doxastic state, taking into account the con-
tent of the report and the degree to which she trusts the report. There
are two questions to address here.
First, is testimonial inference a reliable belief-forming mechanism?
At the outset, the ubiquity of testimonial inferencemakes it a dangerous
choice for the chopping block, at least if justication is to be something
with which actual epistemic agents ought to concern themselves. Be-
yond this, however, testimonial inference does seem to be quite reliable.
Anytime wemanage to form a true belief on the basis of someone else’s
assertion, we’ve done so using testimonial inference. While it’s true that
people sometimes lie andmisleadwith testimony, testimonial inference
is not, in general, an unreliable belief-forming mechanism.
This raises a second question: Is there something about testimonial
inference in these cases that would render it suciently distinct to be
considered a dierent, unreliable belief-forming mechanism? There
are some kinds of testimony, for example eye-witness testimony, that
are notoriously unreliable. As a result, onemight argue, inference based
on that particular kind of testimony constitutes a distinct belief-forming
mechanism — one that’s incapable of conferring justication. Perhaps
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the same can be said for testimony under evidential distortion.
There are several reasons to think that this kind of re-classication
doesn’t do quite the same work in the cases we’ve focused on, however.
A narrow classication like ‘watching Fox News’ or simply ‘newscasting’
won’t work as the classier for two reasons. First, it is particular to the
instances of distortion we’ve been discussing — it is by no means nec-
essary to the phenomenon. Insofar as the phenomenon of evidential
distortion is a general one, it would be useful to have a similarly general
explanation of the shortcoming in agents’ epistemic practices. Second,
just as testimony is generally reliable, so too is testimony gathered from
these sources. It is only with respect to propositions subject to distortion
that the problem arises.
But, perhaps this suggests a better classier: testimony aected by
evidential distortion. This, too, is problematic. Recall that evidential
distortion is a structural phenomenon aecting one’s total body of evi-
dence. It does not need to be the case that individual reports are unreli-
able. In fact, none of the instances discussed so far involved fabrication
— it is only in combination with the pattern of testimony in a particular,
distorting epistemic context that such reports are genuinely misleading
for the agent who hears them. So, in an important sense, the testimony
itself is reliable, even under evidential or ideological distortion.45 We
could, instead, look at forming beliefs on the basis of a body of evi-
dence aected by evidential distortion, but this has the same problem
as dismissing testimony altogether. It is very dicult to avoid eviden-
45It’s also worth emphasizing that evidential distortion need not mislead so long as
it leads — distortions that make it easier to acquire true beliefs are still instances of
evidential distortion.
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tial distortion altogether. Moreover, this route risks running afoul the
well-known generality problem for reliabilism— even if there are clear
descriptions under which the belief-forming mechanism is unreliable,
there is no clear way to determine exactly which way of describing the
it is relevant for determining whether the resultant belief is justied.46
So, re-classication doesn’t seem particularly promising — testimonial
inference remains a reliable belief-forming mechanism.
Generic Acquisition. Our second characterization of these inferences
describes them as the product of a far more fundamental cognitive pro-
cess: generic acquisition. Generics are sentences like these:
(a) ‘He walks home from work.’
(b) ‘Birds y.’
(c) ‘Birds are female.’
Such constructions are quite common in English and many other lan-
guages. Each takes some trait, such as walking, ying, or being female,
and applies it to a category, such as the way someone gets home or birds.
In general, generics have a few noteworthy features. First, we tend to
have very clear intuitions about their veracity: (a) and (b) are true, but
(c) is clearly false. Second, despite this clarity, nailing down the seman-
tic content of generics in general is notoriously dicult. The literature
describing candidate semantics for generics spans from accounts that
oermyriad complex and precise semantics, such asCohen (2012),Nickel
(2008), and Pelletier and Asher (1997), to accounts like Sterken’s (2015), that
give up entirely on the notion that there even is a unied semantics to
46See Conee and Feldman (1998).
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be had. Third, generic constructions have no explicit quantiers, de-
spite being generalizations. So, whether the trait in question applies to
all, some, or most of instances cannot be read directly o of the surface
grammar, as it can for claims like “all lions are intelligent” and “most
Lannisters are awful”. Finally, generics tolerate exceptions. Even though
penguins do not y, (b) seems true and, even if he takes the bus one day,
you can still say (a).
Of course, generics aren’t limited to mundane facts about locomo-
tion. Oppressive beliefs can take the formof generics, as in the following
(repugnant, false) instances:
(a) ‘Women are hysterically emotional.’
(b) ‘Black men are dangerous.’
(c) ‘Immigrants are criminals’
Because each of these takes the form of a generic, agents who believe
them need not take the existence of counterexamples — calm and ra-
tional women, pleasant and safe black men, law-abiding immigrants —
as evidence against them. So, where oppressive beliefs take this form,
they may be particularly dicult to eradicate. But how do such beliefs
come about?
Despite their semantic complexity, generics are among the rst gen-
eralizations humans learn, beginning at age two (Gelman, 2005). In her
work on generic acquisition, Leslie (2008) argues that this is evidence for
an “innately given default [cognitive] mechanism” geared toward form-
ing generalizations (p. 22). This mechanism is the fundamental cogni-
tive means by which we relate a trait, such as ying, to a domain, such
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as birds. In learning to identify new traits or domains, the associations
we form between those categories and ones we already know are, by
default, structured as generics. On this characterization, dierences in
the salience of possible categorizations are key to building the associa-
tions that give rise to generic inferences — explicit testimony need not
be involved.47 To the purpose at hand, Rhodes et al.’s (2017) study of the
development of social categorization in children demonstrates that this
kind of salience-based generic acquisition appears to play a signicant
role in shaping beliefs about social groups.
Where this seems to be the appropriate characterization, then, we
can pursue the externalist’s question: Is generic acquisition is a reliable
belief-forming mechanism? Since an appropriate semantics for gener-
ics is evasive, this is a dicult question to address. The so-called strik-
ing generics are particularly problematic. For example, the sentence
mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus is felicitous despite the fact that only a
very small percentage of mosquitoes in fact carry the virus. More gen-
erally, it appears that striking features require only some of the group’s
members to have that feature in order for generics involving it to be true
of the group (Leslie, 2008, p. 43). So, if being hysterically emotional is a
striking feature, a claim like women are hysterically emotional, will be ex-
traordinarily dicult to falsify. Insofar as the externalist’s question re-
quires us to quantify the proportion of true and false beliefs produced
by this process, this kind of imprecision and exibility does not do the
work we might want it to in this case.
47 For a demonstration of how the tone of media coverage accords with racial ide-
ology in this way, see (Ghandnoosh and Lewis, 2014) and (Dixon and Linz, 2000; Dixon
et al., 2003).
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Moreover, on a broader level, if generic acquisition is as fundamental
to our epistemic capacities asLeslie (2008) argues—acting as the starting
point from which we develop more rened epistemic states — ruling it
out as a reliable belief-forming process has ramications for nearly all
of our beliefs. Importantly, this is also a case in which there is no clear
distinction to be made between the acquisition of oppressive generic
beliefs and neutral ones.48 In both of these cases, the belief-forming
mechanism operates identically, regardless of whether the agent is af-
fected by evidential distortion.
So, on the reliabilist’s externalism, there’s little room to avoid the
conclusion that these beliefs, too, are justied.
3.3.5 Where are we now?
On both the internalist and externalist views of justication, epis-
temic attitudes brought about by the inuence of ideological distortion
may turn out to be justied, morality and distortion notwithstanding.
This seems like the wrong result. In §3.1, we looked at the case of ide-
ological distortion surrounding Muslims after September 11th. While
we’ve seen how ideological distortion can inuence agents’ beliefs, even
agents who are neither malicious nor irrational, it still seems as though
something has gone wrong for an agent who comes to believe that Mus-
lims are dangerous on the basis of this kind of evidence. It seems as if
there’s something more we expect from this agent.
48 As Mills (2007) points out, ideology can play a signicant role in determining the
conceptual backdrop against which these acquisitions take place, but this merely de-
termines which associations are likely to be presented— the process itself remains the
same.
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Recently, Basu (forthcoming), Srinivasan (2017), and others have tried
to resolve cases like this by appending a moral constraint onto justied
belief. I think this is misguided for two reasons. First, it is unresponsive
to the epistemic problem. The epistemic problem arises from being in
an epistemic context that distorts the expected relationship between the
evidence you obtain and the world. While the cause of that distortion
is sometimes morally repugnant, ideological distortion extends beyond
immoral beliefs. A solution narrowly targeting these cases will be neces-
sarily partial. Second, the good relevant to epistemic normativity must
be something along the lines of forming true beliefs (or accurate cre-
dences). But, it’s not at all clear that a moral constraint serves this kind
of aim. So, while it’s clear that there is a moral shortcoming here, it’s
unclear how it would be relevant to epistemic normativity. Ideally, a
solution for these cases would be content-neutral, provide genuinely
guiding norms, and respond to the cause of the problem: ideological
distortion.
In both the internalist and externalist analyses above, what goeswrong
is that the operative epistemic norms ignore the context. They ignore
the fact that the agents in question are carrying out their inquiry within
a social context that inuences every aspect of their epistemic practice.
The problem is neither the agent, nor her evidential support relations,
nor the reliability of her belief forming mechanisms, but these things
taken together in a particular context. Given her actual epistemic en-
vironment — the non-ideal world in which we live — her otherwise
unimpeachable epistemic practices betray her in a predictable, systemic
way. This is the sense in which there is something squarely epistemic
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that’s gone awry, quite apart from the very seriousmoral considerations
in play. Epistemic environments like these require dierent norms —
even in epistemology, a non-ideal world requires non-ideal norms.
While characterizing kind of non-ideal epistemic normativity is be-
yond the scope of the present work, our focus on ideological distortion
also illustrates an importantly structural form of epistemic injustice, to
which we now turn.
3.4 Structural Epistemic Injustice & Responsibility
Ideological distortion’s epistemic harm is best captured by Miranda
Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice:
Epistemic Injustice. A wrong done to someone specically in
their capacity as a knower. Fricker (2007, p. 1)
While many harms are intertwined with our epistemic lives in one way
or another, epistemic injustice focuses on individuals’ capacity to act as
epistemic agents — to come to know through their practices of gather-
ing and responding to evidence.49
However, much of the discussion around epistemic injustice con-
cerns injustices committed by an individual agent against another in-
dividual agent. This focus on specic actors misses the sense in which
injustice is often diuse. It is often part of our social structures in a way
that doesn’t lend itself to picking out the actors or actions causing it,
49 I’ll use the term ‘epistemic injustice’ to refer, specically, to this kind of epistemic
harm, distinguishing it from things like distributive epistemic harm. See Hookway
(2010) for a discussion of other forms of epistemic injustice.
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and its consequences can be subtle things — feeling less safe walking
home at night because of your hijab, for example, or feeling ill-at-ease
for fear of being stereotyped because of your race. While analyses of
oppression are often built around these structural injustices, the struc-
tural tends to slip out of focus in discussions of epistemic injustice. As
we’ve seen, however, evidential distortion is just such a structural phe-
nomenon. Correspondingly, the injustices to which it gives rise will be
structural as well.
3.4.1 Structural Injustice
Where evidential distortion brings about epistemic injustice, it does
so bymaking certain epistemic aims, in particular the formation of true
beliefs and accurate credence, unnecessarily dicult to achieve for agents
in aected epistemic contexts. Regardless of whether one grounds the
importance of truth in the conditions on knowledge, the thought that
belief aims at the truth, or something else entirely, truth-directedness is
fundamental to our epistemic practices.
Oppressive ideologies tend to involve beliefs that demean themoral-
ity, intelligence, and general humanity of those oppressed (Fricker, 2007;
Mills, 2007). As such, they are particularly reliable sources of mislead-
ing idelogical distortions.50 While it is not exclusively oppressive ideolo-
gies that have this detrimental eect, many of them do. When they do,
the resulting ideological distortion undermines this truth-directedness,
making it far more likely that individuals’ bodies of evidence mislead-
50 Haslanger (2012c) argues that at least some of the claims supported by oppressive
ideologies might be true, however.
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ingly support propositions reinforcing that ideology. Moreover, because
this misleading evidence appears only within the relatively narrow do-
main of the ideology, ideological distortion is akin to a kind of gaslight-
ing. For those aected, the harm— unduly high condence in false ide-
ological propositions — is both dicult to detect and, because it relies
on those otherwise reliable faculties, dicult to overcome.
Where such distortions are tied to one’s social position, we see a kind
of structural epistemic injustice: an agent’s social position aects her
epistemic context so as to lead her predictably toward false beliefs with
little way of recognizing that she is being misled, let alone preventing
it.51 This is particularly evident in “self-subordinating” cases like those
discussed by Nussbaum (2001) in which, for example, women in patriar-
chal societiesmay genuinely take their “rightful place” to be subordinate
to a husband. If that’s correct, the injustices of ideological distortion, like
any injustice, require redress. But it’s far from clear where to begin.
3.4.2 Responsibility, Blame, & Stewardship
Likening it to a birdcage, Frye (1983) explains the very similar phe-
nomenon of structural oppression this way:
It is only when you step back, stop looking at the wires one
by one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic view of the
whole cage, that you can see why the bird does not go any-
where [...] It is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by
51 This primary injustice also brings about secondary epistemic justices, such as those
discussed by Fricker (2007) andDotson (2014), as a result of making the dehumaninzing
beliefs associated with oppressive ideologies more prevalent.
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a network of systematically related barriers, no one of which
would be the least hindrance to its ight, but which, by their
relations to each other, are as conning as the solid walls of a
dungeon. (p.4)
In other words, no individual harm is to blame for the overall oppres-
sive eect of sexism, racism, and the like. Rather, the blame seems to
be just as diuse as the oppression itself. So, too, in the epistemic case:
no individual news report, article, etc. is responsible for the misleading
overall eect on one’s total body of evidence. If that’s right, however,
how do we address this structural epistemic injustice? Where do we be-
gin without blame?
This felt need to reach for blame comes from the fact that we tend
to think about responsibility for injustice in terms of liability.52 On this
model, we look for the individual who is to blame for the injustice and
ask that they repay it proportionally. Our accounting is individualistic
and retrospective. But, this won’t work well for structural epistemic in-
justice. As we’ve seen, the harm is not caused by any individual — it is
a feature of the epistemic context as a whole. While individual agents
contribute to this harm, it’s not clear that those individual agents bear
the blame for that harm — certainly not all of it. Additionally, even
where we can identify relevant individuals, there’s little use in retro-
spective amelioration. We cannot simply supply truths to those who
have already formed beliefs on the basis of distorted evidence and de-
mand that they come to believe them. Moreover, given the epistemic
52 The discussion that follows is inspired by Young’s (2011) discussion of structural in-
justice in social contexts. Independently,Medina (2012) uses this discussion to similar,
though distinct eect.
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consequences of evidential distortion, overcondence and rigidity (see
§3.3.1), even retracting past testimony may not have the desired eect.
Rather, we need a forward-lookingmodel of redress. One that enjoins
those who are partially responsible for the existence of epistemic con-
texts that create ideological distortion to alter that context, to recognize
and reduce the ways in which those contexts contribute to this kind of
structural epistemic injustice injustice— to engage in a kind of steward-
ship over our epistemic contexts.
But who bears this responsibility? Instead of looking to an ill-suited
individualistic account, I suggest amodel akin to Young’s (2011, Ch. 4) so-
cial connectionmodel of responsibility. Here, the central observation is
that while wemay not all contribute to structural injustice, or may do so
to signicantly greater or lesser extents, we are nonetheless members of
that social context and, as a result, cooperative with it. In the epistemic
case, that cooperation comes in the form of maintaining, participating
in, and even simply failing to criticize the epistemic habits and prac-
tices that contribute to the distortion. Because we learn these practices,
in part, from those around us, these behaviors contribute to inculcating
the same epistemic practices in others. If this is the sense in which we
are responsible for the structural epistemic injustice in play, we can turn
to the question of what the responsibility of stewardship amounts to.
Just as in Young’s (2011, p. 102-3) political example, individuals can-
not resolve structural epistemic injustices on their own—doing somust
be a collective eort. Rather than adopting a passive, consumptive stance
toward our epistemic contexts, participants in an epistemic community
must take an active role in scrutinizing and maintaining the integrity of
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their epistemic contexts. On this view, being a good epistemic agent re-
quiresmore than just responsibly collecting evidence. Wemust also cre-
ate and disseminate evidence responsibly and critically observe howour
epistemic contexts aect individuals’ interpretation of that evidence.
Conclusion
Ideological distortion is common. It has wide-ranging eects on in-
dividuals’ epistemic states and, in some cases, gives rise to epistemic in-
justice. Moreover, on standard accounts, it appears that beliefs brought
about by such distortions are justied. While the responsibility of stew-
ardshipmay suggest a way to reduce the eects of ideological distortion
over time, this is no reason to let the question of justication slip away.
In fact, we have particularly good reason to pay close attention to justi-
cation in these cases because of the very plausible connections between
justied belief, warranted action, and moral blameworthiness. Justied
belief, it is often thought, warrants action in a way that screens omoral
blameworthiness. While the actionmay still be wrong, the agent herself
isn’t morally blameworthy for performing it in virtue of holding a jus-
tied belief that sanctions the action. If that’s correct, today’s so-called
“rational racist” is (implausibly) morally blameless for actions taken on
the basis of such beliefs. As we saw in §3.3.5, however, there seems to be
a squarely epistemic shortcoming in these cases. If that’s right, there’s
room for an account of justication sensitive to that shortcoming. I leave
it to future work to provide a fuller characterization of that epistemic
defect and oer a suitably responsive account of justication.
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CHAPTER IV
I Know You Are, But What Am I?
The social contexts we occupy determine a lot about our lives.1 These
contexts constrain our food choices, career choices, religious and po-
litical views, family structures, whether we drive on the left or right
side of the road, and whether we think Disneyland is better than Dis-
ney World. They familiarize us with persons and things, such as sous
chefs and sports cars, as well as particular properties, such as popularity
and poverty.
Much of socialmetaphysics is devoted to answering what social kinds
like careers and familial structures are, and how their existence is ex-
plained by their broader ontological context. Our current project fol-
lows this same vein, focusing on the phenomenon of social identity.
Whilewe propose and defend a fairly specic understanding of social
identities, paradigm cases are easily recognizable. For example, con-
sider the following quotation from Rachel Dolezal — a woman with
white parents, who passed as black for many years:
1 This chapter was co-authored with Dr. Robin Dembro. We regard our contribu-
tions in writing, research, and inspiration to be equal.
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I identify as black. [As a ve-year-old child] I was drawing self-
portraits with the brown crayon instead of peach crayon [with]
black curly hair.2
What information does this statement convey? Presumably, Dolezal
is not saying that she has belonged to a black community since she was
ve years old or that she has African ancestry — it is widely known that
these things are false. Instead, the quotation articulates a certain rela-
tionship between Dolezal’s psychology and behaviors on one hand and
a particular social group on the other — a relationship that may hold
regardless of whether Dolezal is or is taken to be a member of that so-
cial group.3 It articulates a kind of bridge between her self-identication
and a social group — what one might call a social-self-identication or
social identity.
Social identities, while a critical part of the social landscape, are under-
explored in comparison with social groups themselves. While a large
literature asks what it is to belong to particular groups, such as women,
blacks, or disabled persons, only a few authors have attempted to an-
swer what it is to identify as (e.g.) a woman, black, disabled, and so on.4
And yet this project is important not only to ll out our picture of social
ontology, but also to explain particular social phenomena and pursue
political justice. Getting clearer on what social identities are and how
they relate to other social categories will elucidate the role that iden-
2 Li, David K. “‘I Identify as Black’: Rachel Dolezal Speaks out.” New York Post, 17
June 2015. Web. 31 Aug. 2015.
3 Wherever relevant, we assume that Dolezal’s statements can be taken at face value.
4 Most notably, among philosophers, Anthony Appiah and Sally Haslanger have
oered characterizations of social identity. We address their proposals in §4.5.
118
tities play in explanations of behaviors, beliefs, and perceptions, why
persons sometimes are praise- or blameworthy for adopting particular
social identities, and why we may have a prima facie obligation to allow
the formation of and subsequently respect social identities.
This paper aims to provide such clarication. On our proposed ac-
count, social identities are the self-identities wemake available to others
— they act as a bridge between our internal self-identication and our
preferred public perception. We begin by stating our theoretical goals,
then turn to a discussion of social roles and social practices, which are
the foundation of social identity. With these in place, we oer our ac-
count of social identity, and close by discussing some of its upshots.
4.1 Methodology
This section claries our project’smethodology. After describing and
contextualizing this methodology, we will turn to constraints guiding
our analysis of social identity.
4.1.1 Our Approach
We want clarity about social identities. In particular, we want to say
what they are and how they relate to nearby social categories. But some
preliminary terminological ground-clearing is necessary. The term ‘so-
cial identity’ is used in a number of ways. There is (perhaps) an everyday
meaning of the term, the meaning of the term in psychology (and par-
ticularly, in social identity theory), and themeaning of the term in other
philosophical accounts. The dierence in usage raises the question of
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how our use of the term compares.
We are not interested in the project of spelling out the everydaymean-
ing of the term ‘social identity’ (if there is one), or of entering a dispute
about what philosopher (or psychologist) has captured the truemeaning
of ‘social identity’. But neither is our project simply talking past other
usage of ‘social identity’. Our project is to propose a theory of social
identity that we think does better work than other theories. That is,
while our proposal and the alternatives all describe intelligible, some-
times overlapping notions, we think that our account is more successful
in light of the explanatory and normative work we think the concept
of social identity can and should do. And we rmly believe that this is a
legitimate approach to judging theoretical adequacy— as Elizabeth An-
derson puts it, “theories do more than represent facts — they organize
them for our use.”5,6
By analogy, consider the the concept of persons. The everyday con-
cept of persons is by and large restricted to human beings. Butmore and
more frequently, philosophers (and others) are presenting theories of
persons that suggest that this concept should be revised, and should ex-
tend to certain intelligent non-human animals such as primates. While
it seems that both the restricted and expanded concepts are intelligible,
those debating over conicting theories of persons need not be simply
talking past each other. Rather, they may be trying to determine which
concept is better suited to do the social, political, and perhaps moral
5 Anderson (1995, p.30)
6 This sentiment is also nicely echoed by David Plunkett and Alexi Burgess: “Our
conceptual repertoire determines not only what we can think and say but also, as a
result, what we can do and who we can be.” (Burgess and Plunkett, 2013, p. 1091)
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work that we want the concept of persons to do. And the reader is no
doubt familiar with similar debates over the concept of marriage, natu-
ral citizenship, sexual consent, and countless other concepts.
All this may sound well and good — we hope that it does — but it
doesn’t get us very far unless we say something about what ‘work’ we
want the concept of social identity to do. We turn now to this.
4.1.2 Criteria for a successful analysis of social identity
We hope our analysis will oer a simpler, more elegant explanation
of the target phenomena. More specically, we adopt the following con-
straints on a successful analysis of social identity.7
(i) Preserves intuitions regarding paradigm cases of social identity.
The rst constraint is, at bottom, assurance that a successful analysis
of social identity doesn’t change the subject. Recall that our methodol-
ogy is centered around the question what concept best serves the work
that we want a concept of social identity to do. A concept of social iden-
tity cannot serve these purposes by radically changing the subject. Re-
turn to the example of the concept of persons— if an analysis of persons
is to be successful, it had better deliver the result that you and I are both
persons. If the analysis says that only green-eyed brunettes who are 5’6”
are persons, something has gone terribly wrong. Wewanted the analysis
to best serve the explanatory and normative goals we have relative to a
particular kind of animal (e.g., animals withmoral status). If the analysis
7 Constraints (i) and (ii) mirror constraints found in Barnes (2016), an analysis of
disability.
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changes the subject — if it focuses on an entirely dierent subject — our
explanatory and normative goals are confused.
Similarly, when we look for a successful analysis of social identity,
we are looking for an analysis that serves explanatory and normative
goals relative to a kind of thing that, while likely admitting of vague-
ness and borderline cases, we can easily point to at the appearance of
paradigm cases. The particularly social nature of the target phenomena
makes our intuitions about them indispensable data points with respect
to both paradigm cases and theoretical aims.
(ii) Neatly explains the unity of and phenomena surrounding social identities.
Just by looking at paradigm cases, we see that social identities come
in a variety of forms. Social identities might concern socially salient
features, such as one’s race, gender, or sexual orientation. They might
also concern less salient features, such as one’s occupation, entertain-
ment choices, family position, or regular activities. What makes each
of these an identity? And what, if anything, distinguishes them from
non-social identities? A successful analysis of social identity will explain
what is uniquely social about these identities as well as distinguish them
from features of a person that do not qualify as identities at all. In other
words, the analysis must articulate a common basis of social identities.
An account thatmeets this condition will ontologically unify various in-
stances of social identity, while distinguishing them from nearby phe-
nomena. Moreover, it will allow us to disambiguate cases in which (e.g.)
an individual’s social identity comes apart from social perceptions (as in
the Dolezal case), or even comes apart from publicly recognized cate-
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gories (as, for example, at the beginning of some social movements).
In addition to explaining the unity of social identities, we expect a
successful account to explain phenomena surrounding social identities.
For example, what is the relationship between an individual’s social be-
havior and their social identity? How should we characterize situations
in which someone is not perceived to be or accepted as amember of the
group with which they socially identify? These explanations require a
robust understanding of social identities.
(iii) Allows and provides resources for normative evaluation of social identities.
We do not think that an analysis of social identity should immedi-
ately rule out normative evaluation of social identities. Whether certain
social identities are good, bad, or neutral is (we think) open to question.
Granted, we (usually) don’t choose to be (e.g.) black, gay, or disabled.8
But social identication leaves room for something further — some-
thing requiring the exercise of agency. Even if certain social identities
involve no particuar choice or other act of agency, why think agency is
not involved in having a social identity? as (e.g.) a Trekkie, a liberal, a
philosopher, or a gym rat? (Or, alternatively, why think that these can-
not qualify as social identities?) If agency can be involved, it seems that
we can make better or worse choices with respect to (at least some of)
our social identities. And, if social identities are subject to normative
evaluation, an account of social identity should also provide explana-
tory resources for that task.
8 We take it that this determinateness (often) applies to self-identication. See §4.3
for further discussion of the distinction between self- and social-identication.
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(iv) Explains our prima facie obligation to respect social identities and permit
their formation.
The normative evaluation of any particular social identity notwith-
standing, there is general agreement that social identities are important
(to various degrees) to individuals. Whether an identity is, for a partic-
ular individual, extremely important (as many racial or sexual orienta-
tion identities are) or less important (as one’s identity as a philosopher
or gym rat might be), social identities align not only with how an indi-
vidual sees themselves, but also how they would like to be seen by oth-
ers. (More on this later.) To the extent that social identity is a matter of
agency, our obligation to respect others’ autonomy goes hand-in-hand
with our obligation to respect the formation of social identities. Some-
times, the expression of identity will be harmful to others, and so should
be discouraged or prohibited—e.g., identity as a Klanmember or a drug
lord. Excepting these extreme cases, however, we seem to have a prima
facie obligation to respect individuals’ expression of their identities.
A successful analysis of social identity should provide a theoretical
basis for the intuition behind this obligation. This immediately rules
out concepts of social identities that are so broad as to permit (e.g.) mere
interests (such as hobbies) to count as social identities. It also rules out
concepts that are so narrow as to disacknowledge the social identities
of individuals in oppressed or minority groups. Finally, we note that
this condition puts pressure on accounts that construe social identities
as inevitable features of one’s psychology. While wemay be obligated to
permit the expression of inevitable identities, if an individual exercises
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agency in socially identifying with a particular group, it would be a frus-
tration of agency (and not only expression) to prohibit the formation of
that social identity.
4.2 The Foundation of Social Identity: Social Roles
Before we can understand social identities, we need to understand
the nearby social categories that shape and constrain them. In partic-
ular, we need to understand social roles — roughly, social positions that
individuals are sorted into when they are perceived as belonging to a
certain social category — and their relation to social identities. In this
section, we explore social roles, emphasizing their formation via social
practices and their central features.
4.2.1 Social Practices as the Basis of Social Roles
Our discussion of social roles begins with their formation. Here, we
follow Sally Haslanger’s proposal, on which social roles are social po-
sitions occupied by persons on the basis of their engagement in cer-
tain social practices.9 These practices, according to Haslanger, are con-
stituted by the interaction between humans and their resources. The
key elements of this interaction are broken down into two parts: shared
blueprints and resources.10 “Shared blueprint” is what we will call a com-
9 Haslanger (2016, §6). While we have some disagreements with details of
Haslanger’s account, we are in overall agreement that social roles are importantly con-
nected to social practices: the conditions for occupying a social role and these roles’
features will depend on practices.
10WhileHaslanger uses the term ‘schemas’, we think that ‘shared blueprints’ is amost
descriptively evocative term.
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munity’s collective interpretive guide for the world. This guide con-
sists of habits, concepts and beliefs that facilitate interpretation of so-
cial meaning. Because shared, these blueprints allow us to “interpret
and organize information and coordinate action, thought, and aect,”
(Haslanger, 2016, p. 126). They are public, they are the basis for be-
havioral and emotional dispositions, and they are resistant to updating.
And, most importantly, they allow us to have a coordinated, mutually
intelligible interpretation of and response to resources, which includes
anything taken to have (positive or negative) value. OnHaslanger’s view,
and the view we adopt here, our responses to resources — the way we
behave (and expect others to behave) regarding them and what we do
with them — create social practices. To better understand this mecha-
nism, consider a simple example:
Hillcrest Elementary’s schoolyard contains a large slide. Hill-
crest students all view the slide as a means of entertainment,
and they share a belief that going down the slide is, by far, the
best recess activity. As a result, they are willing to wait in long
lines to go down the slide, and will frequently trade their spot
in line for food or other toys. Moreover, they resent when oth-
ers cut in line, or take too long at the top of the slide.
Even this toy (sorry!) example describes a number of social practices
that might arise out of something so minor as a shared blueprint ac-
cording to which a playground slide is a desirable resource. From this
shared blueprint arises coordinated behavior (waiting in lines), thought
(trading resources), and even aect (resenting line-cutters).
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In most everyday examples, the variety of blueprints between dif-
ferent groups and cultures, as well as the vast number of ways in which
blueprints can direct our responses to resources,makes for amuchmore
complicated picture. As Haslanger points out, this is true of resources
as simple as an ear of corn:
An ear of corn can be viewed as something to eat, as a com-
modity to be sold, or as a religious symbol. In other words, we
can apply dierent [blueprints] to the object, and the [blueprints]
frame our consciousness and evaluation of the object. [They]
not only oer modes of interpretation, but license dierent
ways of interacting with the corn. Actions based on these dif-
ferent [blueprints] have an eect on the ear of corn qua re-
source, e.g., it might be cooked for food, or the kernels re-
moved to be shipped, or itmight be dried andhung in a promi-
nent place to be worshipped. (ibid.)
The various coordinated actions that we might take with respect to an
ear of corn and the shared attitudes or thoughts that we might have in
response to it can all constitute social practices.
Because resources can be anything that is viewed as valuable, we need
not limit ourselves to examples of toys or corn. For better or worse,
people place value on an enormous variety of things: art, literature,
skin color, personality traits, accents, stature, table etiquette, criminal
records, reproductive capacities, electronic currency, stock shares, and
on and on. The social world, on this picture, is a constant swirl of shared
blueprints and the entities that — according to those blueprints — are
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of value. Out of this mixing, we get habitual, shared, and coordinated
behavior, aect, and thought. We get social practices.
4.2.2 From Social Practices to Social Roles
Social practices, on the Haslangerian picture just described, establish
a structure of coordinated responses to resources. The fact that practices
establish this structure is essential to understanding what social roles are
and how they come to be. This is because, within the structure, we nd a
variety of social relations (or properties) stemming from practices. Exam-
ples include relations between persons (e.g., being a parent/child of, be-
ing a friend of, being an employer/employee of) and relations between
persons and things (e.g., exercising, eating, studying). These relations
need not be pairwise — having black skin is a social relation as is being
a triplet.11 By participating (willingly or unwillingly) in social practices,
we enter into these social relations. For example, when someone adopts
a child, they enter the relation of being a parent, because they partici-
pate in the social practice of taking adoptive adults to be parents of the
adopted child. Similarly, to participate in social practices surrounding
cocktail parties might mean that one will enter relations like dressing
up, drinking, or making small talk. And to participate in the social prac-
tices surrounding law and crime might mean that, if one is judged to
have performed a particular sort of action, they will lose some relations
(such as being a citizen) and gain new ones (such as being a prisoner).
11 Often, social relations will be grounded in non-social facts about individuals and
their relationships to others, as in the case of skin colors that are read as black and hair
colors read as blond. What makes these relations social, on this account, is that they
carry social meaning according to our shared social blueprints.
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Social roles correspond to social relations in two ways. First, we are
assigned social roles when we are perceived to stand in (or regularly en-
gage in) enough of the social relations relevant to that role. That is, it is
sucient for an individual to be perceived as being saturated by the set
of relations associated with a group.12
For example, it is plausible that a number of social relations are asso-
ciated with persons who are women, such as relations of dress, speech,
occupation, and presenting as female. It is not necessary that one is per-
ceived to stand in all of these relations to be perceived as a woman— it is
sucient to be perceived as standing in enough of these relations.13 Sec-
ond, being assigned a social role can in turn aect what social relations
we stand in.14 To esh this out, we will begin with some examples.
Being perceived as occupying certain positions in certain social re-
lations can immediately result in a new social role. Our rst example
picks out just this kind of role: Consider the many practices surround-
ing American football. Our shared blueprint with respect to football
leads to a number of shared behaviors, thoughts, and aects. Millions
12 This is not to suggest that every group has an associated social role. Rather, being
perceived as saturating the conditions for membership in a group will result in occu-
pying a role only where that collection of practices matters (to some degree) to some
surrounding social group.
13 We draw an analogy here with the notion of ‘genericity’ common in linguistics.
Generics are fault-tolerant constructions like “birds y”, for which the existence of
individuals that do not meet the description does not falsify the description. We take
it that many of the membership criteria for social roles are best understood as being
fault tolerant in a similar way.
14 On this point, we disagree with Haslanger, who requires both regular participation
in a social practice to have the corresponding social role, and who does not allow that
one can occupy a social role simply by virtue of being perceived to participate in a
social practice. This gap between participation and perceived participation will be
particularly important in our later discussion of ‘passing’ — that is, occupying a social
role without in fact having the corresponding social relation (e.g., a homosexual who
is perceived and so treated as a heterosexual, a black person who is perceived and so
treated as white). (See §4.5).
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of Americans attend football games, purchase team memorabilia, sell
and trade tickets, and feel elation and devastation based on game out-
comes. Out of these and other practices comes an array of social re-
lations, but central among them is the relation between a professional
football player and a professional football team. By signing a contract
with a professional football team, an individual (say, Dan Marino) im-
mediately comes to stand in this relation — one that is established by
the practices surrounding football.
Occupying this relation carries immense and immediate social force
when it is recognized by other persons. Upon signing, Marino became
subject to new expectations (such as attending practices and games),
gained new rights (such as a right to receive payment from the team),
and also gained a new social status as an athletic celebrity. These rights,
expectations, and status are all part of the social role of professional
football player. By occupying this role, Marino also entered into var-
ious social relations, such as being an employee and having fans.15
Other social relations result in social roles, but do not do so with the
same immediacy — rather, one takes on these roles by being perceived
to habitually and regularly stand in the social relations associated with
that role. Consider, for example, the social relation of organizing events.
In many academic departments, a small number of faculty members
regularly volunteer to organize department events. Occasionally enter-
ing into this relation may not aect their role in the department. But,
15Similar things can be said of the relations parent of, convicted of, or spouse of
— if perceived to occupy these relations, they typically immediately result in being
assigned a social role that brings along with it new social relations, expectations and/or
rights.
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by being perceived to consistently take on this task, a faculty member
may nd herself assigned a new social role: being an organizer. Occupy-
ing this social role will, in turn, relate one in new ways to other people
and things: it might become expected of those individuals that they will
organize events, they may face disproportionate disapprobation if they
fail to do so, they might be given access to event funds, and so on. And
all of this, we might imagine, will go along with occupying the role of
organizer, and will only come about when someone is perceived to reg-
ularly participate in practices surrounding the organization of events.
Organizing one event, in this sort of scenario, is not enough to be as-
signed the role of organizer.
Regardless of whether a social role is assigned immediately, or on
the basis of regular participation in a social practice, the structural re-
lationship between practices, relations, and roles is similar: participat-
ing in practices places one into social relations, and being perceived to
occupy (or regularly occupy) certain social relations may lead to being
assigned a corresponding social role. (We grant that it is a contingent
matter whether a given social group has a corresponding social role, or
more than one corresponding social role.) We can express this relation-
ship between social relations and corresponding social roles as follows:
In general, if the condition for occupying a certain position in a social
relation is having (enough of) properties P1 . . . Pn, the condition for
occupying a corresponding social role is being perceived and treated
as having (enough of) properties P1 . . . Pn.
Such assignment to a social role typically bringswith it additional norms,
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expectations, and rights regarding one’s behavior, thought and aect.16
For simplicity’s sake, we have been speaking as though a unique set of
relations is associated with each group throughout this section. This will
not always be the case, however. Rather, many groups (perhaps most)
will have distinct (though overlapping) sets of relations associated with
them. As a result, multiple social roles may be associated with a single
social group. And while we understand that this sketch of social roles
leave much of this complexity under-explored, we leave a richer exam-
ination to future work.
4.3 The Dimensions of Social Identity
With that view of social roles freshly in mind, we turn to the main
event: social identity. In this section, we aim to answer a number of
questions about social identity: What is a social identity? What does
it mean to have one? What is distinctly social about them? We begin
by dening criteria for possessing a social identity, then examine the
dimensions of the resulting concept.
16 It is worth noting that, on our proposed conception, being assigned a social role
does not require that the individual members of a social group possess sharply de-
ned concepts or linguistic labels of that role. Our responses to each other, including
the expectations and norms we place upon each, can occur wholly or partially unac-
knowledged or even unnoticed. For this reason (among others), articulation of social
phenomena is the goal of inquiry in social philosophy and the social sciences, rather
than its object: conceptualization or labeling is often unnecessary for the creation of
social roles, creating the project of discovering social roles and articulating their fea-
tures.
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4.3.1 Criteria for Possessing Social Identities
Social identities are a relation between individuals, their self-identity,
and social roles. They act as a kind of bridge between one’s internal
identication and their preferred public perception. As discussed in
§4.2, social roles are determinedbyhowwe are perceived by those around
us. But, this does not mean that we have no agency in the matter. Con-
sider, for example, a young man deciding whether to come out to his
parents as gay. For all they know, he is straight. So, he currently oc-
cupies the social role of being straight, at least at home. But, having
realized that he is gay, he comes to self-identify as gay.17 This inter-
nal identication is crucial to social identity, but it is the choice to come
out, the choice tomake that private identity public, thatmakes it a social
identity. This is the relationship at the core of social identity.
Of course, social identities may not have uptake. If the young man’s
parents ignore him or tell him that he’s merely confused, and then con-
tinue to ask after his girlfriend, they do not allow him to enter the so-
cial role of being gay. He has the social identity of being gay in virtue
of his actions, but lacks the role. Similarly, after being outed as hav-
ing white parents, Rachel Dolezal was no longer taken as being black,
despite asking to be. She ceased to occupy the social role despite still
self-identifying as black and still making that identity public — despite
still having the social identity.
From these cases, we can see that having a social role is neither nec-
17 This should not be taken to suggest that one must be correct about one’s social
group membership in order to self-identify as a member of the group. One can, for
example, self-identify as a Scotsman owing to misinformation about their place of
birth.
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essary nor sucient for having the associated social identity. Rather,
the following conditions, which we take to be necessary and jointly suf-
cient, give rise to social identities:
Self-identication
In order to have a social identity, one must self-identify
as a member of the group in question.
Role-directed Externality
In order to have a social identity,
a. (externality) one must, consciously or unconsciously,
make their self-identication externally available, whether
by engaging in certain behaviors or displaying certain
readily perceptible features, where those behaviors or
features outwardly conform (or, in certain cases, are
merely intended to conform) to the social blueprint
for a role associated with a particular group,18 and
b. (role-directedness) one must allow, or at least accept,
that others take them as occupying that social role as
a result of the fulllment of (a).
The self-identication condition states that, for example, one cannot
have the social identity of being gay without actually identifying as gay.
The role-directed externality condition adds to this that one cannot have
the social identity of, say, being a woman without outwardly engaging
18Note that this condition does not require that conforming to the role be intentional.
Most conforming behaviors, we take it, will be intentional, but not intentionally di-
rected at the role. Rather, they will be the result of internalized identities. In other
words, (a) merely requires that the behaviors that do conform to the role are non-
accidental.
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in social practices surrounding the ‘woman’ role (according to her in-
ternalized blueprint) and allowing others to take her as a woman as a
result. ‘Behaviors’ here includes not only actions, but also expressed at-
titudes, preferences, physical appearance, etc. Finally, these conditions
are cognitivist only to the extent that, in order to have a particular so-
cial identity, someone must possess the concept of the social role with
which they identify. These require a good deal of unpacking, of course.
We say more about each of these in turn.
Self-identication
Bill Clinton self-identies as aDemocrat. EllenDeGeneres self-identies
as a lesbian. George R. R. Martin self-identies as a fantasy author (and
probably a nerd). Each of these identities shapes the attitudes, beliefs,
and preferences of those who possess them. Moreover, each of these
individuals expresses a sort of armation of these identities and soli-
darity with the associated group. By contrast, while all three of them
would identify themselves as over 5’5”, it’s highly doubtful that any of
them self-identify with that trait in any meaningful sense.
While a thorough exploration of self-identication is beyond the scope
of this paper, we should say at least a few words about what it is to self-
identify with a social role. Common-sense notions of self-identication
abound, but perhaps the most common is the idea of the ‘true self’,
which is taken to be the instinctual source of creativity and authentic-
ity.19 We take this view to oversimplify our interaction with the shared
19Such views originate withWinnicott (1965).
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blueprints we encounter. It suggest a process of unconscious develop-
ment or discovery, as if the self is a fully-formed artifact merely await-
ing archaeological introspection. On this view, the obfuscated true self
is not subject to development through our choices (social or otherwise).
But this is clearly at odds with much of our experience.
Self-identifyingwith a social role, especially doing so strongly, changes
the individual we take ourselves to be. To see this, consider the dif-
ference that self-identication can make in the case of ethnic identity.
Suppose a pair of twins have some Native American heritage. The rst,
call her Anya, strongly self-identies as Native American. As a result,
she wishes to learn more about Native history, attends events aimed at
Native people, and participates in Native cultural activities. The second
twin would identify herself as Native American if asked, and perhaps
weakly self-identies as Native American, but does none of Anya’s cul-
tural study. These two women have very dierent self-identities.
This is dicult to explain on the “true self” view, however. To begin,
it is unclear how something like the “true self” could govern traits as nu-
anced and culturally developed as ethnic identity. Even granting that,
it is dicult to see how a true self view would explain the very dier-
ent self-identities of two people with such similar backgrounds without
resorting to the suggestion that one (or both) of them has gone wrong
somewhere along the line. On such an account, one of these women
should feel that she lacks authenticity and should be hiding her true
self. This, however, seems both unlikely and unjustly chastising.
If not the ‘true self’, however, then what?
The examples used above — e.g., Anya and Ellen — are instances of
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the sort of attitude we mean to pick out with the term “self-identity”. In
each case, what distinguishes self-identity from merely identifying-as
is a sense of kinship and solidarity. Individuals who self-identify with
a group see themselves tting it, as the sort of person who ought to be
in it, and they actively see themselves as a part of it (or a would-be part
of it, for cases in which public knowledge is necessary for membership
and those in which the group is not yet broadly recognized).
Richard Jenkins denes identication as “the systematic establish-
ment and signication, between individuals, between collectives, and
between individuals and collectives, of relationships of similarity and
dierence.”20 Our notion of felt ‘kinship’ picks out a similar process,
focusing instead on internally-directed perception of similarity. To feel
kinship with a social group is to see oneself as relevantly similar to other
members of the group. This feeling of kinship, in the sorts of cases we’re
looking at, goes hand-in-hand with solidarity.
More thanmere similarity, solidarity brings with it a governing sense
of unity. In Political Solidarity, Sally Scholz identies three central char-
acteristics of solidarity: it mediates between the group and the individ-
ual, acts as a form of unity, and entails positivemoral obligations. These
obligations, in the case of social solidarity are constituted by the felt obli-
gation to adhere to the customs, social mores, etc. that characterize and
unify a group.21 This is the sort of solidarity we have in mind.22
While more political forms of solidarity can (and often do) play a
20 Jenkins (2004, p. 19)
21 Scholz (2008, Ch. 1).
22 This solidarity is compatible with critical attitudes toward problematic (even, per-
haps, alienating) aspects of the groups with which we identify.
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role in our social identities, the vast majority of the obligations we feel,
in Scholz’ words, “accrue with groupmembership” and “pertain to day-
to-day responsibilities”.23 Together, kinship and solidarity give rise to a
sense thatwe are governedby the prescriptive ideals of our self-identities.
As a result, our attitudes andpriorities are shaped, in part, by self-identity.
Of course, the ability to see oneself as tting into a group and to ex-
perience solidarity with that group is inextricably bound to its shared
blueprint. In §4.2, we described these blueprints as interpretive guides
to social meaning, which consist of habits, concepts, and beliefs. Where
these blueprints are available, self-identifying with a group is seeing
oneself as the sort of person who does (or should) stand in the social
relations necessary to be part of that group. Where occupying a social
role involves being perceived by others as saturating the set of social
relations associated with a group, then, self-identifying with that role’s
social group involves perceiving oneself as saturating them.24
Some features of this explanation of self-identication areworth high-
lighting. First, as we just saw, groupmembership is not a necessary con-
dition on self-identity. If African ancestry is necessary for membership
in the social group of blacks, then Rachel Dolezal is not a member of
that group. Nevertheless, this does not prevent her from self-identifying
as black, however erroneous that may be.25 The question of what the
actual conditions for group membership are is distinct from the ques-
23 We take Scholz’ use of the term “group membership” here to be loose enough to
allow our reading. Scholz (2008, p. 21)
24What it takes to saturate a set of social relations is not the same across groups or
individuals. Some relations might seem necessary to one group, but completely un-
necessary to another.
25We discuss this case further in §4.4.
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tion of what it takes to have the corresponding self-identity. Second,
identifying-as is distinct from self-identication. We identify as many
things — a certain height and weight, a particular gender, a participant
in certain athletic activities, a True Fan of certain television shows, a
lover of various foods, etc — but very few of these properties are stal-
wart, persistent, or central enough to become part of our self-identity.
Most are merely properties we have. Third, self-identication varies in
strength. Both of the central features we’ve discussed, kinship and soli-
darity, can be felt to varying degrees. Finally, while feeling kinship and
solidarity requires having concepts of the relevant group, it does not re-
quire having a label for that group. That is, all one needs is an ability to
recognize the group and to recognize one’s own similarity with it.26
Role-directed externality
This is the feature that makes social identity social. There are two
aspects of role-directed externality: one’s behavior and one’s attitude
toward that behavior. We begin with externality.
The externality condition states that onemust outwardly conform or
intend to conform to the shared blueprint for the target social role, leav-
ing open that many social groups have multiple roles associated with
them and, therefore, multiple shared blueprints. Role-directed exter-
nality need not target more than one of those roles and need not occur
under the guise of conforming. We often unconsciously behave in ways
that conform to our social identities without any intention to do so.
26In this, we depart from Appiah (2005), who requires that social identity have a basis
in socially salient and labelled “kinds of persons”. We discuss Appiah further in §4.5.
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For example, someone with the social identity of a Trekkie must,
in some way, conform or intend to conform to the particular social
blueprint she’s internalized for Trekkies. That might mean that she at-
taches a Star Trek logo to her keychain, attends a fan club meeting, or
simply talks with others about the series. None of this behavior needs to
be undertaken by the agent under the guise of conforming to the relevant
blueprint. More often than not, these behaviors are merely byprod-
ucts of self-identifying with an internalized blueprint. This is clearly
the case, for example, formost cisgender women’s role-conforming be-
havior — seldom is wearing a skirt explicitly meant to conform to a
blueprint for ‘woman’.27
Sometimes, however, intentions do come into play. There are two
ways this might happen. First, someone might attempt to outwardly
conform with the relevant social blueprint, but have yet to gure out
exactly how to do so.28 Take, for example, a transgender woman who,
though she knows what she wants to do — adopt feminine manner-
isms and speech patterns for example — hasn’t yet mastered knowl-
edge of how to do it. In these cases, an attempt to conform to a so-
cial blueprint may fall short of in fact conforming. Such instances still
satisfy the externality condition. Second, intentions to conformmay be
forward-looking, involving partial planning for the future.29 This sort of
27Note also that ‘woman’ is a fairly clear case in which the role one identies with
may come apart from the role they are placed in, though they are associated with the
same group. In this case, the blueprint to which a particular woman is conforming is
unlikely to be associated with the same role that the editor for, say, Hustler Magazine
associates with women.
28 Without getting mired in debates surrounding knowledge how, it suces to say
that, insofar as knowledge-how and knowledge-that are independent, we should ex-
pect cases like this to be fairly common. (See Fantl (2014) for further discussion.)
29 Setiya (2015)
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forward-looking intention is sucient for social identity so long as the
role-directedness condition is met. This condition species an attitude
one must bear toward their action, namely that they allow and accept
others taking them as occupying the relevant social role as a result of
that intended behavior. So, in the case just mentioned, the woman in
question has a social identity as a woman only if, having expressed her
intention, she allows others to take her as a woman on the basis of those
intentions. Without this, she may still self-identify as a woman, but she
lacks the social identity. She is, colloquially speaking, in the closet.
It is also important to note that simply allowing others to take her as a
woman is not sucient formeeting this condition—shemust allowoth-
ers to take her as a woman as a result of her behavior or her intentions.
The connection between action and attitude is critical to the agential
nature of social identity, and marks another substantial distinction be-
tween social identity and social role. While social roles can be assigned
to us without our consent, social identities cannot. Thus, regardless of
how often people misgender a feminine-presenting genderqueer per-
son (for example, Ruby Rose), and regardless of whether they do so on
the basis of behavior that does outwardly conform to a social blueprint
for a role associatedwith the group ‘woman’, Rose’s refusal to accept that
gender role means that role-directedness is not met.
Finally, note that this condition does not require uptake. It may be
that no one in fact recognizes or accepts the individual’s social identity,
either because they do not take them to be a member of the relevant
social group, or because they assign to them a social role that, though
associated with that group, is not the one the individual identies with.
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In the case of the transgender woman who is trying but failing to actu-
ally conform, for example, she satises the role-directedness condition,
regardless of anyone else taking her to be a member of the social group
‘woman’. Similarly, early feminists such as Susan B. Anthony, who iden-
tied with a dierent role for women than the one assigned by the per-
vasive cultural blueprint, still satised the role-directedness condition,
even if they were unsuccessful in achieving their desired role.
Together, self-identication and role-directed externality give rise to
social identities. But, this relatively simple picture might belie the com-
plexity of social identity. Social phenomena, we reiterate, are messy.
Intention, allowing, and acceptance are attitudes that admit of border-
line cases. Someone who is just coming out as transgender, for exam-
ple, might well be uncomfortable with people taking her as a woman—
she might be a borderline case of accepting and allowing. In this case,
her social identity with respect to gender will be vague (though her self-
identity is not). This, we take it, is the correct result — insofar as these
phenomena are messy and that mess must nd some place in any ad-
equate theory of the target phenomena, this is an intuitive place for it.
Another way social identities aremore complex than we’ve suggested so
far is that they vary along several dimensions. We discuss these dimen-
sions in the next section.
4.3.2 Independence, stickiness, and context sensitivity
Social identity is not settled by groupmembership or assigned social
roles. We have already seen cases in which individuals’ social identity
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comes apart from both their social group and assigned social roles, but
this should not suggest that disparity between role and group needs to
be as fraught as these casesmight suggest. Take, for example, the case of
NPR’s Nancy Updike, who sincerely adopted the social identity of being
a lesbian despite, in fact, not being sexually attracted to women.30 Up-
dike’s social identity matched her social role and self-identication in
this case, but not her social group. Similarly, in a particularly quotidian
case, someone who appears very youngmight have the groupmember-
ship and social identity of a university student, but lack this social role
because no one interprets her as old enough to be in college.
In this way, role, identity, and group are independent, to an extent,
because social identity depends neither on how others perceive you, as
social role does, nor on social groupmembership. This is not to suggest
that these things cannot inuence social identity, however. Clearly, we
have some privileged, though not infallible, access to facts about our-
selves. Insofar as we correctly perceive things like the nature of our sex-
ual attractions, those facts are likely to inuence our social identity. In
addition, how others perceive us can have an eect on how we perceive
ourselves. Someone who has a social role of being straight — someone
who is perceived and socialized as straight — might disregard their at-
traction to members of the same sex, adopting a straight social identity
as a result. These inuences on the formation of an agent’s social iden-
tity can pull in opposite directions, mutually reinforce one another, or
be completely neutral. Regardless, they do not determine the social iden-
tities we end up with.
30 Ira Glass (2004, Prologue)
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There ismuchmore to social identities than the degree to which they
are inuenced by our roles and groups. The social identity of being a
Trekkie is dramatically dierent from that of being black or gay. Satis-
fying the goal of explaining the unity of social identities (desideratum
(ii) from §4.1) while at the same time respecting these dierences re-
quires that we recognize the dimensions of social identities: stickiness
and context sensitivity.
Stickiness
Social identities are often ‘sticky’, where stickiness is determined by
(i) the ease of entering and exiting the identity and (ii) the degree to
which the identity directs and constrains the individual’s behaviors, at-
titudes, and preferences. Sticky social identities are typically those for
which the behaviors, attitudes, or practices associated with the identity
are extremely salient to the individual, the identity is resistant to updat-
ing, or is especially value-laden to the individual.
Condition (i), that sticky social identities are dicult to enter or exit,
may obtain for myriad reasons. For example, the practices surrounding
some social identities may be particularly burdensome for an agent to
undertake. The practices surrounding gender, a social identity we take
to be paradigmatically sticky, make it dicult to enter or exit because
they are tied to things like developmental conditions and physically ob-
vious sex characteristics. Regardless of whether it ought to, the perva-
sive shared blueprint for gender relies on these features, and this re-
liance is partially responsible for the stickiness of gendered social iden-
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tities. Such features are dicult to even comprehend changing formany
people (even if it is relatively easy to change or minimize them) and the
social practices surrounding themmay strictly prohibit changing them.
By contrast, social identities like being a runner have, for most people,
no such hurdle. The practices one needs to engage in are clear and ac-
cessible. It is, however, worth pausing to note that entering or exiting
the social identity of being a runner will be dicult for some people —
a transradial amputee, for example,must go through a dicult, complex
process to obtain a prosthetic limb capable of supporting her runs. The
stickiness of a social identity, then, is not uniform across individuals.
The degree to which an identity constrains behavior, attitudes, and
beliefs contributes to its stickiness because our self-identication with
these traits, along with their externality, becomes ingrained — we be-
come accustomed, for example, to dressing in a certain way or holding
certain attitudes. These habits can be dicult to change, even when one
means to. Their being deeply ingrained in this way can arise from ex-
ternal pressure tomaintain them, the duration over which one has had a
social identity, or the presence of surrounding social practices that pres-
sure one to socially identifywith a role uponbeing assigned to it. For this
reason, social identities that correspond to social roles with strong social
momentum (such as those pertaining to familial relationships, gender,
race, and socioeconomic states) are more likely to be sticky.31
31Alco (2005) argues that gendered and racial social identities are distinct from all
other social identities because these identities are embodied. We think that, if there
is such a distinction between these and other identities, it will be better captured in
terms of degrees of stickiness.
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Context Sensitivity
Our social identities dier across our social contexts. Among friends,
our politics are laid bare. At work, we aremore cautious andmore diplo-
matic. At church, we take no pains to let others know a “deviant” sexual
orientation, but at University, we might slap rainbow stickers on our
laptops or join a queer student group.
Consider Paul, a freshman at St. Pius High School. Paul has a strict
Catholic family, a strong church community, andhappens to self-identify
as gay. In such a situation, despite the fact that he might have a small
group of friends outside of the school to whom he is out, the vast ma-
jority of his social life involves him passing as straight. In other words,
in the social context of his Church, Paul’s social identity includes being
Catholic, a high school student, a man, etc., but does not include being
gay. Among close friends — a very dierent social context — his social
identity includes his being gay as well.
So, while our self-identities may be consistent across our social con-
texts, our social identities can dier. Of course, some social identities will
show up more frequently than others. We take it that very sticky iden-
tities like race and gender may show up in all contexts. This, however,
will not be the true in certain cases. For example, a closeted transgen-
der individual might choose very carefully the social contexts in which
they have a gendered social identity (as opposed to merely passing as
the gender with which they do not identify).
We take these to be the critical features of social identities. In the next
section, we discuss this explanatory power it aords.
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4.4 Upshots
This section is devoted to discussing the explanatory upshots of our
account of social identities. We rst will show that, with this account
in hand, we can constructing robust, structural explanations of persons’
behaviors, as well as discrimination against persons with particular so-
cial identities. We will then turn to other types of explanation, and
show that our account is capable of dissolving some puzzles surround-
ing ‘passing’, as well as explaining our moral and political obligations
concerning social identities.
4.4.1 Structural Explanation of Behavior and Discrimination
We have argued that social identities should be understood as having
two components: self-identication and externality of that identity. In
particular, we emphasized that social identities reveal agents chosen ori-
entation toward particular social roles on the basis of self-identication.
The account then, describes social identities as pertaining to psychologi-
cal features and individual agency, butwithin constraints of the available
(or potentially available) social roles. On one hand, this is to make the
fairly mundane point, emphasized by many philosophers, that choice
is exercised within constrained options. But it also allows us to provide
structural explanations of how individuals behaviors relate to their so-
cial identities, as well as of why there is persistent discrimination against
persons with particular social identities, even when this discrimination
is unintentional.
Before exploring these explanations, we should rst introduce our
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understanding of a structural explanation. Here, we again follow (Haslanger,
2016, p. 2), who provides the following lucid description of the dier-
ence between local and structural explanations:
Suppose I am playing ball with my dog. I stu a treat into a
hole in the ball and throw it for him. The ball goes over the lip
of a hill and rolls down into a gully. Why did the treat end up
in the gully? If we imagine the trajectory of the treat alone...it
would be a huge task to explain the particular events that de-
termined each of its movements. A much easier explanation
would be to point out that the treat was inserted into a ball
that was thrown and rolled down the hill into the gully. In this
latter explanation, we explain the behavior of the treat by its
being part of something larger whose behavior we explain.
Haslanger here illustrates the key feature of a structural explanation
of behavior: rather than limiting focus to the individual whose behav-
ior we want to explain, we look to the system in which the individual is
embedded for clues about how their behaviors were constrained. Such
explanation can be tting, then, for something so minute as why you
extend a hand when rst meeting someone. A useful explanation of this
action will not simply focus on your armmovements and the neurolog-
ical processes. Rather, it will explain the social meaning of this action
(and the lack of this action) — that is, it is considered polite to shake
someone’s hand when rst meeting, and impolite to not to do so.
We think that a similar style of explanation is most useful when we
want to explain individuals’ social behavior more generally. Recall the
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metaphorical shared ‘blueprints’ discussed earlier—a community’s col-
lective interpretive guide for the world, consisting of shared habits, con-
cepts, and beliefs that facilitate interpretation of socialmeaning. Among
the many important results of shared social meaning are what we have
been calling ‘social roles’. And, with this in mind, we can begin to see
why a structural explanation of individual social behavior is available.
Social interactions, on our account, are at least in part driven by per-
sons’ social identities, because social identities are the externalization
of self-identication with a social role. But, if we want to predict or ex-
plain someone’s behavior, we suspect that it may not be illuminating to
merely point to their mental states in isolation — instead, we will need
to explain the social signicance of roles with which they identify.
For example, suppose a heterosexual couple, call them Jared andHolly,
walks into an autobody shop. Even though they both know nothing
about cars, Jared walks up to the mechanic to ask about the car, while
Holly stays behind. In order to explain these behaviors, it isn’t satisfac-
tory to simply point to their self-identications. So what if Jared identi-
es as aman, andHolly as a woman? The heart of the explanation lies in
the connection between these self-identications and the social mean-
ing of the roles with which they self-identify. By looking at what the
most pervasively shared blueprint says about how a man (or a woman)
should behave or what he/she ought to know, (e.g., he should act as-
sertively and know things about cars), we begin to understand Jared’s
and Holly’s behaviors. Persons who socially identify with a group will
feel subject to prescriptive ideals and expectations of that group (as de-
termined by the particular blueprint they’ve internalized), may experi-
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ence stereotype threat associated with that identity, and can be expected
to perform behaviors that align with their social identities.
Importantly, this can also allow for a better explanation of behaviors
by persons who self-identify with a social role that is not widely recog-
nized. One author, who identies as genderqueer andpresents androgy-
nously, frequently and intentionally lowers their voice when interacting
with strangers who take them to bemale in order not to spare them con-
fusion and embarassment. This action also can be explained by looking
to the combination of structural and psychological features: because the
most pervasively shared blueprint has no recognized role correspond-
ing to their self-identity, they choose to pretend to be something that
they are not. Such structural explanations of how social identities inu-
ence behaviors are, we think, incredibly illuminating.
Our account of social identities also allows us to pinpoint and struc-
turally explain certain forms of discrimination. That is, rather than fo-
cusing only upon individual biases (implicit or explicit), we think that
important forms of discrimination occur at the structural level. The
most familiar kind of structural discriminations aect persons who oc-
cupy particular social roles or social groups— for example, hiring prac-
tices that are discriminatory against persons take to bewomen andblacks,
building codes that discriminate against disabled persons, and so on.
A less apparent form of structural discrimination targets persons with
certain society identities, insofar as they frustrate persons’ attempts to
occupy the corresponding social role.
One glaring example of this in the current American healthcare sys-
tem is the availability of medical treatment that transgender women
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need in order to occupy social roles associated with the group ‘woman’.
Consider the following newspaper article excerpt about a transgender
woman named Alena:
To be able to [be taken to be a woman], she requires a steady,
aordable supply of prescription hormones— something im-
possible to come by in Albany. Alena nds herself in a double-
bind that makes securing aordable prescription hormones
for transition virtually impossible. She is one of 600,000Geor-
gians who have been left uninsured for healthcare as a result
of the Republican state’s refusal to expand Medicaid under
Barack Obama’s Aordable Care Act... Even if she were en-
titled to Medicaid, Georgia — along with 15 other states —
specically excludes health coverage for transition-related treat-
ment, so she wouldn’t get anything anyway.32
This form of explanation is structural — even if everyone surround-
ingAlenawaswithout explicit or implicit bias against transwomen, these
policies discriminate against her. And, importantly, they are not dis-
criminatory against her for being assigned male at birth, or for self-
identifying as a woman, or for her social role (which is, unfortunately,
that of aman). They are discriminatory precisely against her social iden-
tity, given that she was assigned male at birth. That is, these policies
target persons who were assignedmale at birth, but who self-identify as
women and so are trying to occupy the corresponding social role. And
the policies cause a grave injustice by preventing these women from ac-
32Pilkington (2015)
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cessing aordable healthcare that would facilitate their gender role tran-
sition. Additionally, this level of analysis is valuable because it sidesteps
ontological issues concerning what it means to be a woman. While both
authors take transgender women to be women, it is nevertheless clear
that public debate over this ontological question often impedes progress
in rectifying cases like Alena’s. On our account, this is a red herring —
because social identity does not depend on social group membership,
the ontological question is irrelevant.
Similar structural discriminations can be seen in (e.g.) identication
requirements that prevent persons fromwearing certain religious cloth-
ing such as burqas, or laws that prevent homosexual persons from get-
ting married or adopting foster children. All of these practices system-
atically target persons with self-identities who are attempting to be seen
by others in accordance with those identities.
4.4.2 Explaining Identity Passing
In addition to the structural explanations discussed above, our ac-
count of society identity has the virtue of being able to contribute to
two ongoing debates in social ontology.
The rst concerns a phenomenon known as ‘passing’. Passing is stan-
dardly described as occurring when a person is taken — even consis-
tently taken — to be part of a social group to which they do not belong.
Here are two high-prole examples:
• Rachel Dolezal living as a black woman for years, despite having
no black ancestry.
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• Caitlyn Jenner (prior to ‘coming out’) living as man called ‘Bruce’,
despite not being a man.
Although these particular examples are controversial, the possibility
(and frequency) of passing is not. However, we think that the standard
description of passing (seen above) is ambiguous. In particular, it does
not distinguish between two importantly dierent (though potentially
overlapping) kinds of passing.
When we say that someone is a man, what is picked out by ‘is’: group
membership, role occupation, or social identity? By disambiguating
these possibilities, we discover that passing occurs in two forms:
Group Passing: An individual group passes when they occupy
a social role associated with a social group to which they do
not belong.
Identity Passing: An individual identity passes when they oc-
cupy a social role associated with a self- or social identity that
they do not have.
In many cases, both group and identity passing occur. But these can
occur separately, so it is important for that a social ontology be able
to describe and explain both phenomena. Consider, for example, ve-
year-old Dolezal — arguably, she was a member of the group of white
persons, and she occupied the corresponding social role. Nonetheless,
even at this age, Dolezal reports that she expressed a self-identication
as black. We might say, then, that while Dolezal did not ‘group pass’ as
white because she really did belong to the social group of white peo-
ple, she did ‘identity pass’ as white because her social identity was black.
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The aforementioned case of Nancy Updike provides another useful ex-
ample here. While she identied as a lesbian, she was ‘group passing’
as a lesbian to those who knew and accepted that identity because, as
she explained, she was wrong about belonging to that social group. But,
she was not ‘identity passing’ as a lesbian at that time because her social
identity really was that of a lesbian.
4.4.3 Moral Explanation
The previous discussion was of ways that our account of social iden-
tities explained observable phenomena surrounding social identities.
We now turn to another dimension of explanation: that of moral facts.
Specically, we think that our account can explain both the moral sig-
nicance of persons’ social identities — that is, that we can bear respon-
sibility for them— and a prima faciemoral obligation to permit the for-
mation of social identities, and allow persons to occupy the social roles
that correspond to their identities.
Let’s begin, then, with our responsibility for social identities. Two
things strike us as wrongheaded ideas about our social identities: (a) that
they are not morally evaluable (or always good) just because they are a
chosen expression of self-identity, or (b) that they are notmorally evalu-
able because we have no control over these identities. The reason why
we dismiss the rst suggestion is, in a way, simple: social identities are
(in part) ways of being in the world. And we think that there are bet-
ter and worse ways of being in the world. Consider this example from
Anthony Appiah:
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[Suppose] I adopt a life as a solitary traveler around the world,
[and] my parents tell me that I am wasting my life... You don’t
have to be a communitarian to wonder whether it is a satisfac-
tory response to say only that I have considered the options
and this is the way I have chosen... It is one thing to say that
[others] ought not to stop you from wasting your life if you
choose to; but it is another to say that wasting your life in your
own way is good just because it is your way. (p. 14)
Appiah’s tale illustrates that, assuming we have some choice in the
way that we live, it is not a carte blanche justication to say ‘I live this
way because it’s how I see myself as meant to live’. Our actions are not
performed in a bubble — someone who wastes their education and tal-
ent harms themselves and others, even if indirectly.33 And certainly, to
use a more extreme example, we would all agree that, no matter how
much someone self-identies as a white supremacist, it would be better
for them to keep it to themselves, rather than express this identity with
their words and actions.
This tale also illustrates why we reject the second thought — that we
are not responsible for our social identities because we have no say in
what those identities are. We admit that (at least in many cases) persons
might have no control over their self-identications. But, because we
hold to the idea that persons exercise agency over what they do and say,
we are committed to the idea that we exercise agency in the develop-
33 Nagel (1979, p. 5) picks out a similar point, observing that someone who “wastes
his life in the cheerful pursuit of a method of communicating with asparagus” is not
living well, despite being happy.
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ment of social identities. And this is just because, on our model, social
identities are formed when an agent externalizes self-identication.34
Because agency and acceptance (within social constraints) is central
to our understanding of social identities, it also explains why it seems
that we have a prima facie obligation to allow the formation of and re-
spect persons’ social identities.35 When the exercise of agency does not
cause signicant harm to others, we ought not prevent it, even if the
agent is making a poor or unwise choice. Discrimination against per-
sons who express non-typical identities, such as male-assigned persons
expressing feminine identities, persons expressing queer identities, etc.
that prevents them frombeingwilling to express their self-identications
(ie., form a social identity) violates their agency.
Similarly, both individual biases and structural features (such as the
ones described above) that prevent someone from having mobility be-
tween social roles can also violate agency, as in Alena’s case. (Of course,
there may be situations in which someone’s social identity cannot or
should not be accommodated: persons who identify as Vikings or Nazis
strike us as examples of both kinds.) In addition, it may perpetuates
harmful social roles that would be bettered by allowing the role to be
determined by persons who socially identify with the relevant group.
This latter thought is captured byWesleyMorris in his recent New York
34 This is not to suggest that the social practices surrounding certain roles (in partic-
ular, many of the very sticky roles such as race and gender) do not exert substantial
pressure on individuals to adopt social identities corresponding to those roles.
35This is again nicely illustrated by Appiah’s statement that, “It is one thing to say
that the government or society or your parents ought not to stop you from wasting
your life if you choose to; but it is another to say that wasting your life in your own
way is good just because it is your way, just because you have chosen to waste your
life.”
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Times article, “The Year We Obsessed Over Identity”:
[I] wonder if being black in America is the one identity that
won’t ever mutate. I’m someone who believes himself to have
complete individual autonomy, someone who feels free. But
I also know some of that autonomy is limited, illusory, condi-
tional. I live knowing that whatevermyblacknessmeans tome
can be at odds with what it means to certain white observers,
at any moment. So I live with two identities: mine and others’
perceptions of it.
Here, Morris describes a situation in which his social identity cor-
responds to a social role associated with blackness, (i.e., “others’ per-
ceptions of [his identity]”), that diers from the role that he identies
with. And presumably, we would all be better o if we allowed the so-
cial role of black persons to be determined by persons who identify as
black, rather than by ‘white observers’. The latter has gotten us less than
nowhere.
Similarly, it is reasonable to think that we would do well to (continue
to) expand the social roles for ‘women’ to accommodate thosewho iden-
tify as women. As we have seen over the last 5-10 years in America,
changing the entry conditions for a social role can in turn aect the ev-
eryday concept of the associated group that ts that role. That is, by
changing who will be seen as a woman, we aect our everyday concept
of what a woman is, shifting it away from a biological concept toward an
identication concept.36 Our concepts and their associated social roles
36 Depending on one’s view about the relationship between concepts and social
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seem to be, in this respect, situated in a feedback loop, with changes to
one aecting the other. And so, we would like to suggest, it may be that
accommodating agents’ social identities can have positive eects far be-
yond the individual, and may in some cases further the cause of social
justice bymaking our social roles (i) more inclusive, and (ii) determined
to a greater extent by persons occupying them.
We are, of course, only touching upon huge themes of structural ex-
planation, individual and group agency, social justice, and inclusivity.
These themes would require many more pages to explore in detail, but
we hope to have motivated the idea that our account of social identities
has a wide breadth of explanatory power.
4.5 Alternative Accounts
Now that we have motivated and described our proposed account of
social identities, we will briey explain why we found the two promi-
nent philosophical accounts of social identities unsatisfying. In particu-
lar, we will address accounts proposed by Sally Haslanger and Anthony
Appiah, and explain why we think that our view is preferable. It is im-
portant to note that, because we are not wedded to the idea that there is
one one ‘correct’ understanding of identity, we are not out to argue that
Haslanger’s or Appiah’s proposals are incorrect; rather, we are out to ar-
gue that our proposal is a viable theoretical alternative and best serves
the suggested purposes for the concept of social identity.
kinds, we expect there will be varying views about how these shifts to our everyday
concepts may or may not additionally change what the social kind in fact is.
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4.5.1 Appiah & ‘Kinds of Persons’
Let’s begin by looking at Appiah’s account. In his book The Ethics of
Identity, Appiah proposes an understanding of social identity that does
not distinguish between what we have been calling ‘psychological’ iden-
tity and ‘social’ identity. His view can be broken down into roughly two
parts: kinds of persons, understood as ‘ways of being’, and identication
with those kinds.
Appiah emphasizes that each of us, in the one life that we have to live,
is faced with certain constraints on the kind of persons we can be, and
that these constraints shape our social identities. Says Appiah:
In constructing an identity, one draws, among other things, on
the kinds of person available in one’s society. Of course, there
is not just one way that gay or straight people [etc.] are to be-
have, but there are ideas around...about how gay [or] straight
[etc.] people ought to conduct themselves. These notions pro-
vide loose norms or models, which play a role in shaping our
plans of life. [Social] identities, in short, providewhatwemight
call scripts: narratives that people can use in shaping their
projects and in telling their life stories. (p. 21-2)
OnAppiah’s picture, then, to have a social identity requiresmodeling
one’s life according to a shared narrative about how a certain kind of
person’s life ought to go, be it a woman, a black person, a lesbian, a
philosopher, or an American. To construct a social identity is to use the
corresponding narrative as a “norm or model” for one’s life.
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Regarding kinds of persons, Appiah follows Ian Hacking in think-
ing that, in order to intentionally act as (e.g.) a woman, an American,
etc., one must bear the label associated with that group and understand
one’s actions under a description employing that label. And because
(as mentioned above) Appiah understands the construction of a social
identity as using a particular narrative as a norm or guide for one’s life,
intentionally acting in accordance with these narratives is a necessary
condition for creating a social identity. For this reason, Appiah argues
that labels “mold” identication, because it is by referencing these labels
that people think that something-or-other is appropriate to being (e.g.)
a woman, an American, etc.
In sum, on Appiah’s view, by internalizing social group labels that we
bear as part of our identities — and so, shaping our lives in accordance
with the narratives associatedwith these labels—we come to have social
identities.
4.5.2 Response
We agree with much of Appiah’s view on social identities. For ex-
ample, we agree with Appiah that social identities involve identication
with a certain social group. We also agree that social identities are agen-
tial in that they involve more than mere internal identication with a
group — they also involve taking certain actions that express that inter-
nal identication.
Despite these substantial points of agreement, there are two impor-
tant respects in which we think that Appiah’s account of social identities
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frustrate the proposed purposes for the concept of social identity.
The rst concerns Appiah’s requirement that one bear the label of
the group that one socially identies with. This requirement, as Appiah
notes later, means that one belongs to the group of persons that one
identies with, and is seen by others as belonging to that group.
This requirement on possessing a social identity has two negative ef-
fects. To see this, consider two kinds of cases:
1. Someone identies with a certain group, but is restricted because
of (e.g.) social discrimination from joining it, and
2. Someone identies with and belongs to a certain group, but is not
acknowledged as belonging to the group.
Examples of the rst sort of case might include (e.g.) a young boy who
identies as a dancer, but is then prevented fromdancing by his parents,
or someone like Rachel Dolezal, who (for a period of time) both iden-
tied as and was taken to be black, but was not in fact black. Examples
of the second sort of cases might include (e.g.) a bisexual woman who
identies as bisexual, but is presumed to be straight because she is dat-
ing a man, or a light-skinned black person who identies as black, but is
presumed to be white by others.
The rst thing to notice is that Appiah is unable to explain these
seemingly paradigm cases of social identity. On his account, none of
the people in the above cases in fact have the social identity that they
appear to have. The second and related thing to notice is that, in these
cases, Appiah’s view might be used to justify dismissing persons’ iden-
tities as delusional or insignicant. Take, for example, the case of a bi-
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sexual woman who is assume by others to be straight because of dating
a man. Her social identity, on Appiah’s view, must be dierent than her
social identity would be if (e.g.) she were single and others took her at
her word when she said that she is bisexual. But it is undeniably im-
portant as a matter of justice that her social identity can be the same,
regardless of whether that social identity has uptake.
Our second point of concern lies with Appiah’s severe restriction of
the number of available social identities. The reason for this restriction
lies in the connection Appiah makes between social identities and ‘ways
of being’ or ‘kinds of person’. OnAppiah’s view, the other available social
identities are identities corresponding to kinds of persons. But the only
kinds of persons are those kinds for whom we have a denoting term in
public discourse.
We think that there is good reason to not restrict social identities to
ones formed in response to a person’s being attributed (and self-attributing)
a publicly available label. This view prevents Appiah from capturing
cases of social identity when there is no widely-recognized social group,
because a social movement is in its early stages. No doubt, the rst per-
sons to identify as transgender or feminist found themselves in this po-
sition. Regardless of whether they had a label associatedwith their iden-
tity, and regardless of the fact that there was no culturally shared nar-
rative for that identity, they began social movements by forging new
narratives, and so new social groups. That is, these social identities were
formed (in part) as an attempt to change the available social roles, and
not in response to pre-established roles. Not only does this failure con-
ict with our intuitions about seemingly paradigm cases of social iden-
162
tity, but they additionally undercut the political importance of respect-
ing social identities when possible and permissible.
4.5.3 Haslanger & Internalized Maps
Haslanger’s view of social identity diers dramatically fromAppiah’s.
Focusing upon racial identities in particular, Haslanger argues that racial
identities are not just due to acting upon internalized terms, but instead,
are “deeply embodied.” She argues:
Important components of racial identity...are somatic, largely
habitual, regularly unconscious, often ritualized. Our racial
identities deeply condition how we live our bodies and relate
to other bodies. Individuals are socialized to become embod-
ied subjects, not just rational, cognitive agents; so race and
gender socialization isn’t just a matter of instilling concepts
and indoctrinating beliefs, but are also ways of training the
body-training the body to feel, to see, to touch, to fear, to love.
I do not claim that our identities are entirely non-cognitive,
but to focus entirely on the cognitive, especially the inten-
tional, is to miss the many ways that we unintentionally and
unconsciously participate in racism and sexism. (Haslanger,
2012a, p. 284-5)
Combining this requirement for a more “embodied” account of so-
cial identity, along with a further requirement for an account that does
not see social identities as having an ‘on/o’ switch, but as coming in
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degree, Haslanger proposes that we understand social identity as con-
sisting of a variety of features that one can have to a greater or lesser
degree. For example, she suggests that a satisfactory account of racial
identity might include the following as dimensions of racial identity:
• unconscious somatic (routine behaviors, skills, and “know-hows”)
• unconscious imaginary (unconscious self-image/somatic image)
• tacit cognitive (tacit understandings, tacit evaluations)
• perceptual (perceptional selectivity, recognitional capacities)
• conscious cognitive (fear, apprehension, attraction, sense of com-
munity)
• normative (aesthetic judgments, judgments of suitability or appro-
priateness, internalized or not?) (ibid., p. 290)
On Haslanger’s view, we should prefer an account of social identities
on which these identities are a sort of map that organizes and guides us
with respect to social groups. So, Haslanger argues, someone need not
have internalized the label ‘white’ to have a white racial identity; it is
enough that their ‘map’ is, to continue the metaphor, a white map. That
is, it organizes and guides them to behave, think and perceive charac-
teristically as a white person. While such a person might disavow their
white identity, and refuse the corresponding label, they will still have a
white identity, according to Haslanger. Social identities are not somuch
about what we take ourselves to be or want ourselves to be; they are
more about the way we in fact are.
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4.5.4 Response
Like Appiah, Haslanger seems to presume that having a society iden-
tity as (e.g.) a white person requires that one both is white and is recog-
nized by others as being white. Because this isn’t an essential parts of
her picture, though, and because we discussed above our worries about
these requirements, we will set this issue aside.
But, having set that aside, we have two remaining worries. Both trace
back to her strongnon-cognitivismabout social identity, which is clearly
seen in her claim that one can have a social identity that they disavow, so
long as the map guiding their behavior is associated with that identity.
This strongly suggests that Haslanger does not require that someone
self-identify with a certain group in order to have the social identity
corresponding to that group.
We do not deny that the phenomenon that Haslanger pinpoints is a
real and important phenomenon. However, we think that is is a mistake
to call this ‘social identity’, rather than distinguishing it both from what
we have termed psychological identity, and the external expression of
those identities — i.e., ‘social identities’ on our terminology. We assume
what Helen Longino calls the theoretical virtue of “ontological hetero-
geneity” — that is, the virtue of emphasizing distinctions between qual-
itatively diverse subjects.37 And we think that conation of automatic
social responses, (to some degree) cognitive awareness of self-identity,
and the expression of those identities under a single term ends up cre-
ating two diculties. First, it hinders the account from being able to
37 Longino (1990)
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neatly explain the relation between these somatic, incultured responses
to one’s environment, one’s psychological sense of groupbelonging, and
one’s expression of agency with respect to that psychological sense. As
a result, the account will also have a more dicult route to explaining
phenomenon surrounding these distinct states, such as identity passing
or transitioning. In early stages of gender transitioning, for example,
a transgender women might have the automatic responses associated
with the gender she was assigned at birth, but importantly, we would
not want to say that she still has the social identity of a man.
Cases of transitioning also bring the second worry about Haslanger’s
account to the fore. In its reaction to Appiah’s cognitivism, this account
completely removes agency from the picture of social identity. Bymak-
ing this move, we think it ends up undercutting many of the political
goals that we take to be motivating our account of social identity. Social
identities, on our view, are not so much about the way we in fact are,
but what we take and want ourselves to be. We think that an account
of social identity should emphasize the importance of respecting per-
sons’ social identities by recognizing them as an expression of agency,
and so enabling (when possible) the person to (continue to) occupy the
associated social role.
That is not to say that we think Haslangerianmaps are completely up
to us. But we also do not think that they are inexible and permanent
— we can, to some extent, revise our maps. That is, while we reject
the idea that we build ourselves from scratch, we also reject the idea
that we have no say in who we are — we exercise agency, even though
we exercise agency within social structures that signicantly constrain
166
our options. Persons demanding recognition of new gender or sexual
identities, or personswho (e.g.) have implicitly racist responses to others
but who are attempting to change these responses, are doing something
incredibly important in rejecting their incultured maps. On our view,
it is important to reserve the term ‘social identity’ for the lives they are
attempting to lead, the lives they mean to lead — without it, we are left
without a category that can gure in our political exhortations to remove
discrimination and other injustices that prevent persons from revising
these maps. That is, by relegating identity to a somatic realm, there is
no clear way to pinpoint the harm that is done in preventing the success
of someone’s expressed desire for a dierent social role.
4.6 Conclusion
In the above, we present a theory of social identities that we argue
does better explanatory and normative work than its competitors. On
this theory, social identities are understood as role-directed externalities
of one’s self-identication with members of a social group.
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